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Administrative Law.  McAninch v. State of R.I. Dept. of Labor and 
Training, 64 A.3d 84 (R.I. 2013).  The Superior Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals, and the Superior Court Rule of 
Civil Procedure that extends the last day in computing any time period to 
any day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, applies to such 
appeals. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On June 30, 2009, the last day of the Providence Public 
Library’s (hereinafter “the PPL”) fiscal year, the PPL terminated 
thirty-eight union and eight nonunion employees.1  Subsequently, 
on July 9, 2009, Karen McAninch (hereinafter “McAninch”), the 
business agent for the United Service and Allied Workers of Rhode 
Island (USAW-RI) and representative for the union employees of 
the PPL, filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and 
Training (hereinafter “the DLT”) alleging that the PPL failed to 
pay these employees a total of $149,482.82 in accrued vacation 
pay.2  The PPL argued that employee vacation pay did not accrue 
until July 1, 2009, the beginning of their new fiscal year, and, as 
none of the thirty-eight workers were still employees as of that 
date, they were not entitled to vacation pay.3 
The DLT held a hearing on July 8, 2010, at which the hearing 
officer found that the employees were not entitled to vacation 
pay.4  On October 12, 2010, McAninch filed a complaint seeking 
Superior Court review of the DLT’s decision in favor of the PPL.5 
On October 5, 2011, the trial justice sua sponte dismissed 
McAninch’s appeal, finding that the Superior Court did not have 
 1.  McAninch v. State of Rhode Island Department of Labor and 
Training, 64 A.3d 84, 85 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id.  As support, McAninch argued that the PPL/USAW-RI collective 
bargaining agreement and the PPL employee handbook stated that the 
employees would be entitled to this accrued pay.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
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subject matter jurisdiction because McAninch had not filed a 
timely request for review.6  Under the language of § 42-35-15(b), 
McAninch had thirty days from September 9, 2010, the date the 
DLT mailed its decision to the parties, in which to file her 
complaint with Superior Court.7  The thirty day filing window 
ended on October 9, which fell on the Saturday of Columbus Day 
weekend in 2010.8 McAninch contended that she filed the 
complaint first on October 12 when it was hand-delivered to the 
clerk’s office and again when the identical complaint was mailed 
on October 8.9  However, the clerk’s office did not record it as filed 
until October 13.10 
In dismissing the case, the trial justice noted several issues.  
First, she found that administrative appeals are similar to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of Superior Court decisions 
and, since time limitations to the Court are “mandatory,” “Rule 6 
of the [Superior Court] Rules of Civil Procedure—which extends 
the last day in computing any time period to the next day which is 
neither a Saturday, Sunday, nor holiday—[was] not applicable” to 
administrative appeals.11  In addition, she found § 42-35-15(b),12 
the statute governing the judicial review of contested cases, 
including the filing period, does not contemplate waiving the time 
limitations for “excusable neglect,” an alternative theory put 
forward in the plaintiff’s complaint.13 
McAninch filed a writ of certiorari on November 4, 2011, 
arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of the date by 
which the complaint must have been filed and, alternatively, that 
even if the complaint was not timely filed, the court should find 
excusable neglect and allow the review.14  The Rhode Island 
 6.  Id. at 86. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 85 n.1. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 86. 
 12.  “Proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in the 
superior court of Providence County or in the superior court in the county in 
which the cause of action arose, or where expressly provided by the general 
laws in the sixth division of the district court or family court of Providence 
County, within thirty (30) days after mailing notice of the final decision of the 
agency . . . ”  R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 42-35-15(b) (2011). 
 13.  McAninch, 64 A.3d at 86. 
 14.  Id.  
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Supreme Court granted the writ on February 2, 2012.15 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the applicability of 
Rule 6 to administrative appeals de novo because “the meaning 
and effect of court rules is a question of law.”16  Under § 42-35-16, 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), the Court also reviews 
de novo questions of administrative law keeping in mind that the 
“ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended 
by the Legislature.”17 
Upon review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first sought to 
determine if the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction 
over an administrative appeal.  The Court determined that, based 
on the language in § 42-35-15(a) and (b), the Superior Court has 
subject matter jurisdiction over administrative appeals and, if the 
USAW-RI appeal was timely, the Superior Court’s jurisdiction 
should be invoked.18 
On appeal, McAninch argues that Rule 6 should apply to 
administrative appeals because of the rule’s “clear language” and 
points to the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure 80(c) and 
81.19  In response, the PPL and the DLT argue that the Supreme 
Court had previously held that Rule 6 did not apply in 
administrative appeals,20 that Rule 80(b) which states that the 
timeline under which a petitioner can file for review of an 
administrative decision “shall be provided by law,” and that the 
“unambiguous[ ]” language in § 42-35-15 regarding the thirty day 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  Id. (quoting Heritage Healthcare Services, Inc. v. Marques, 14 A.3d 
932, 936 (R.I. 2011)). 
 18.  Id. at 87 (citing Rivera v. Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode 
Island, 70 A.3d 905, 911 (R.I. 2013)). 
 19.  McAninch, 64 A.3d. at 87–88.  Rule 80(c) states that “these rules, so 
far as they are applicable, shall govern review proceedings.”  Id. at 87 n.2.  
Rule 81 contains the proceedings to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply and administrative appeals are not among the proceedings listed.  Id. 
at 87 n.3. 
 20.  Id. at 88 (citing Pizzi v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 
857 A.2d 762, 763–64 (R.I. 2004) (finding that a memorandum order for a 
case dismissed on procedural grounds; however, the Court discussed whether 
Rule 6 allowed for the time limitation to be extended by one day if the 
plaintiff received the decision by mail)). 
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filing period, should control here.21 
In finding that Rule 6 applies to administrative appeals and, 
therefore, McAninch’s complaint was timely filed, the Court 
reasoned that, although “the time and procedure” “to secure 
appellate review are to be strictly construed,” the Superior Court 
has the “equitable authority” to determine whether a statute 
providing for judicial review should be tolled.22  The Court looked 
to court rules and case law to address the defendant’s arguments 
with regard to Rule 80(b) and § 42-35-15.  In its holding, the Court 
found three Superior Court rules relevant:  (1) Rule 6(a), which 
allows the filing of a request for review to occur up until the end of 
the day that is not “a Saturday, Sunday, nor a holiday” if the last 
day of the time allowed by a statute is a Saturday, Sunday, or 
holiday; (2) Rule 80(c), which affirms that the rules of civil 
procedure govern the review proceeding of administrative actions; 
and (3) Rule 81, which does not include administrative appeals on 
the list of proceedings to which the Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply.23   
Further, by identifying case law which held that other 
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure applied to administrative 
appeals, the Court found precedent for the application of Rule 6 
here.24  The Court found additional textual support for its decision 
in Rule 1 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure which 
states that “rules of civil procedure [are to] be construed and 
administered ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action’ . . . those rules of civil procedure 
which are consistent with the nature of an appellant proceeding 
may be applied in the furtherance of that goal.”25  The Court 
noted that its own Rule of Appellate Procedure, Article 1, Rule 
20(a) contains language similar to Rule 6 “that extends the last 
day in computing any time period to the next day which is neither 
a Saturday, Sunday nor a holiday.”26  In its determination that 
“consistency demands that Rule 6(a) appl[y] to the Superior 
 21.  Id. at 88. 
 22.  Id.  The Court found precedent for this reasoning in Rivera.  See id. 
 23.  Id. at 88–89. 
 24.  Id. at 89 (citing Carbone v. Planning Board of Appeal of South 
Kingstown, 702 A.2d 386, 389 (R.I 1997)). 
 25.  Id. at 89. 
 26.  Id. 
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Court’s review of administrative decisions,” the Court noted that 
the practical result of the trial court justice’s ruling would have 
resulted in the McAninch having only twenty nine days to file, not 
thirty days as afforded by law.27  The PPL and the DLT’s 
argument with regard to the proffered case law provided 
precedent was not compelling to the Court.28 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Court clearly resolved this matter based on a logical 
analysis of standard practices in the court system and a brief 
exploration of case law that had applied other Rules of Civil 
Procedure to administrative appeals.  Although the Court did not 
return to a specific inquiry about the legislative intent, § 42-35-
15,(a) and (b) lay out both the right to judicial review and the 
process of the review, including timelines for accessing and 
performing that review, the latter included presumably to promote 
judicial efficiency.29  By holding that Rule 6 applies to the 
Superior Court’s review of administrative decisions because 
“consistency demands [it],” it appears that the Court indirectly 
“give[s] effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the 
Legislature,” as it promotes access to the right to judicial review of 
administrative decisions and maintains efficient court processes.30 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rule 6 of the 
Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to 
administrative decisions and therefore, the trial justice had erred 
in determining that the Superior Court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction over McAninch’s timely appeal.  The Court 
relied on textual support in court rules as well as case law in 
extending Rule 6 to administrative appeals, finding that the 
application of the rule to this type of proceeding was consistent 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 89–90.  The Court noted that the case cited by the PPL was 
dismissed on procedural grounds, so the language in the memorandum did 
not provide precedent, and, further, that the facts in Pizzi were substantially 
different than those at issue here.  Id. at 90.  
 29.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15. 
 30.  McAninch, 64 A.3d at 85, 89.  
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with other practices. 
 
Alix R. Ogden 
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Administrative Law.  Rivera v. Emp. Ret. System of R.I., 70 A.3d 905 (R.I. 
2013). A Rhode Island Superior Court has equitable authority in 
administrative appeals to determine whether the statute R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 
§ 42-35-15(b), which provides the timeline for judicial review of 
administrative decisions, should be tolled in appropriate circumstances.  
While this statute was held to unambiguously require administrative appeals 
be filed within thirty-days from the day after the notice of decision is mailed, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held the Superior Court abused its 
discretion in not finding a reasonable reliance basis for equitable tolling in 
this case. The court abrogated prior legal precedent that had misstated the 
administrative appeal timeline as requiring appeals to be filed thirty-days 
from the receipt of notice and because this same timeframe was 
communicated to the plaintiff multiple times by the deciding agency, the 
court found the plaintiff had a reasonable reliance basis to justify equitable 
tolling in this case. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 17, 2007, Cranston Police Department 
sergeant Lillian Rivera applied for accidental disability benefits 
for post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety disorder.1  On 
January 9, 2008, the Retirement Board used its authority under 
R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 36-8-32 to deny Ms. Rivera’s accidental 
disability application.3  In the notice of denial dated January 18, 
2008, the letter stated that Ms. Rivera could appeal to the 
Retirement Board if the appeal was received “within 30 days of 
the receipt” of the letter.4  Ms. Rivera subsequently appealed, and 
the Retirement Board sub-committee voted to deny her claim and 
the matter was presented to the full Retirement Board for a final 
determination on May 14, 2008.5  The full Retirement Board voted 
unanimously to uphold the sub-committee’s decision to deny Ms. 
Rivera’s accidental disability pension; however, during this 
hearing, the chairman of the board stated to Ms. Rivera, on the 
record, that she may seek judicial review with the “Rhode Island 
 1.  Rivera v. Emp. Ret. System of R.I., 70 A.3d 905, 906 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. at 907 n.1 (describing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-8-3 (1989) (providing 
provides the statutory framework for the Retirement Board and its authority 
to oversee the retirement system through rules and regulations)). 
 3.  Id. at 907.  
 4.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 5.  Id. 
 
RIVERA.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:18 PM 
846 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:845 
Superior Court within 30 days of receipt” of the denial notice.6 
In the denial notice to Ms. Rivera, dated May 19, 2008, the 
executive director of the Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode 
Island (ERSRI) wrote that Ms. Rivera had a right to judicial 
review and that “the thirty-day requirement would begin from the 
date the U.S. Post Office indicates the letter was received” by Ms. 
Rivera.7  However, accompanying that letter, which was mailed to 
both Ms. Rivera and her attorney, was a document entitled 
“NOTICE OF RIGHT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.”8  This notice 
indicated, pursuant to “Rhode Island General Laws § 42-35-15,” 
that Ms. Rivera had “thirty (30) days from the date of the mailing 
of” the denial notice to file an appeal.9  The denial letter was 
dated May 19, 2008 and postmarked on May 21, 2008.10  Ms. 
Rivera signed an affidavit that she received the certified mail 
notice and also retrieved the certified letter on May 29, 2008.11  
Ms. Rivera appealed the ERSRI final decision to the Superior 
Court on June 27, 2008,12 which the Supreme Court noted was 
filed within thirty days of Ms. Rivera’s receipt of the notice of final 
decision.13 
On March 16, 2011, the trial judge of the Superior Court held 
that the “‘[the Superior] Court lack[ed] jurisdiction over this 
matter’” because the petitioner did not file the appeal within the 
statutory timeframe dictated in General Laws 1956 § 42-35-
15(b).14  Further, the trial judge found against Ms. Rivera’s 
contention that this statute was ambiguous and instead found the 
statutory language was unambiguous, “require[ing] the filing of 
agency appeal in Superior Court thirty days from the mailing of 
the notice.”15  The trial judge also considered Ms. Rivera’s 
 6.  Id. at 907–08 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 7.  Id. at 908 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  8.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 9.  Id. (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 10.  Id. n.4 (explaining that Ms. Rivera claimed the letter’s postmark 
really read May 22, 2008). 
 11.  Id. at 908. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 913. 
 14.  Id. at 908; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(b) (providing that 
proceedings for review are instituted by filing a complaint in superior court 
“within thirty (30) days after the decision thereon”). 
 15.  Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 909. 
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argument that she had reasonable reliance for her appeal date but 
found that while equitable tolling “could apply,” it should not 
apply in this case because Ms. Rivera did not have a sufficient 
basis for reasonable reliance of the agency’s erroneous statements 
about the filing timeframe.16  The primary basis for the finding of 
unreasonable reliance precluding equitable tolling was that Ms. 
Rivera’s attorney “should have been aware of the correct 
deadline”; thus, the Superior Court entered judgment against Ms. 
Rivera on April 28, 2011.17 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted certiorari to review 
Ms. Rivera’s appeal of the Superior Court’s decision regarding 
denial of administrative appeal.18  The Court noted that while it 
never before expressly decided the standard of review for Superior 
Court decisions regarding equitable tolling, abuse of discretion 
was the proper review standard to evaluate the trial judge’s 
decision as to whether or not to allow equitable tolling to extend a 
statutory appeal deadline.19  The Court decided this was the 
appropriate standard because other courts used this standard in 
similar circumstances.20 
Substantively, first the Court addressed the trial judge’s 
holding regarding whether § 42-35-15(b) was ambiguous and 
upheld the lower court’s holding that the statute was clear and 
unambiguous, and thus, the statute must be interpreted literally, 
giving plain and ordinary meaning to words with “no room for 
statutory construction” whereby requiring the statue to be applied 
“as written.”21  Further, because the Court found § 42-35-15(b) 
unambiguous regarding the timeline for administrative appeals, 
the Court was forced to abrogate its previous holding in Bayview 
 16.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 909–910; see generally R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(g).  
 19.  Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 909–10 (citing Holmes v. Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 62 
(1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 
2008); Zerilli-Edelglass v. New York City Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 81 (2d 
Cir. 2003)). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Rivera, 70 A.3d. at 910 (citing Planned Env’t Mgmt. Corp. v. Robert, 
966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Towing, Inc. v. Stevenson.22  In that case the Court had misstated 
the statutory timeline as allowing appeals to be filed thirty days 
“after receiving notice” and clarified that the thirty-day timeline  
for administrative appeal decisions begins the day after notice is 
mailed.23  The Court also held that the postmark provided 
conclusive but not exclusive evidence of mailing date; however, 
here such a holding was inconsequential because by any 
calculation the petitioner’s June 27, 2008 complaint was filed 
more than thirty days from the date of the denial notice mailing.24 
Second, the Court addressed the trial judge’s statement that 
the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction for appeal of this 
administrative decision due to timeliness.25  The Court held that 
the Superior Court had jurisdiction for administrative appeals and 
unquestionable power to adjudicate the subject matter, but also 
noted that the proper question was whether or not the Superior 
Court should have adjudicated equitable relief given the 
unambiguous timing statute for administrative appeals and the 
fact that “[s]tatutes prescribing the time and the procedure” for 
appellate review should be “strictly construed.”26  Nevertheless, 
the Court noted that strict statutory construction in the context of 
equity is not an “impenetrable bar” and held that the Superior 
Court has equitable authority to determine if judicial review of 
administrative decisions pursuant to § 42-35-15(b) “should be 
tolled in appropriate circumstances.”27 
Third and finally, the Court questioned whether the trial 
judge abused his discretion by finding no reasonable reliance and 
answered this question in the affirmative.28 The Court specifically 
pointed to the inaccurate timelines that had been affirmatively 
communicated to Ms. Rivera twice by letter and in the final 
 22.  Id. at 911; 676 A.2d 325, 328 (R.I. 1996) (emphasis in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23.  Rivera, 70 A.3d at 911. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 908. 
 26.  Id. at 909, 911–12 (citing Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Saccocio, 43 A.3d 
40, 44 (R.I. 2012); Johnson v. Newport Cnty. Chapter for Retarded Citizens, 
Inc., 943 A.2d 1045, 1051 (R.I. 2008); Sousa v. Town of Coventry, 774 A.2d 
812, 814 (R.I. 2001)) (emphasis added).  Specifically, the Court stated in 
Johnson that “equitable tolling is an exception to the general statute of 
limitations based upon principles of equity and fairness.”  943 A.2d at 1051. 
 27.  Rivera, 70 A.3d at 912 (citing Johnson, 943 A.2d at 1051). 
 28.  Id. at 913. 
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hearing on May 14, 2008, by the chairman.29  Therefore, the Court 
held that while the notice of judicial review that accompanied the 
final denial letter did contain the correct statutory timeframe, the 
multiple conveyances of the erroneous deadlines through ERSRI’s 
official communication made it reasonable that Ms. Rivera would 
rely on the erroneous deadline.30  Further, as Ms. Rivera’s appeal 
was filed within the thirty-day timeline dictated under the 
erroneous but relied-upon timeline, the Court could not uphold the 
trial judge’s finding of unreasonable reliance.31 The Court thus 
found the trial judge’s refusal to toll the statutory deadline was an 
abuse of discretion and thus, quashed the judgment of the 
Superior Court, directing that on remand Ms. Rivera’s appeal was 
to be considered timely.32 
 
COMMENTARY 
The holding in this case clarifies the statutory deadline for 
appeals in Administrative Law cases. The holding had 
underpinnings of fairness policy in an area of law, specifically 
statutory deadlines, that typically has little emphasis on fairness. 
Thus, the holding can be interpreted as opening the door in 
comparable factual circumstances where tolling of statutory 
deadlines serves the principles of fairness and equity. 
The Court based its holding on the fact that authoritative 
misstatements were communicated to Ms. Rivera by the 
administrative agency, the same erroneous statements about the 
administrative deadline were made in Bayview Towing, and that 
case was  subsequently followed by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Providence School Department v. 
Anna C., and therefore it was reasonable for Ms. Rivera to rely on 
the erroneous timeline as the applicable law for administrative 
 29.  Id. at 907–08, 913.  The original denial notice dated January 18, 
2008 and the final determination denial notice dated May 19, 2008 both 
indicated that the thirty-days began upon receiving notice of denial.  Id. at 
907–08.  
 30.  Id. at 908, 913.  The court also noted that while Ms. Rivera’s 
attorney should have implemented the better practice of consulting the text 
of the actual APA, that this did not negate Ms. Rivera’s reasonable reliance.  
Id. 
 31.  Id. at 913–14. 
 32.  Id. at 914. 
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appeal deadlines in Rhode Island.33  The Court emphasized that 
the Superior Court has equitable authority to apply tolling in 
certain circumstances and held that because reliance was 
reasonable in this particular circumstance denying equitable 
tolling in this case was an abuse of discretion.34 
The Court opinion, on its face, emphasized that “principles of 
equity and fairness” dictated the outcome in this “rather unusual 
case,” implying a rather narrow holding.35  However, despite the 
impliedly narrow holding, the Court also highlighted that the 
principles of equity and fairness should dictate the application of 
equitable tolling in future administrative appeals under § 42-35-
15(b),  despite the general rule that unambiguous statutes create 
a presumption that statutory timelines should be construed 
strictly.36 
The Court’s further emphasis of equity and fairness principles 
at the end of the decision seems to imply that these principles 
were important to the Court and could help predict outcomes in 
future cases.37  Further, in the portion of the opinion refuting that 
statutory construction is an “impenetrable bar” to concepts of 
equity, the Court emphasized the holding in Johnson, which 
states specifically that “equitable tolling is an exception to the 
general statute of limitations based upon principles of equity and 
fairness.”38 Given the emphasis on equity and fairness throughout 
the opinion it seems possible that in similar future cases 
principles of equity and fairness may provide an additional 
argument for relief where administrative appeals would be 
otherwise barred by § 42-35-15(b). 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court abrogated prior 
misstatements as to the applicable statutory deadline for 
administrative appeals under § 42-35-15(b) and clarified that the 
statute requires appeals to be filed within thirty-days from the 
 33.  Id. at 912–13; see also 676 A.2d at 328; 108 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 34.  Rivera, 70 A.3d at 912–13. 
 35.  Id. at 913–14. 
 36.  Id. at 910, 912; see also Planned Env’t Mgmt. Corp., 966 A.2d at 121; 
Sousa, 774 A.2d at 814. 
 37.  See Rivera, 70 A.3d at 913.  
 38.  Id. at 912 (quoting Johnson, 943 A.2d at 292). 
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mailing of the administrative agency’s denial notice.39  The Court 
reaffirmed that while statutes prescribing administrative 
deadlines are to be strictly construed, Superior Courts can apply 






 39.  Id. at 911. 
 40.  Id. at 912–14. 
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Arbitration.  Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477 (R.I. 2013).  A 
defendant’s objection to a plaintiff’s petition to confirm an arbitration award 
is sufficient to satisfy the “application” element of R. I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-
14(a), allowing the Superior court to conduct a modification inquiry.  
Findings that arbitrators made an error of law are not sufficient to permit 
modification of an arbitration award. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Plaintiff, Joyce Wheeler (“Plaintiff”), was injured in a motor-
vehicle accident with an underinsured driver, the tortfeasor, on 
October 19, 2007.1 The tortfeasor’s insurance company, 
Progressive Insurance Company (“Progressive”), did not contest 
liability and paid Plaintiff the $25,000 policy limit for bodily 
injury.2  Plaintiff also sought to recover for her injuries under the 
uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) provisions of her own 
policy with Encompass Insurance Company (“Encompass”), the 
Defendant.3  Plaintiff’s insurance contract with Encompass 
capped payment of UM coverage at $100,000.4 Encompass 
contested the nature and extent of Plaintiff’s injuries and the 
parties agreed to submit the dispute to binding arbitration.5  
There was no record of the question(s) submitted to the 
arbitration panel.6 
The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to 
a total award of $172,750, which included damages and 
prejudgment interest.7  The panel also concluded that Progressive 
had paid $25,000 of those damages and Encompass had paid 
$5,000 pursuant to the Medical Payment provision of the policy.8  
Following arbitration, Encompass made payment of the UM policy 
limit, $100,000, to Plaintiff.9 
Plaintiff filed a petition in Superior Court to confirm the 
arbitration award, to which Encompass filed an objection.10  
 1.  Wheeler v. Encompass Ins. Co., 66 A.3d 477, 478 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 479–80. 
 4.  Id. at 479. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. n.2. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. n.3. 
 10.  Id. 
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Encompass argued that Plaintiff could not recover more than the 
UM policy limit of $100,000 and objected to the amount of the 
arbitration award that was over $100,000.11  Plaintiff argued that 
when determining the amount an injured party was entitled to 
recover from a UM, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lombardi permitted 
arbitrators to award prejudgment interest in excess of policy 
limits.12 In response, Encompass alleged that it entered 
arbitration subject to the terms of Plaintiff’s policy, which limited 
arbitration to disputes regarding the amount Plaintiff could 
recover from a tortfeasor; as the litigation at issue was not 
between Plaintiff and Encompass the arbitration panel was barred 
from rendering an award in excess of policy limits.13  The Superior 
Court justice, relying on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Pogorilich, 
concluded that the arbitrator made an error of law and found that 
the award of prejudgment interest was therefore improper.14  
Based on this conclusion, the trial justice sustained Encompass’s 
objection to the extent that the award exceeded the policy limit.15  
The trial justice went on to modify the arbitration award, vacating 
the portion of the award in excess of $100,000.16  Plaintiff 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.17 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Prior to addressing the issues, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court reiterated the standard of review for arbitration awards.18  
The Court highlighted the statutory proscription against courts 
vacating an arbitration award absent corruption, fraud, 
substantial prejudice, arbitrators exceeding their power, or such 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 479–80 (citing 773 A.2d 864, 870 n.2 (R.I. 2001).  The Court in 
Lombardi made it a point to show that when an arbitration panel was asked 
to determine the liability of the UM prejudgment interest could be included. 
773 A.2d at 870 n.2.  The Lombardi Court pointed out that Allstate Insurance 
Co. v. Pogorilich announced the principal that when the arbitration panel 
was determining the tortfeasor’s liability the limit of payment would be the 
tortfeasor’s policy limit.  Id. (citing 605 A. 2d 1318, 1321 (R.I. 1992).      
 13.  Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 479–80. 
 14.  Id. at 480, 483 (citing 605 A.2d 1318, 1321 (R.I. 1992)). 
 15.  Id. at 480. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at 480–81. 
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imperfect execution of the arbitration that no final judgment on 
the matter submitted was made.19  The Court went on to point out 
that courts must modify or correct an award when there is evident 
material miscalculation of figures or in descriptions of persons, 
things, or property; when arbitrators make an award on a matter 
not submitted to them; or when the award is imperfect in form not 
affecting the merits.20  The Court also reiterated its authority 
under R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-19 to make orders “as the rights of 
the parties and the ends of justice require.”21 
The Court first reviewed a procedural hurdle presented by 
Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award.22  The Court pointed out 
that upon a petition a trial justice must grant an order affirming 
the award except in limited statutorily prescribe situations.23  The 
procedural roadblock existed because in order for the trial justice 
to have the authority to modify an award § 10-3-14(a) as written, 
required an “application” for an award modification by one of the 
parties; however, none of the parties had filed such an 
“application.”24  The Court concluded that when the trial justice 
granted of the petition to confirm the award and vacated the 
portion of the award with regard to the amount in excess of the 
policy limit, this had the effect of modifying the award.25  
Therefore, if no “application” by either party existed, the 
modification would have been invalid.26  In overcoming this issue 
the Court held that Encompass’s objection citing specific grounds 
against Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award satisfied the 
“application” requirement of § 10-3-14(a).27  The Court reasoned 
that because Plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award set in motion 
the review and because Encompass’s objection provided sufficient 
 19.  Id. at 480–81 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-12 (1956)).  
 20.  Id. at 481 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-14 (1956)). 
 21.  Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-19 (1956)). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 481–82. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-3-14(a) (1956)). 
 27.  Id. at 482. The Court relied on the analogous situation present in 
City of E. Providence v. United Steelworkers of Am, Local 15509.  925 A.2d 
246, 253–55 (R.I. 2007).  The Court pointed out that in that case a motion to 
confirm an award alone was sufficient to trigger a review of the award and an 
objection to that review constituted an “application.” Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 482 
n.6. 
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grounds to warrant further inquiry by the lower court, there had 
been an “application.”28 
The Court then turned to the merits and held that the trial 
justice erred in modifying the arbitration award.29  The Court 
reiterated that the standard of review for arbitration agreements 
permitted modification of an award only in the limited, statutorily 
enumerated, circumstances.30  Further, the court reiterated its 
assertion made in Paola v. Commercial Union Assurance 
Companies, that “[a] trial justice has no power to modify an 
award” absent the statutorily enumerated situations.31  The Court 
made special note that there was no record of the arbitration 
proceedings or of the question(s) submitted to the panel, and that 
the parties agreed that the insurance policy was not presented to 
the panel.32  The Court also noted that there was a legally valid 
award calculating prejudgment interest.33  From there, the Court 
examined the trial justice’s analysis and concluded that the trial 
justice had inappropriately engaged in a de novo review and had 
modified the award to correct a mistake of law.34  The Court 
pointed out that the trial justice had incorrectly determined that 
the arbitrators had made a mistake of law, believing that the law 
prohibited an arbitrator from awarding prejudgment interest 
above policy limits.35  The Court went on to show that as a matter 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 482–83. 
 30.  Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-14(a) (1956)). 
 31.  Id. (quoting 461 A.2d 935, 937 (R.I. 1983)).  
 32.  Id. at 483 n.7 (countering the argument by the dissent and the 
decision of the trial court, the Court argued that it would be inappropriate to 
judge the validity of an arbitration agreement based on the wording of a 
policy that had not been available to the arbitration panel). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 484. 
 35.  Id. n.8. The Court was careful to point out that the trial court’s 
assessment that there had been a mistake of law was likewise incorrect.  Id.  
The Court stated that the decision in Lombardi did not bar the award of 
pretrial interest in excess of policy limits when arbitrators had been asked to 
determine the amount injured parties may recover from the UM insurer and 
that the Pogorilich decision only barred the UM insurer from paying in 
excess of the policy limit when the arbitrators had been asked to decide the 
amount the ensured party was entitled to recover from the tortfeasor.  See 
id.; 773 A.2d at 870 n.2; 605 A.2d at 1321.  The Court further highlighted the 
fact that when there was no record of the issue submitted to the arbitrators, 
that as long as the agreement to arbitrate is valid and the matter of the 
dispute is arbitable, the arbitrators are free to frame the issue as they see fit.  
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of settled law, a mistake of law is not sufficient grounds for 
overturning an award.36  The Court argued that to engage in a de 
novo review of the arbitration panel’s award would be 
inappropriate, given the limited role of the judiciary in modifying 
arbitration awards.37  As such the trial court had been obligated 
to confirm the award.  Therefore, the Court vacated the order of 
the Superior Court that modified the award and remanded the 
case to Superior Court with instructions to issue an order 
confirming the award.38 
Justice Robinson, while in concurrence with the majority 
opinion on the sufficiency of the “application,” dissented against 
the majority’s refusal to frame the issue of the award’s validity 
through the lens of the arbitration panels authority as announced 
by the insurance policy.39  Justice Robinson relied heavily on the 
terms of the insurance policy which provided that the parties 
would resort to arbitration to resolve the amount of damages owed 
to the Plaintiff by the tortfeasor.40  In Justice Robinson’s opinion, 
because the panel had made an award on an issue not submitted 
to them, specifically the issue of the UM insurers liability, the 
statute mandated that the trial justice modify the award.41  
Justice Robinson based his argument in large part on the notion 
that an arbitration panel obtains its jurisdiction from the consent 
of the parties and that a panel’s jurisdiction is limited to those 
subjects over which the parties have given it authority.42  Justice 
Robinson argued that, because there was no specific record of the 
questions or the issues presented to the panel, the panel’s 
Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 484 (citing Purvis Sys., Inc. v. American Sys. Corp. 788 
A.2d 1112, 1116 (R.I. 2002)).  Further, the Court noted that the panel must 
have understood the dispute to be between the Plaintiff and Encompass 
because it crafted the award in accordance with the formula presented in 
Metropolitan Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Barry. 892 A.2d 915, 923–24 (R.I. 
2006). 
 36.  Wheeler, 66 A.3d at 473 (citing Aponick v. Lauricella, 844 A.2d 698, 
704 (R.I. 2004); Purvis Sys, Inc., 788 A.2d at 1115; Westminster Constr. Corp. 
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 376 A.2d 708, 711 (1977)). 
 37.  See id. at 483–84. 
 38.  Id. at 484. 
 39.  Id. at 484–85 (citing Bush v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 448 A.2d 782, 
784 (R.I. 1982) (Robinson, J., dissenting)). 
 40.  Id. at 485 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 41.  Id. at 485–86 (Robinson, J., dissenting).  
 42.  Id. at 485 (citing Blackstone Valley Gas & Elec. Co. v. R. I. Power 
Transmission Co., 12 A.2d 739, 749 (R.I. 1940) (Robinson, J., dissenting)). 
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authority could only be determined by examining the language of 
the insurance policy’s very narrow grant of authority.43  
Furthermore, Justice Robinson also pointed out that an 
arbitration panel derives its authority from the mutual consent of 
the parties to be bound.44  Here, he argued that the mutual 
consent of the parties grant of authority to the arbitrators could 
only be determined to extend to the amount of damages Plaintiff 




In examining the Court’s decision it becomes apparent that 
the Court was not motivated to see the decision of an arbitration 
overturned.46  Further, the Court seems to have been motivated to 
penalize Encompass, the insurer, the party with the most ability 
to frame the arbitration, for failing to properly create an 
arbitration agreement beyond the single paragraph present in the 
insurance policy boilerplate.  The Court appears to have been 
completely aware that the entire case could have been avoided if 
Encompass, in drafting such an agreement, had instructed the 
panel as to its authority and which matters would be arbitable.  
While the dissent raises the concern that the importance of 
express mutual assent to the issues of arbitration has been 
weakened by the majority decision,47 it does not grasp the 
function of this decision. The functional effect of this decision is to 
force parties in future arbitrations, especially those between 
insured and insurance companies whose stock and trade are 
written agreements, to specify through unambiguous arbitration 
agreements the scope and extent of an arbitration panel’s 
authority. 
The danger of the majority’s decision is that it could function 
to drive up insurance costs for consumers in the state.  The 
decision creates two separate avenues whereby insurance costs 
may climb.  First, the decision effectively denies insurers judicial 
 43.  Id. at 485 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 45.  Id. at 487 n.11 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 46.  See id. at 483. 
 47.  See id. at 486 (Robinson, J., dissenting) . 
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recourse should an arbitration panel make a mistake of law.  Such 
mistakes of law threaten an insurer’s ability to effectively cap 
their UM liability through policy limits when a dispute is 
submitted to arbitration. This increases the likelihood that 
arbitration becomes too unpredictable and incentivizes insurers to 
turn to the courts, a far more costly process.  Such additional cost 
would conceivably be passed on to policyholders. 
Second, the result may be that insurers will be more 
motivated to offer to settle an insured’s claim at the policy limit, 
thereby limiting their potential liability and avoiding the risk of 
an incorrect and un-appealable arbitration.  This would positively 
impact injured parties, resulting in more rapid UM compensation 
but would however, result in higher costs for policy holders as 
insurance companies raised rates to maintain steady margins.  
However, both of these scenarios are less likely, especially if 
insurers take the relatively inexpensive precaution of drafting 
arbitration agreements that limit the authority and scope of 
arbitration panels.  As has been noted above, the primary function 
of this case will be to incentivize insurers to craft narrow 
arbitration agreements prior to submitting a dispute to 
arbitration. If such narrow agreements are the result, the 
outcomes should not only be more predictable, but also effectively 
capped.  Predictable and controllable outcomes available through 
narrow arbitration should, if anything, help to lower or at least 
stabilize insurance costs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem from this opinion that, except in very limited 
circumstances, the decisions of arbitration panels are secure from 
post-decision relief on the part of one of the parties.  Further, the 
Court affirmed the limited role of the judiciary in overturning 
arbitration and upheld a narrow construction of the judiciary’s 
role under the current statute.48  The Court’s decision has placed 
the responsibility on the parties entering arbitration to clarify and 
specify those issues to be arbitrated.  Additionally, the Court 
effectively penalized attempts to utilize post-decision litigation to 
avoid payment of arbitration decisions.  Finally, this decision has 
the potential to encourage insurers to avoid arbitration and settle 
 48.  Id. at 483–84.  
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UM claims at policy limits or through court proceedings, though 
such affect might cause an increase in premiums.  However, the 
most likely functional outcome is that insurers limit arbitration 
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Civil Procedure.  Vogel v. Catala, 63 A.3d 519 (R.I. 2013).  Providence 
County Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of a lender who sued a 
borrower for breach of contract, breach of an implied-in-fact contract, and 
failure to repay based on a book account.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
unable to review this appeal in a meaningful way because the petitioner 
failed to provide a transcript of the lower bench trial, affirmed the judgment 
of the Superior Court. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On April 9, 2007, Juan G. Catala (“Catala”) called his friend 
David S. Vogel (“Vogel”), asking him for a loan.1  Catala had lost 
his money gambling in Las Vegas and needed additional funding 
to recoup his losses.2  Vogel, then in Rhode Island, agreed to wire 
$8,500 to Catala at The Bellagio Hotel in Las Vegas with the 
understanding that Catala would repay the debt within two 
weeks.3 
On October 18, 2007, as Catala had failed to repay his loan for 
over six months, Vogel filed a complaint in Providence County 
Superior Court alleging breach of contract, breach of an implied-
in-fact contract, and failure to repay based on a book account.4 
On April 23, 2009, Vogel moved for summary judgment, 
attaching an affidavit in which he stated:  “[Catala] called me to 
request that I loan money to him[.]  [Catala] said that he had lost 
a substantial sum of money during his trip to Las Vegas and 
needed to borrow money so that he might win back at least part of 
what he had lost.”5  With that, Catala amended his answer to 
include the affirmative defense that the loan was void under G.L. 
1956 § 11-19-17.6  Subsequently, on February 23, 2010, Vogel’s 
motion for summary judgment was denied.7 
On November 4, 2010, the case was heard as a bench trial in 
 1.  Vogel v. Catala, 63 A.3d 519, 520 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Catala denied the breach of contract claims and stated that “he was 
without sufficient information to admit or deny the book account claim[.]”  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. at 520–21 n.3 (citing in relevant part R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-19-17, 
that “[a]ll . . . promises, given or made . . . for the repayment of money 
knowingly lent for . . . betting, shall be utterly void.”). 
 7.  Catala also motioned for summary judgment based on his 
affirmative defense.  Id. at 521.  That motion was also denied.  Id. s  
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Superior Court and, on May 19, 2011, the trial justice issued a 
written opinion, which concluded that the loan was not void under 
§11-19-17.8  The trial justice concluded that “Vogel’s testimony 
was more credible than” Catala’s testimony and that the loan was 
not extended for gambling purposes, but rather as a traditional 
loan that would have to be paid back.9  The justice ruled that to 
conclude the loan was invalid under §11-19-17 would be an unjust 
enrichment for Catala.10 In accordance with that judgment, 
Catala was ordered to repay the loan along with other costs.11 
Catala appealed the Superior Court’s holding to the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court.12  Catala’s appeal contended that the trial 
justice erred in finding Vogel credible as a witness and that the 
trial justice erred in not voiding the loan under §11-19-17 since, 
according to Catala, Vogel knew that the loan would be used for 
gambling purposes.13 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In reviewing the lower court’s ruling, this Court “gives great 
weight to the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a 
jury in a civil matter, and [] will not disturb such findings unless 
they are ‘clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived 
or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do 
substantial justice between the parties.’”14  Furthermore, even if 
the Court’s review of the record indicated that a contrary 
conclusion could have been reached, the Court does not substitute 
its view for the lower court’s view when the evidence supports the 
lower court’s findings.15 
In this case, however, the Court was unable to conduct a 
meaningful review of the lower court’s ruling because Catala 
failed to provide the Court with a copy of the transcript from the 
lower court.16  Under the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Id. at 522 (citing Cahill v. Morrow, 11 A.3d 82, 86 (R.I. 2011)). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
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Procedure, Catala, as the appellant, had a duty to provide a 
transcript that was “complete and ready for transmission.”17  
Without a copy of the transcript, the Court held it could not 
“engage in any meaningful review of the trial justice’s factual 
determination that Vogel did not ‘knowingly’ lend the money at 
issue in contravention of §11-19-17.”18  The ultimate question to 
be decided in this appeal was whether or not Vogel knew that the 
money he was lending to Catala would be used for gambling.19  
This was a question of fact that was left for the trial justice to 
answer and without a copy of the transcript, the Court was unable 
to hold that the trial justice erred in his findings.20 
Justice Robinson dissented, contending that the Court had 
enough evidence to hold that Vogel should not have been repaid 
for his loan based on Vogel’s judicial admissions.21  Within Vogel’s 
complaint, he stated that “[Catala] needed to borrow money so 
that he might win back at least part of what he had lost.”22  For 
Justice Robinson, the judicial admissions made by Vogel in his 
complaint were enough to conduct a “‘meaningful review’ of the 
trial court’s decision” and find that Vogel was not entitled to 
repayment.23  Justice Robinson found that in Vogel’s complaint, 
he “explicitly indicated the purpose of the loan at issue[,]” and 
that loan was in direct contravention of §11-19-17.24 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled correctly in this case; 
without a copy of the transcript from the lower court, it was 
unable to conduct a thorough review of the trial justice’s 
findings.25 
The credibility of a witness is a factual finding, and a factual 
finding made by a lower court trial justice will only be disturbed 
 17.  Id. (citing Small Bus. Loan Fund Corp. v. Gallant, 795 A.2d 531,532 
(R.I. 2002)). 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 523 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 22.  Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 23.  Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 24.  Id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 25.  See id. at 522.  
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when it is “clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice 
misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the 
decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.”26  It is 
difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to make a determination 
going to any of these tests without a copy of the transcript.27 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Robinson does not see the 
need to review the transcript at all.28  In his view, Vogel’s own 
complaint appears to contain an admission that he knew the loan 
was for gambling purposes, and that should be enough to conduct 
a “meaningful review of the trial court’s decision.”29  However, the 
affidavit on which Justice Robinson bases his dissent does not 
indicate that Vogel knew with any certainty that Catala would use 
the loan for gambling purposes, as required by §11-19-17.30  The 
affidavit, the only document available to the Court for review on 
this appeal, does not unequivocally state that Vogel knew Catala 
would be gambling with the loaned money.31  The affidavit says 
only that Catala “needed to borrow money so that he might win 
back at least part of what he had lost.”32  One can win back money 
through efforts and investments not limited only to gambling.  
Though perhaps intuitively apparent, there is no definitive 
indication contained within the affidavit that Catala would use 
the loan for gambling.33  Without a copy of the transcript, the 
Court had “no choice but to uphold the lower court’s finding.”34 
Furthermore, ruling in favor of a party that is unprepared for 
its appeal would undermine the significance of the Supreme Court 
Rules of Appellate Procedure.  The Court was not prepared to 
disturb the factual findings because Catala’s attorney failed to 
provide it with the most basic of materials. Accordingly, an 
unprepared appellate court is in no position to overturn a lower 
court’s factual findings, regardless of any judicial admissions that 
may appear to point in one direction or another. 
 26.  Id. at 522 (citing Cahill, 11 A.3d at 86). 
 27.  See id. 
 28.  Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 29.  See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 30.  See id. at 523 (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 31.  See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 32.  See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 33.  See id. (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
 34.  See id. at 522 (citing Berquist v. Cesario, 844 A.2d 100, 105 (R.I. 
2004)). 
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Also, it appears that a substantial injustice would have been 
done were Catala to escape responsibility and not be ordered to 
repay the $8,500, especially considering that his legal team failed 
to supply the Court with a copy of the transcript. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of 
the lower court, holding that without a copy of the transcript, it 
was unable to conduct a meaningful review of the trial justice’s 
factual findings and upheld the judgment that the $8,500 loan 
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Constitutional Law.  Reilly v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, No. 
10-461 S., 2013 WL 1193352 (D.R.I. March 22, 2013).  Granting summary 
judgment is inappropriate where a plaintiff has suffered an unconstitutional 
violation of his or her First Amendment right to free speech but material 
facts central to the apportionment of liability between individual and 
municipal defendants remain in dispute.  An individual defendant’s motion 
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for his or her 
alleged freedom of speech violation will only be granted where no dispute 
exists that the defendant’s restriction of speech was both content-neutral and 
acceptable in scope.  Where a plaintiff argues for the purposes of summary 
judgment that a genuine dispute of fact exists as to the content-neutrality of a 
police officer’s suppression of plaintiff’s freedom of speech, the plaintiff is 
precluded from a favorable summary judgment on the issue of municipality 
liability for that officer’s employer until such dispute is resolved. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On February 2, 2010, Judith Reilly (“Plaintiff”) and a friend, 
Oscar Lemus, attended the Providence State of the City address at 
the Providence Career and Technical Academy (“PCTA”) 
auditorium in order to distribute flyers criticizing Mayor David 
Cicilline (“Mayor”) for his recent decision to re-appoint an official 
accused of ethics violations to the City Planning Commission.1 
Although there was “no evidence that Plaintiff obstructed 
pedestrian traffic” and such traffic was “relatively sparse,” 
someone notified Chief Dean Esserman (“Chief Esserman”) of the 
Providence Police Department (“PPD”) that either someone was 
distributing flyers or obstructing the entrance to the PCTA.2  
Chief Esserman testified that based on this information he asked 
Officer Paul Kennedy (“Officer Kennedy”) to “check out the 
situation and address it.”3  According to Officer Kennedy’s 
testimony, he then told Officer Alyssa DeAndrade (“Officer 
DeAndrade”) “if there are people blocking, move them,” while 
Officer DeAndrade testified that Officer Kennedy told her to 
 1.  Reilly v. City of Providence ex rel. Napolitano, No. 10-461 S., 2013 
WL 1193352, at *1 (D.R.I. March 22, 2013). 
 2.  Id. at *1–2.  Testimony on this fact was unclear because Chief 
“Esserman did not recall” whether someone “told him about flyers being 
distributed or people obstructing the entrance.” See id. at *2 (emphasis 
added). 
 3.  Id. at *2. 
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“move [Plaintiff and Lemus] from the front of the building.”4  In 
any event, Officer DeAndrade testified that she instructed her 
patrolmen to “clear the sidewalk.”5 
As a result of this chain of orders, Plaintiff testified that she 
was told by a PPD officer that “she could not distribute flyers 
anywhere on the city block in front of the PCTA.”6  Further, 
Plaintiff testified that she was “again approached by a [PPD] 
officer and threatened with arrest” after she “moved back towards 
the entrance.”7  According to Plaintiff’s testimony, after ignoring 
the officers’ commands a third time, Officer DeAndrade “reiterated 
that Plaintiff would be arrested if she continued to distribute 
flyers in front of the [PCTA].”8  The facts were in dispute as to the 
extent of the PPD’s restrictions on where Plaintiff could distribute 
her flyers, but the PPD at no time prevented Plaintiff from 
distributing flyers completely.9  Instead, Plaintiff’s ultimate claim 
focused on whether the extent of PPD exclusion of Plaintiff’s flyer 
distribution was an unconstitutional suppression of her First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.10 
Plaintiff complied with PPD instructions and was never 
arrested.11  However, after a formal civilian complaint to the PPD 
yielded no response, Plaintiff commenced a civil action against 
Chief Esserman, Officer Kennedy, and Officer DeAndrade, as well 
as the City of Providence, alleging a violation of her freedom of 
speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment.12  The parties 
subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment.13 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.   Plaintiff’s Alleged Violation of First Amendment Right to 
Freedom of Speech 
The parties agreed upon the first two prongs of the three-step 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. at *2–3.   
 9.  See id. 
 10.  See id. at *1–2. 
 11.  Id. at *2. 
 12.  Id. at *1, *3. 
 13.  Id. at *1, *12–13. 
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test14 laid out by the United States Supreme Court for assessing 
whether or not a plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free speech 
has been violated; specifically, that the Plaintiff’s act of 
distributing leaflets was a constitutionally protected act of free 
speech and that the area where plaintiff distributed leaflets was a 
public forum.15  Thus, the Rhode Island District Court for the 
District of Rhode Island (“the court”) focused its analysis, and the 
parties their arguments, on the third prong of the test: whether 
the government’s restrictions on Plaintiff’s speech: “[were] 
content-neutral, [were] narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest and [left] open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”16  If the government restrictions satisfied these 
three elements, then restrictions on Plaintiff’s right to free speech 
might have been constitutional.17 
 
1. Content Neutrality 
The government’s purpose for restricting Plaintiff’s speech 
was the central focus of the content neutrality analysis and “[t]he 
‘principal inquiry’ in assessing content-neutrality [was] ‘whether 
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.’”18 
In this case, all three individual defendants submitted 
testimony that they were unaware of the contents of Plaintiff’s 
flyers when restricting where Plaintiff could distribute the 
same.19  However, Plaintiff submitted the following five pieces of 
circumstantial evidence to combat the individual defendants’ 
testimony:  (1) that Oscar Lemus testified that he witnessed the 
Mayor watching Plaintiff from a window; (2) the flyers distributed 
 14.  To apply the three-prong test prescribed by the Supreme Court a 
court must determine (1) whether the First Amendment protects the alleged 
speech/conduct at issue; (2) whether the forum for such speech is public or 
non-public; and (3) whether the justifications for exclusion of speech are 
proper given the forum and other standards.  Id. at *3 (citing Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985)). 
 15.  Id. at *4 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1983)).  
 16.  Id. at *4 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 177) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 17.  Id. at *4. 
 18.  Id. at *4 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Beacon Hill Architectural 
Comm’n, 100 F.3d 175, 183 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
 19.  Id. at *4. 
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by Plaintiff prominently displayed the Mayor’s name in large 
lettering; (3) “the weakness of [individual defendants’] public 
safety rationale for ordering Plaintiff to move”; (4) “the City’s 
failure to process Plaintiff’s civilian complaint in the manner 
required by PPD procedures”; and (5) the fact that Plaintiff was 
never informed of the alleged public safety reasons for PPD 
officers restricting the areas where she could distribute flyers.20  
The circumstantial evidence cited by Plaintiff allowed the court to 
find that “a reasonable fact-finder could infer that [individual 
defendants] acted because of the contents of the flyers,” and thus, 
their actions were not content neutral.21 
 
2. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government Interest 
To justify their conduct, the individual defendants averred 
that their actions “advanced the government’s interest in 
maintaining the movement of pedestrian traffic on the sidewalk in 
front of the PCTA” and that their actions furthered “the 
government’s interest in ensuring that emergency exits are clear 
in the event of a mass evacuation.”22  Thus, individual defendants 
in this case offered two alleged substantial government interests, 
maintaining the movement of pedestrian traffic and maintaining 
clear emergency exits, as justifications for their conduct.23 
The court rejected the first justification, maintaining the 
movement of pedestrian traffic, on the grounds that Supreme 
Court precedent “‘ha[d] dismissed the danger to traffic congestion 
as a justification to ban leafleting’” because the act of handing out 
leaflets did not lead to pedestrian traffic congestion.24 The 
Defendants’ second justification, maintaining clear emergency 
exits from the PCTA, was similarly rejected by the court despite 
testimony that Chief Esserman received a complaint about 
Plaintiff obstructing the doors to the PTCA.25  Based on the 
unsure testimony of Esserman, and the fact that such evidence 
would be inadmissible as hearsay at trial, the court rejected the 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at *5. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at *6 (quoting Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 
984 F.2d 1319, 1324 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 25.  Id. 
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individual defendants’ justifications for their unconstitutional 
conduct, thus finding that no substantial government interest was 
served by their restriction of Plaintiff’s speech and that the 
individual defendants’ violated the First Amendment.26 
 
3. Ample Alternative Channels of Communication 
The court found, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, that the Defendants’ conduct left ample 
adequate alternative channels of communication that Plaintiff 
could have utilized.27  Regardless of the extent of PPD’s alleged 
restrictions, Plaintiff could have distributed flyers across 
Cranston Street from the PCTA near the Citizens Bank parking 
lot or near the Central High School parking lot, both areas utilized 
for parking by State of the City attendees.28  For those reasons, 
the court held that although, as was argued, Plaintiff was not able 
to access all attendees of the Mayor’s speech, Plaintiff had access 
to a portion of such attendees.29 
 
B. Qualified Immunity 
In order to determine whether the individual defendants 
could be held liable for violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment 
right to free speech, the court looked to whether the doctrine of 
qualified immunity applied.30  As framed by the court, the 
application of the qualified immunity doctrine turned on “whether 
a reasonably competent police officer could have thought that the 
restrictions imposed on Plaintiff’s speech were constitutional.”31 
The court then found that two disputes of material fact 
precluded a favorable summary judgment for the individual 
 26.  The court noted that hearsay evidence which would be inadmissible 
at trial is also inadmissible for the purposes of a motion for summary 
judgment.  Id. at *6 (citing Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st 
Cir. 1990)). 
 27.  Reilly, 2013 WL 1193352, at *7. 
 28.  Id. at *1, *7. 
 29.  Id. at *7. 
 30.  Id. at *8.  In the context of this case, the doctrine of qualified 
immunity shields police officers from civil liability so long as their conduct is 
not in violation of a clearly established constitutional right of which a 
reasonable police officer in their situation would have been aware of.  Id. 
(citing Diaz-Bigio v. Santini, 652 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2011)). 
 31.  Id. at *9. 
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defendants.32  First, the court pointed to the previously discussed 
issue in dispute of whether the individual defendants’ suppression 
of the Plaintiff’s speech was content neutral.33  The court then 
noted that if the content of Plaintiff’s speech did motivate the 
individual defendants’ allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the 
doctrine of qualified immunity would not shield the individual 
defendants from liability.34  The second factual issue precluding 
the court from granting summary judgment on the individual 
defendants’ qualified immunity defense was the dispute about the 
scope of their orders to Plaintiff.35  Plaintiff testified that the 
individual defendants ordered her not to distribute her flyers 
anywhere on the PCTA block, whereas the individual defendants 
testified that their order was limited to the 170-foot stretch of 
lower sidewalk in front of the steps leading to the PCTA 
auditorium doors.36  The court found that a reasonable police 
officer could have believed that the conduct the individual 
defendants attested to was constitutional, and thus, although 
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were violated, the individual 
defendants’ conduct could satisfy the standards for qualified 
immunity.37  Thus, if a fact-finder determined that the individual 
defendants’ actions were content neutral and their restrictions on 
Plaintiff’s speech were limited to the 170-foot stretch in front of 
stairs to the PCTA, they would be protected by the doctrine of 
qualified immunity and would face no civil liability for their 
actions.38 
 
C. Municipal Liability 
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against the City of 
Providence would be appropriate if the individual defendants’ 
actions on the night in question were in conformity with and 
motivated by official PPD policy, in which case the PPD policy 
could be the cause of the violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at *9–10. 
 38.  Id. at *10. 
 
REILLY.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:32 PM 
2014] SURVEY SECTION 871 
rights.39 
Plaintiff cited numerous sources of evidence that the conduct 
of PPD officers on the night in question was in conformity with 
PPD policies.40  Thus, the court easily found that, although not 
facially unconstitutional, the clearly established PPD policy, 
which Chief Esserman knew to suppress citizen’s First 
Amendment rights, may have been enough to hold the City liable 
for the actions of PPD officers who acted in accordance with that 
policy.41  As such, the disposition of the case on the issue of the 
City’s liability turned on, inter alia, a fact-finder’s determination 
of the content-neutrality of the individual defendants’ conduct.42  
The court found that because Plaintiff argued that a genuine issue 
of fact existed in regard to the content-neutrality of such conduct, 




This case implicates an individual’s right to distribute 
leaflets, an issue about which the court is able to cite many cases 
explaining why public safety and pedestrian traffic, both 
legitimate government concerns, are often not sufficient 
justifications for suppression of the right to distribute literature.44  
 39.  Id. at *11–12. 
 40.  See id.  Plaintiff’s cited sources included testimony from Chief 
Esserman that indicated that the PPD officers’ actions were in conformity 
with their training, a fact that was further attested to by Officer DeAndrade 
as well as by several officers serving under her control on the night in 
question.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at *11–12. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  According to the court, provided that Chief Esserman made the 
decision to order the restriction of Plaintiffs right based on the content of the 
speech, Plaintiff could succeed on her claim against the city.  This is because 
it is essentially undisputed “that [Chief] Esserman possessed [the] final 
authority with respect to PPD policy,” thus any decision by Chief Esserman 
based on the content of Plaintiffs speech would constitute PPD policy and 
thus expose the City of Providence to liability.  Id. at *10–11 (citing Pembaur 
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986) (plurality opinion)). 
 44.  Id. at *5 (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182 (1983); 
Bays v. City of Fairborn, 668 F.3d 814, 823 (6th Cir. 2012); Saieg v. City of 
Dearborn, 641, F.3d 727, 736–37 (6th Cir. 2011); Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 
387 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2004); Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 
1039 (7th Cir. 2002); Lederman v. United States, 291 F.3d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir. 
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As the jurisprudence in this area is quite explicit, the court found 
that at the State of the City address, with only several hundred 
attendees, the pedestrian traffic flow concerns and the public 
safety concerns were not sufficiently grave and apparent as to 
justify summary judgment in favor of Defendants.45 
The judge also prudently denied Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment, while still finding that her First Amendment 
rights had been violated, because the facts in dispute were central 
to the determination of liability.46  Summary judgment is only 
appropriate where the facts are so clear and undisputed that no 
reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, which 
was clearly not the situation in this case.47 Suppression of 
constitutional rights, especially those held as dearly as the right to 
free speech, is a serious matter, both for the victim of such 
suppression and the alleged suppressor.  Thus, in denying the 
parties cross-motions for summary judgment in this case, the 
court ensured that a fair and just decision will be arrived at, after 
a weighing of the merits of the claims and defenses of the 
respective parties.48 
CONCLUSION 
Although the court found that individual defendants’ actions 
were not narrowly applied to serve a legitimate government 
purpose and were thus unconstitutional violations of Plaintiff’s 
First Amendment rights, summary judgment was not appropriate 
in favor of the individual defendants and the City of Providence or 
Plaintiff because significant material issues of fact remain to be 
resolved in order to justly apportion liability.49 
 




 45.  Id. at *1. 
 46.  Id. at *12–13. 
 47.  See id. at *3. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  Id. at *12–13. 
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Contract Law.  Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I. 
2013).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a nominee of a mortgage 
lender, who holds only legal title to the mortgage but does not hold the 
accompanying promissory note, may exercise the statutory power of sale and 
foreclose on the mortgage.1 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In May of 2007, Anthony Bucci and his wife (“the plaintiffs”) 
made arrangements to finance the purchase of a home.  
Accordingly, they borrowed $249,900 from Lehman Brothers 
Bank, FSB (“Lehman Brothers”), signed a promissory note that 
evidenced the debt, and executed a mortgage on the property that 
secured the loan.2  However, although the promissory note was 
made payable to Lehman Brothers, the mortgage was granted to 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS).3  The 
mortgage document provided that MERS was designated “as 
nominee for the lender and the lender’s successors and assigns.”4 
In October 2008, the plaintiffs defaulted on the note by 
ceasing to make loan payments.5  After the plaintiffs failed to cure 
the default, MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings and scheduled 
a foreclosure sale for July 10, 2009.6  However, the day before the 
 1.  Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069, 1088–89 (R.I. 
2013). 
 2.  Id. at 1072.  While only Anthony Bucci signed the note, both he and 
his wife executed the mortgage; “[h]owever, this fact d[id] not affect [the 
Court’s] decision in this case.”  Id. at 1072 n.1. 
 3.  Id. at 1072. 
 4.  Id. at 1073.  In 1993, MERS was developed by major participants in 
the lending community “to form a national electronic registration system that 
would track the transfer of ownership interests in residential loans.”  Id. at 
1072.  According to MERS, prior to its creation, “the constant buying and 
selling of mortgage-backed loans [on the secondary mortgage market] became 
costly and time-consuming, because each transfer required that an 
assignment of the mortgage be recorded in the local land evidence records.”  
Id. at 1073.  “In a typical MERS transaction, when a loan is made by a 
member of MERSCORP [the parent company of defendant MERS], the 
member will be designated as the lender in the promissory note, and MERS 
will be named in the mortgage as the mortgagee.”  Id. at 1073.  This allows 
members of MERS to transfer title to other MERS members without having 
to re-record with each transfer because MERS remains as holder of the 
mortgage.  Id. at 1073. 
 5.  Id. at 1072. 
 6.  Id. at 1074. 
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foreclosure sale was set to take place, the plaintiffs commenced an 
action seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in an 
attempt to prevent MERS from exercising the power of sale 
contained in the mortgage.7  The plaintiffs presented a variety of 
arguments asserting that MERS lacked the authority to 
foreclose.8  The trial justice encapsulated the controversy in two 
inquiries:  first, whether MERS had the contractual authority to 
foreclose under the note and mortgage, and second, whether 
MERS had the statutory authority to foreclose.9  The trial justice 
answered in the affirmative to both questions and entered 
judgment on behalf of the defendants.10  Plaintiffs appealed.11 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The plaintiffs asserted a variety of errors on appeal.12  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed each of the plaintiffs’ 
arguments after categorizing them based on whether they 
contested the defendant’s contractual authority to foreclose or the 
defendant’s statutory authority to foreclose.13 
 
A.   Contractual Authority 
First, the plaintiffs argued that the provision of the mortgage 
that empowered the “Lender” to invoke the statutory power of sale 
precluded MERS from having contractual authority to foreclose 
and sell the property.14  In agreement with the trial justice, the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that this language did not 
preclude MERS from foreclosing because another provision of the 
 7.  Id. at 1074–75. 
 8.  Id. at 1075–76. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1076–77. 
 11.  Id. at 1077. 
 12.  Id. at 1078–79.  
 13.  Id. at 1079.  In addition, the plaintiffs argued that this case was 
moot because MERS had issued an internal policy change preventing MERS 
from initiating future foreclosure proceedings.  Id.  However, the Court 
concluded that this was “merely a voluntary cessation by MERS” because the 
“plaintiffs have failed to provide . . . any indication that MERS ‘cannot 
reasonably be expected to’ reinitiate foreclosure proceedings if this case were 
dismissed as moot.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the case before the 
Court was not moot.  Id. at 1081. 
 14.  Id. at 1081. 
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mortgage “specifically granted the Statutory Power of Sale” and 
right to foreclose to MERS.15  The Court noted that the language 
that granted the “Lender” power to invoke the statutory power of 
sale did not negate the previous language that explicitly granted 
MERS the right to foreclose and sell the property.16 
The plaintiffs’ second argument was that Lehman Brothers 
never authorized MERS to act as its nominee because Lehman 
Brothers did not sign the mortgage.17  The trial justice had 
dismissed this argument, reasoning that Lehman Brothers would 
not have disbursed the loan proceeds to the plaintiffs if, in fact, it 
did not intend to designate MERS as its nominee.18  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court took a different route to reach the same 
conclusion.19  First, the Court noted that “[a] nominee 
relationship is akin to that of a principle and agent,” and the 
existence of such a relationship is a question of fact.20  Before the 
trial judge, the parties had agreed to the fact that MERS was the 
nominee of the beneficial owner of the note.21  Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that because the existence of an agency 
relationship is a question of fact, and the parties had previously 
agreed to this fact, the plaintiffs had waived their agency 
argument.22 
 
B.    Statutory Authority 
The plaintiffs presented three arguments regarding the 
statutory authority for MERS to foreclose and exercise the power 
of sale.23  First, the plaintiffs cited to § 18-10-1 and contended 
 15.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 1077. 
 19.  Id. at 1082. 
 20.  Id. (citing Culhane v. Aurora Loan Servs. of Neb., 826 F. Supp. 2d 
352, 370 (D. Mass. 2011)). 
 21.  Id. at 1082–83.  Before the trial justice, the parties had agreed to a 
certain portion of the affidavit of Cheryl R. Marchant, Vice President of the 
Aurora, the servicer of the loan.  Id. at 1076, 1082.  Within this agreed-upon 
portion was a paragraph that provided that “MERS, in its capacity as a 
mortgagee, is the nominee of the beneficial owner of the Note.”  Id. at 1082–
83. 
 22.  Id. at 1083. 
 23.  Id. 
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that because MERS was not a trust company, nor a national 
banking association, this section precluded it from acting as a 
nominee.24  The Court first provided that this argument was 
waived because this statute was not raised before the trial 
justice.25  Nevertheless, the Court went on to conclude that even if 
the argument had been raised below, the section has no effect on 
MERS’s ability to act as a nominee.26  The Court reasoned that 
simply because the statute authorizes other entities to act in a 
nominee capacity did not necessarily preclude MERS from doing 
so.27 
The plaintiffs next argued that MERS may not exercise the 
statutory power of sale contained in § 34-11-22 because MERS 
was not a true mortgagee, but instead a “nominee mortgagee,” 
which was not contemplated by any Rhode Island statute.28  
However, the Court noted that the right to exercise the power of 
sale in a mortgage is not derived from statute, but rather from 
contract.29 Therefore, in order to protect the liberty of contracting, 
the agreement “shall be held valid and enforced in the courts[] 
unless a violation of the law or public policy is clear and 
certain.”30  Given that the designation of MERS as grantee of the 
mortgage was not a “clear and certain” violation of §34-11-22, the 
Supreme Court held that MERS was the mortgagee.31 
The plaintiffs’ final assertion conceded that MERS was the 
mortgagee, but provided that because it did not also hold the note, 
it was implicitly prohibited from foreclosing or selling as 
legislation regulating mortgagees required there be a unity in the 
note holder and mortgagee.32  As an initial matter, the Court 
recognized that it is no longer the case that the mortgagee and 
note holder are almost always the same entity.33  The Court first 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 1083–84. 
 26.  Id. at 1084. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 1085 (quoting Gorman v St. Raphael Acad., 853 A.2d 28, 38 
(R.I. 2004) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 31.  Id. at 1085. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 1086. When the statutes were originally enacted, the 
mortgagee and note holder were almost always the same entity, but due to 
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found support within the definitions of nominee and note owner.  
While a nominee “holds bare legal title,” the note owner “retains 
the beneficial interest, or equitable title, in the mortgage.”34  
Citing the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the 
Court noted that “[t]he law contemplates distinctions between the 
legal interest in a mortgage and the beneficial interest in the 
underlying debt.  These are distinct interests, and they may be 
held by different parties.”35  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
the note and the equitable interest in the mortgage remained 
unified, as the lender retained equitable title to the mortgage and 
passed that equitable title to each of its successors and assigns.36  
In addition, the Court noted that MERS was the holder of the 
legal title to the mortgage, and has always acted as an agent of 
the owner of the equitable title.37  Accordingly, as the holder of 
legal title, MERS may foreclose on behalf of the note owner, but 
the proceeds from such a foreclosure sale are a part of the 
beneficial interest belonging to the owner of the note.38 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rightfully concluded that a 
nominee of a mortgage lender, without holding the accompanying 
promissory note, may exercise the statutory power of sale and 
foreclose on the mortgage.  In an ever-changing world, the laws 
must be able to adapt without allowing nonmaterial distinctions 
to have a material impact.  In reality, when a mortgagor defaults 
on their loan, does it matter to the mortgagor whether the “Entity 
A” or “Entity B” initiates foreclosure proceedings and invokes the 
statutory power of sale? 
The answer to that question is likely, “that depends.”  If 
the modernization of the world of lending, this is no longer the case.  Id. 
 34.  Id. at 1087. 
 35.  Id. at 1087–88 (citing Culhane, 708 F.3d at 292) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 36.  Id. at 1088–89. 
 37.  Id.  The Court noted a policy reason for finding this agency 
relationship; citing the Restatement (Third) Property §5.4 cmt. e., it noted 
that “Courts should be vigorous in seeking to find such a relationship, since 
the result is otherwise likely to be a windfall for the mortgagor and the 
frustration of [the note owners]’s expectation of security.”  Id. at 1089. 
 38.  Id. 
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certain policies are followed, then aside from some initial 
confusion for the mortgagor and perhaps different procedures to 
follow based on which entity initiates foreclosure proceedings, 
there may not be very much of an issue.  Of course, as noted by 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court, MERS does provide some 
benefits, including the easier buying and selling of mortgage-
backed loans in the secondary mortgage market.39  Additionally, if 
these nominee mortgagees were not permitted to exercise the 
right to foreclose and statutory power of sale, this would allow for 
some tremendous windfalls for mortgagors with MERS-type 
lending transactions across the country.40 
However, when document-recording policies within MERS are 
not followed or are otherwise insufficient, some significant 
problems can surface.  For example, in a bankruptcy case, due to 
“issues surrounding [an] assignment from MERS,” Wells Fargo 
was unable to prove how it acquired the note at issue, and as a 
result, that it owned the note.41  That case makes it evident that 
strict adherence to recording regulations must be had; otherwise, 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the legal interest 
and equitable interest in a mortgage may be held by different 
parties without breaking the unity between the note holder and 
mortgagee.  Further, a nominee of a mortgage lender, who holds 
only legal title to the mortgage, but who is not holder of the 
accompanying promissory note, may exercise the statutory power 
of sale and foreclose on the mortgage. 
 
Aaron F. Nadich 
 
 
 39.  Id. at 1073. 
 40.  Id. at 1088.  
 41.  See In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 56–57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
Consequently, the court held that Wells Fargo did not have standing to bring 
its claim.  Id. 
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Contract Law.  The Law Firm of Thomas A. Tarro, III, et al. v. Maria 
Checrallah, et al., 60 A.3d 598 (R.I. 2013).  An attorney and law firm sued a 
former client, alleging breach of contract, as the former client had retained 
the attorney and law firm on a contingent fee basis to secure a settlement 
agreement, but failed to pay the attorney.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
attorney and law firm. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In March 1989, Maria Checrallah (the “Defendant”), hired 
Thomas A. Tarro (the “Plaintiff”) to “prosecute and settle all 
claims for damage against [her father’s estate] and [her brother] 
or others who shall be liable on account of the handling of [her 
father’s estate] before and after his death.”1  The Defendant 
agreed to pay Plaintiff fifteen percent of any monies recovered in 
prosecuting or settling her claims.2 Plaintiff negotiated a 
settlement of the Defendant’s claims with Victory Finishing 
Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter “Victory”) for $2,390,000.3 After 
securing the settlement, Plaintiff set up a distribution between 
the two beneficiaries of the estate (the Defendant and her 
brother), and began to act as a collection agent for the Defendant.4  
At this point, the Plaintiff and Defendant agreed the Plaintiff 
would continue his representation of the Defendant in any 
matters relating to the estate and the settlement.5 
Over the next decade, Victory made payments on the 
settlement; pursuant to their agreement, fifteen percent of each 
payment went to Plaintiff as his fee.6  After 1999, Victory entered 
into receivership, and the estate filed claims in the receivership 
proceeding in an effort to secure the payment of the settlement.7  
As a part of the receivership proceeding, in February of 2002, 
Plaintiff served Victory’s receiver with notice of his attorney’s lien 
for the amounts still owed to the Defendant.8 
 1.  Tarro v. Checrallah, 60 A.3d 598, 599 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. at 599–600. 
 5.  Id. at 600. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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In July of 2002, the Defendant discharged the Plaintiff from 
his duties as her attorney and retained new counsel.9  Three years 
later, in 2005, the Defendant and successor counsel made a final 
settlement agreement with Victory regarding the promissory 
note.10  The Defendant accepted a payment of $1,250,000 as 
payment of her claim, with $100,000 payable within ninety days of 
the agreement, and the balance due by August 2007.11  An 
amendment to the final settlement mandated $200,000 be paid by 
August 2006, with the balance being due by August 2007.12 
The Plaintiff moved to enforce his attorney’s lien and received 
fifteen percent of this $200,000 payment, initially deposited 
within the Registry of the Court, later released to the Plaintiff by 
the Superior Court.13  It is undisputed that the final payment of 
$950,000 was made to the Defendant in time, and that the 
Plaintiff never received a portion of either the initial $100,000 
payment or the final $950,000 payment.14 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract 
and other related actions against the Defendant, requesting 
fifteen percent of the $100,000 and $950,000 payments.15  The 
Defendant responded, filing a counter claim that the Plaintiff had 
breached his representation agreement by failing to provide 
“effective and zealous representation,” as well as alleging 
malpractice; these counterclaims were disposed of by summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiff.16  The Plaintiff then moved for 
summary judgment on its own claims.17 
At a Superior Court hearing on the summary judgment 
motion, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff was not entitled 
to a contingency fee for the receivership settlement, as he was 
discharged prior to the negotiation of that settlement and recovery 
should be limited under quantum meruit for the value of services 
rendered.18  The Superior Court then granted summary judgment 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. n.4. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 600–01.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 601. 
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for the Plaintiff, holding that the Plaintiff earned fifteen percent 
of any amounts recovered by the Defendant when the 1989 
settlement was negotiated.19 Plaintiff was awarded fifteen percent 
of the receivership settlement negotiated by successor counsel as 
well as prejudgment interest.  After the entry of final judgment, 
the Defendant appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.20 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews the Superior 
Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, affirming “only if, 
after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party” the Court concludes that “no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”21  The non-moving party cannot 
rely upon allegations or denials in pleadings and must prove the 
existence of disputed facts by competent evidence.22 The 
Defendant contended that although the material facts of the case 
were not disputed, the Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law, because the successor counsel actually negotiated 
the final settlement after Victory entered receivership.23  
Additionally, in the event the Plaintiff succeeded, the Defendant 
urged the Court to limit the Plaintiff’s recovery under quantum 
meruit, allowing recovery only for the value of services rendered.24 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court began its review noting that 
clients have the right to discharge their attorneys at will, 
although in doing so clients may be subject to consequences for 
breach of contract.25  The Court held that the major distinction 
between recovery in contract and recovery under quantum meruit 
lies in the amount of performance of attorney’s services completed 
prior to discharge.26  Recovery for the reasonable value of services 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.; see Great American E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d 571, 574 (R.I. 
2012). 
 22.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 601; see Narragansett Improvement Co. v. 
Wheeler, 21 A.3d 430, 438 (R.I. 2011). 
 23.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id.; see Lake v. Winfield Fuller Co., 173 A. 119, 120 (R.I. 1934). 
 26.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602. 
 
TARRO.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:39 PM 
882 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:879 
rendered under quantum meruit is always allowable after 
discharge without cause; specifically, recovery is limited to this 
form when an attorney is discharged without cause prior to the 
full performance of all duties contemplated in an agreement.27  
Where an attorney has substantially performed the duties set 
forth in an agreement though, the appropriate remedy is in 
contract and will be found in the expected benefit of the bargain.28  
This expectancy can only be satisfied if the agreed contingent fee 
is paid in full.29 
Turning to the facts of this matter, the Court found that there 
was no dispute, as the Plaintiff agreed to represent the Defendant 
in the probate proceedings for her father’s estate, and he would 
receive fifteen percent of any amount recovered.30  The Court 
examined the retainer agreement and concentrated on the express 
provision that the Plaintiff would be paid “[f]ifteen (15%) [p]ercent 
of whatever may be recovered from said claim by suit, settlement 
or any other manner.”31  The Court then found that when the 
Plaintiff reached the original probate settlement, he had 
performed his duties to the Defendant under the agreement and 
became entitled to his full contingent fee; the discharge of his 
services after this point did not affect his right to the full fee.32  
The Court concluded by dismissing the Defendant’s contention 
that separate collection efforts conducted by successor counsel 
diminished the Plaintiff’s right to his fee and affirming the 




 27.  See id.; Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 10 (Cal. 1972). 
 28.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 602. 
 29.  Id.  The Court noted that other jurisdictions have also held that if an 
attorney substantially performs under a contingent fee agreement, then the 
contract remedy of the expected benefit of the bargain is the correct remedy.  
Id. at 603; see also Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 906 F.2d 650, 
652–53 (11th Cir. 1990); McCullough v. Waterside Associates, 925 A.2d 352, 
355–57 (Conn. App. Ct.  2007); MacInnis v. Pope, 285 P.2d 688, 689–90 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1955). 
 30.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 603. 
 31.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
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COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reached the correct result 
in this case. The Defendant sought to deny the Plaintiff a 
contracted fee after the Plaintiff had completed the duties 
contemplated by their agreement.  To reach another result would 
be to deny the Plaintiff a vested right under the terms of the 
agreement between the parties.  Additionally, to rule in favor of 
the Defendant would lead to parties retroactively altering the 
terms of a contingent fee agreement, which would undermine the 
integrity of any contingent fee arrangement.  Parties should not 
be allowed to alter fees already earned as the appropriate time for 
such negotiation is during the period in which a retainer 
agreement is created. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision is founded on 
traditional contract principles, and the Court’s affirmation of 
summary judgment, a “drastic remedy” that is dealt with 
cautiously,34 sends a clear message—the integrity of contingent 
fee agreements will be respected.  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court was most interested in upholding the retainer agreement as 
written and signaled it may have gone even further than the 
Plaintiff requested by awarding damages in excess of what the 
Superior Court awarded.35  The material facts not being in 
dispute, the Court faced a choice between upholding a traditional 
right to recovery, or the de facto abrogation of an agreement.  
Affirming the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment made 
it clear that the Court will not encourage parties to seek judicial 
rewriting of substantially performed retainer agreements. 
The enforcement of contracts is critical to commerce and 
personal transactions of all sizes and shapes.36  Altering in any 
way the agreed terms of the parties would destroy a deal arrived 
at by equals and consonant with well established contract law.  
 34.  Tarro, 60 A.3d at 601 (citation omitted). 
 35.  See Tarro, 60 A.3d at 603–04 n.6. 
 36.  See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS §1.1 (Richard A. 
Lord ed., West 4th ed. 2007) (“Contract law is designed to protect the 
expectations of the contracting parties.  It is intended to enforce the 
expectancy interests created by the parties’ promises so that they can allocate 
risks and costs during their bargaining.”); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ON 
CONTRACTS 6 (Aspen, 3d ed. 2004) (“Exchange is the mainspring of any 
economic system that relies as heavily on free enterprise as does ours.”).   
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The Defendant did not allege anything beyond a failure to 
perform.  The Court correctly granted summary judgment because 
there were no facts whatsoever indicating an actual controversy 
about whether performance was made by the Plaintiff. This 
judgment made it clear that contracting parties cannot avoid their 
obligations on bare allegations unsupported by fact. 
The case does, however, raise legitimate concerns. The Court’s 
decision here means that prospective clients seeking to retain 
counsel need to be aware, in advance of signing any agreement, 
that there is little doubt it will be judicially enforced if necessary.  
The Court’s decision made clear that, when balancing the 
interests of an attorney being paid for work performed and a 
client’s desire to limit payment to value received, the client’s 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an attorney who 
has substantially performed duties under a retainer agreement is 
entitled to the full fee assigned to him by that agreement, even if 
he is subsequently discharged. The Court determined that 
subsequent alteration of a settlement agreement by a successor 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099 (R.I. 2013).  A defendant 
contended that it was an error for the trial court justice to decline to (1) 
conduct a post-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether or not the jury 
was racially biased and if this was an improper extraneous influence as well 
as if the jurors engaged in misconduct, (2) allow all fifteen members of the 
jury to participate in deliberations, and (3) permit jury instructions that a 
defense to disorderly conduct charges could be found if police were 
excessively aggressive.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, except 
for under rare circumstances, jurors’ racial bias does not constitute 
“extraneous prejudicial information” calling for review as prescribed by 
Rule 606(b). 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In July of 2003, the Narragansett Indian Tribe (“the Tribe”) 
and the Rhode Island State Police engaged in an altercation as a 
result of which seven Tribe members, including Hiawatha Brown 
(“Brown”), were arrested.1  Brown was charged with one count 
each of simple assault, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct.2 
At the trial court level, the jury originally consisted of sixteen 
individuals:  three racial minorities and thirteen non-minorities.3  
A minority juror, however, became ill and was subsequently 
discharged from service, leaving only two minority jurors on a 
panel totaling fifteen individuals.4 Upon the completion of 
testimony, the trial justice denied Brown’s motion requesting that 
the jury instructions provide that disorderly conduct is defensible 
if state actors used excessive force during the altercation.5 
Brown requested that all members of the jury be allowed to 
participate in deliberations, or alternatively, if only granted a 
twelve panel jury, that both minorities be guaranteed members.6  
The State objected to these requests.7  The trial justice denied 
both of Brown’s requests, reasoning that she neither had the 
authority to allow all fifteen jurors to deliberate if the State 
 1.  State v. Brown, 62 A.3d 1099, 1102 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. at 1102. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
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objected nor to provide a guaranteed slot on the empaneled jury 
for the minorities.8  Once the twelve-person jury was assembled, 
only one minority remained.9 
During the course of jury deliberations, the trial justice 
received a series of three notes from the jury.10  The first 
expressed concern over a juror who refused to find any defendant 
guilty due to the state police’s actions; the second, sent hours 
later, informed the judge that the jury was deadlocked on the 
majority of the charges and requested that she clarify the law 
regarding self-defense; the third stated that the jury was hung 
regarding all sixteen charges.11 
Upon close of deliberations that day, the deputy sheriff saw a 
group of jurors “lagging behind . . . speaking” quietly.12  He 
approached them and informed them that they were not allowed 
to discuss the case unless all jurors were present, as he felt that 
one of the jurors was pushing his opinion on the others.13  Due to 
the deputy’s suspicions, the judge individually interviewed several 
jurors who had been observed taking part in the conversation.14  
Each denied that they were discussing the case, but rather 
admitted to speaking about motivations, frustrations, dispositions, 
and personality conflicts.15  After receiving a “pep talk” from the 
judge, the jury convicted Brown of disorderly conduct and simple 
assault but acquitted Brown of the charge of resisting arrest.16 
Approximately one month later, Brown moved for a new trial 
stating that, subsequent to the close of trial, he discovered 
 8.  Id. at 1102–03. 
 9.  Id. at 1103. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 1103–04.  As a result, Brown made two motions:  (1) for a 
mistrial, reasoning that jury deliberations had broken down, or in the 
alternative, (2) for the removal of the juror who was pressuring his opinion on 
the other jurors outside of deliberations.  Id. at 1104.  The State objected to 
both motions based on the statements from the jurors that they had not 
discussed the case except during deliberations.  Id.  The trial justice, relying 
on statements from the jurors and the fact that he sheriff had only seen the 
jurors talking, but had not heard the content of their conversation, found that 
she had no proper basis from which she could either declare a mistrial or find 
that one juror had “tainted” the others.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 1104–05. 
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evidence that his right to a fair trial was obliterated as 
misconduct occurred during juror deliberations.17  In support of 
this motion, Brown submitted three affidavits discussing juror 
hostility from three jurors.18  These jurors had contacted Brown’s 
counsel after trial.19 
The first affidavit, from juror one, the self-identified minority 
juror, expressed concern that two other jurors had a “joint agenda” 
and that jurors were biased against Brown and his co-
defendants.20 The juror pointed to several incidents to 
substantiate her claim.21  For example, she noted that the jury 
foreperson sent the first note to the judge without asking for 
“input or approval” from any of the other jurors.22  Additionally, 
when the Tribe’s Chief was testifying, a juror questioned, “Why 
did they stand up? He’s nothing.”23  Further, another juror asked 
during jury deliberations, “Who are those people to touch a police 
officer?”24 
Juror two was afraid that two other jurors spoke about the 
case outside of deliberations, although she admitted to not having 
heard any discussions and, thus, her apprehension was based 
solely from watching their behavior throughout the course of the 
trial.25  Juror two reiterated the claims made in the first affidavit, 
that a juror referred to the defendants as “those people” in regard 
to the statement made about touching a police officer and that the 
foreperson sent the judge a note without first consulting her.26  
Juror two also stated that when the jury reached a verdict, one of 
the two jurors whose conduct was allegedly questionable banged 
two water bottles together like he was playing a “tom-tom” 
 17.  Id. at 1105.  This motion was made pursuant to Rule 33 of the 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by which a defendant can move 
for a new trial based on new evidence discovered up to three years after 
judgment is entered.  Id. 
 18.  Id. For the rest of this survey, these jurors will be referred to as 
jurors one, two, and three, respectively. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 1106. 
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
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drum.27 
Juror three stated that the two jurors whose conduct was in 
question had a disrespectful disposition toward the defendants but 
“never used any racial epithets.”28  Juror three noted that he 
remembered the tom-tom incident and found it disrespectful; he 
noted that the jury was not consulted regarding the content of the 
first note the foreperson sent to the judge.29  Juror three also 
speculated that the two jurors in question discussed the case 
outside of deliberations.30 
In June of 2008, the trial court held a hearing on Brown’s 
motion for a new trial to determine if an evidentiary hearing was 
needed.31  Brown argued that the affidavits evidenced juror bias, 
contained comments that “could be determined to be racially 
motivated,” and proved misconduct; an evidentiary hearing was 
therefore necessary.32  The State, however, opposed the hearing, 
insisting that Brown’s motion was grounded in “speculation” and 
mere “interpretations” of other jurors’ actions (but not racial bias 
or epithets), and thus did not show any extraneous information 
had compromised the jury deliberation process.33  Accordingly, the 
State argued that the affidavits were inadmissible as evidence 
pursuant to Rhode Island Rules of Evidence 606(b).34  The trial 
justice denied Brown’s motion for a new trial, agreeing with the 
arguments advanced by the State.35  However, she noted that 
“this Court’s precedent provided little guidance on the issue of 
whether the affidavits constituted a sufficient showing of racial 
bias to warrant an evidentiary hearing,” but ultimately concluded 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id. at 1106.  This rule prohibits a juror from testifying to any 
statement, matter, or to anything upon their or another juror’s mind or 
emotions which influenced them to assent or dissent from the indictment or 
verdict, or to their mental processes, which occurred during jury 
deliberations, during any inquiry conducted regarding the validity of an 
indictment or verdict; it further prohibits a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a 
juror’s statement regarding any matter from which they would be precluded 
from testifying to be used for such purposes.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1107. 
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that the conduct included in the documents was ambiguous and 
did not grant the motion.36  In July of 2008, Brown appealed to 
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, arguing that the trial court 
should have conducted the evidentiary hearing, granted his 
request to allow of the jurors to deliberate, and provided the jury 
with his proffered instruction regarding disorderly conduct.37 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
A.    Juror Misconduct 
A juror may, pursuant to Rule 606(b), testify regarding jury 
deliberations regarding whether “extraneous prejudicial 
information” or “any outside influence” played an improper role on 
influencing any juror, despite the general protections afforded to 
the secrecy of the deliberative process.38  The Court noted that 
although the rule was enacted to advance termination for the 
litigation process as well as finality to judgments, these policies 
must be balanced against a defendant’s right to a verdict based 
exclusively on the evidence presented within the context of the 
trial and courtroom.39 
In the course of such review, an issue of first impression for 
the Court arose: whether the racial bias of jury members 
constitutes “extraneous prejudicial information” or “outside 
influence” which may properly be testified to under Rule 606(b).40  
Thus, the Court deferred to federal case law for guidance and 
agreed with the First and Tenth Circuits that a juror’s racial bias 
does not fall within the rule’s prescribed definition of “extraneous 
prejudicial information” or “outside influence.”41  However, the 
Court agreed with the First Circuit that occasionally juror 
testimony should be admitted to resolve the question of whether 
the defendant received a fair trial where ethnic or racial prejudice 
is involved.42 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1107–08. 
 38.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1109–10 (citations omitted). 
 42.  Id. at 1110.  Contrarily, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that “jury perfection” was unrealistic, and as features of 
 
BROWN.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:43 PM 
890 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:885 
The Court held that the decision as to whether such an 
inquiry should be conducted is within the discretion of the trial 
judge, who is most familiar with the facts and circumstances of 
the case and those participating in the process.43  The Court 
determined that, because the jury (1) acquitted each of Brown’s 
codefendants on at least one charge and (2) convicted Brown while 
acquitting him of one charge, the evidentiary hearing was 
needless as the jury must have scrutinized the circumstances 
surrounding each individual charge to produce such outcomes, 
obliterating Brown’s allegation of a biased jury.44  The Court 
categorized the jurors’ conduct as “impolite” and “ambiguous” but 
lacking a definite “racist undertone” sufficient to substantiate 
Brown’s argument that his conviction was a result of his racial 
background as it was “capable of different interpretations.”45  
Further, as none of the jurors openly articulated racial slurs or 
recommended that Brown’s race or ethnicity should play a role in 
their analysis, the Court agreed with the trial judge’s 
determination that an allegation of racial bias was speculative at 
best.46 
The Court also addressed two instances of non-racially related 
juror misconduct which include the note that was sent to the trial 
justice without the knowledge of the other jurors and the 
discussion of the case outside of the context of deliberations by two 
jurors.47  The Court affirmed the denial of Brown’s motion for a 
new trial based on these allegations of misconduct because they 
did not advance any indication that jury deliberations were 
polluted with banned extrinsic evidence, and the trial justice 
ignored the note upon receipt.48 
 
B.    Selection of Deliberating Cohort of Jurors 
Brown argued on appeal that the trial court committed 
the litigation process serve to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, the 
need to allow evidence of post-verdict testimony from jurors to protect that 
right is non-existent.  Id. at 1109 (citation omitted). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 1110–11. 
 46.  Id. at 1111. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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reversible error in denying his request to allow all fifteen 
members of the jury to participate in deliberations as well as in 
failing to demand that the State provide a “race-neutral reason” 
for objecting to a jury deliberation panel of fifteen individuals.49  
The Court reasoned that a defendant in a criminal case does not 
have a right to any specific individual on a jury.50  Additionally, 
pursuant to Rule 24(c)51 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, only twelve jurors proceed to deliberations unless the 
parties can agree upon another number, and in this case, the 
State did not agree.52  The Court noted that its objection makes 
sense considering that the verdict must be unanimous, and the 
State has the burden of proof.53  Since the jurors who proceed to 
deliberations are chosen randomly, the Court held that no special 
race-sensitive protections are necessary as the process is 
inherently “color-blind.”54  Accordingly, the Court rejected both of 
Brown’s arguments regarding the juror cohort. 
 
C.    Proposed Jury Instructions 
Finally, Brown contended that he was entitled to a jury 
instruction that he could not be found guilty on the charge of 
disorderly conduct if the jury found that the police were the party 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 1112. 
 51.  The pertinent portion of the rule states:   
The court in its discretion may direct the impaneling of a jury not to 
exceed sixteen (16) members, all having the same qualifications and 
impaneled and sworn in the same manner as a jury of twelve (12).  If 
a juror is excused after he or she has been sworn but before any 
opening statement is begun, another juror may be impaneled and 
sworn in his or her place.  All the jurors shall sit and hear the case, 
but the court for cause may excuse any of them from service provided 
the number of jurors is not reduced to less than twelve (12) or such 
other number stipulated to under Rule 23(b).  If more than such 
number remain at the conclusion of the court's charge, the clerk in 
the presence of the court and the parties shall put the names of the 
remaining jurors in a box and from it shall draw twelve (12) names, 
or such other number stipulated to by the parties, to determine the 
issues.  
RI SUPER. R. CRIM. P. RULE 24. 
 52.  Brown, 62 A.3d at 1112. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
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responsible for initiating the altercation which ultimately led to 
his arrest.55  The Court failed to identify any precedent that 
supported Brown’s assertion, and therefore concluded that the 




While it is shameful that racial and ethnic prejudice may still 
be a rampant issue today, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in 
handling this issue on first impression, has rightfully expressed 
legitimate concerns regarding the introduction of evidence of 
racial bias as extraneous prejudicial information on a jury verdict 
while recognizing the importance of ensuring the federally and 
state guaranteed right to fair trial. 
Examples of extraneous influences upon a jury that are 
admissible into post-verdict testimony regarding jury 
deliberations include “jurors reading news reports about the case, 
jurors communicating with third parties, bribes, and jury 
tampering.”57  All of these share the characteristic of constituting 
affirmative actions, posing a clear distinction from possessing a 
racial bias, which does not necessarily have a blatant active 
component.  Simply because one does not openly express a 
prejudice does not mean it does not exist.58  In a world of arguably 
increasing racial tension, there has been a push by some to allow 
evidence of racial bias to be presented before an evidentiary 
hearing to ensure a defendant’s right to a fair trial has not been 
violated;59 this view can be summarized as embodied by a 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 1112–13. 
 57.  Pond, Note, Juror Testimony of Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations:  
United States v. Benally and the Obstacle of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 
BYU L. REV. 244 (2010). 
 58.  See Richard Gabriel, Race, bias and the Zimmerman jury, CNN (July 
16, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/gabriel-bias-zimmerman/. 
 59.  See Amanda R. Wolin, Comment, What Happens in the Jury Room 
Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should It?:  A Conflict Between the Sixth 
Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV. 262, 289–
93 (2012); See Circuit Split:  Ensuring Racial Bias Is Not A Basis For The 
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statement made by D. Grayson Yeargin, Washington, D.C.’s co-
chair of the ABA Section of Litigation’s Criminal Litigation 
Committee’s: “You have to look under the hood now and then to 
make sure the jury is functioning as it should.”60 
However, this view is not shared by all.  Many courts still 
refuse to make an exception to Rule 606(b) for evidence of racial 
bias.  Further, issues would arise regarding other prejudices, such 
as how the disabled would fit into such an analysis of exceptions.  
A concern seems to be a line drawing problem: if racial bias 
becomes an external as opposed to internal distinction, what 
would stop any inappropriate comments or actions occurring 
during deliberations from being classified as external, thus 
becoming admissible,61 and thereby destroying the longstanding 
principle of the jury as a black box?62  Despite the process of voir 
dire, it is impossible to truly determine the inner thoughts and 
prejudices which a person harbors unless they explicitly manifest 
outward actions to project such feelings.  Additionally, allowing a 
probative venture into one’s possible racial prejudice would 
essentially sponsor an exploratory mission into the mental 
processes of a juror, which violates the widespread notions of 
deference to a rendered verdict. As such, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s hesitance in this area appropriately betokens its 
acknowledgment of the vast difficulties presented by the 
possibility of allowing racial bias evidence to be considered under 
a Rule 606(b) review of a verdict that the judiciary may not 
currently be logistically nor ideologically suited to handle. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the trial court’s 
determination that a juror’s racial bias does not fall within Rule 
606(b)’s definition of “extraneous prejudicial information” or an 
“outside influence.”  However, the court concluded that jurors’ 
 60.  Jannis E. Goodnow, Investigating a Juror’s Claim of Racial Bias, 
LITIGATION NEWS:  FROM THE ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION (July 18, 2013), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/mobile/article-racial-
bias.html. 
 61.  See Pond, supra note 57, at 244. 
 62.  See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men:  Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror 
Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 176–77 (2011). 
 
BROWN.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:43 PM 
894 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:885 
racial bias may be admissible under rare circumstances when 
necessary to ensure that a defendant received a trial void of a jury 
which was not impartial but instead biased against him due to his 
race or ethnicity, that only twelve jurors are to deliberate unless 
the parties can agree, and that provoking a defendant does not 
entitle him to a jury instruction of defense to disorderly conduct. 
 
Dana N. Weiner 
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Criminal Law.  State v. DeRobbio, 62 A.3d 1113 (R.I. 2013).  In an 
unprecedented interpretation of the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. 
Slater Medical Marijuana Act, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a 
dismissal of charges under the Act is premature absent an evidentiary 
hearing at which each defendant has the burden of proving that he was in 
possession of an amount of medical marijuana that conforms to the limits set 
forth in the Act. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On January 21, 2010, Cranston police detectives surveilled 
defendant Dean DeRobbio’s (“DeRobbio” or “Defendant”) home 
prior to executing a search warrant.1  When DeRobbio and co-
Defendant, Joseph Joubert (“Joubert” or “co-Defendant”) exited 
the home, a Cranston police officer was directed to stop their 
vehicle.2  At this time, the officer notified the Defendants that he 
had a warrant to search DeRobbio’s home.3  Both Defendants then 
presented the officer with registry identification cards that were 
issued to them under the Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. 
Slater Medical Marijuana Act, G.L.1956 chapter 28.6 of title 21 
(“the Act”).4  The identification cards listed DeRobbio as a patient 
and Joubert as his primary caregiver.5 Joubert’s identification 
card indicated that DeRobbio was his only patient.6 
After searching DeRobbio’s home, Cranston police discovered 
“thirty-three marijuana plants; thirty-nine marijuana seedlings 
without any visible buds; 31.8 grams of marijuana in a plastic 
container in [DeRobbio’s] freezer; thirty-nine and six-tenths grams 
of marijuana in a plastic freezer bag in the bedroom, two and four-
tenths grams of marijuana in a sandwich bag; [and] twelve and 
one-tenth grams of ‘burnt’ marijuana in a prescription bottle.”7  
 1.  State v. DeRobbio, 62 A.3d 1113, 1114 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id.  
 4.  Id. at 1114–15.  Under the Act, a “registry identification card” is a 
document issued by the Rhode Island Department of Health that identifies a 
person as a registered qualifying patient or a registered primary caregiver.  
Id. at 1115 n.3.  
 5.  Id. at 1115.   
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id.  Police also found 40 Vicodin tablets throughout DeRobbio’s 
home. See id. The legality of this search was not challenged by Defendants on 
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Police reports stated that the mature marijuana plants and 
seedlings were found in two separate “grow rooms” located in 
DeRobbio’s basement.8  A total of eighty-five and nine-tenths 
grams of marijuana was found in DeRobbio’s home, which is 
equivalent to approximately 3.03 ounces of usable marijuana.9 
Police also found another registry identification card in 
DeRobbio’s home that was issued to Joubert’s mother, Marie 
Joubert (“Mrs. Joubert”), and listed her as DeRobbio’s primary 
caregiver.10  Police contacted Mrs. Joubert in reference to the 
marijuana found in DeRobbio’s home and, according to police, she 
stated that she knew about the marijuana plants located in 
DeRobbio’s home and that twenty-four of the plants belonged to 
her, though she could not specify which ones because she had not 
actually witnessed them growing, nor had she ever been inside of 
DeRobbio’s home.11  She indicated that she was growing the 
marijuana for two of her patients, DeRobbio and another whose 
name she could not remember.12 
On June 7, 2010, as a result of the search of DeRobbio’s home, 
Defendants were charged with possessing marijuana with intent 
to deliver in violation of Rhode Island’s Uniform Controlled 
Substance Act (“CSA”), G.L.1956 § 21-28-4.01(a)(4)(i), 
manufacturing marijuana in violation of the same provision, and 
conspiracy to violate the CSA.13  On January 5, 2011, DeRobbio 
moved to dismiss all counts, citing the affirmative defense and 
dismissal provision set forth in the Act.14 
Enacted in 2006 “to protect patients with debilitating medical 
conditions, and their physicians and primary caregivers, from 
arrest and prosecution, criminal and other penalties, and property 
appeal.  Id. at 1115 n.4.   
 8.  Id. The two rooms were windowless and contained “fans, timers, 
high-wattage lights, humidifiers, a ventilation system, filters, and a calendar 
with a schedule indicating when to care for the plants.”  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 1115 n.5. This translation is relevant because the Act 
quantifies “usable marijuana” in terms of ounces, not grams.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 1115. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id.  Mrs. Joubert was not charged in connection with this matter.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 1114.  DeRobbio was also charged with committing a crime of 
violence while having an available firearm in violation of § 11-47-3 and with 
unlawful possession of Vicodin in violation of § 21-28-4.01(c)(2)(i), both of 
which are not discussed in this case.  Id. 
 14.  Id. at 1115.  Joubert later joined in this motion.  Id.   
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forfeiture if such patients engage in the medical use of 
marijuana,”15 the Act allows certain individuals identified by the 
Rhode Island Department of Health (“DOH”) as qualifying 
patients to possess “an amount of marijuana that does not exceed 
twelve (12) mature marijuana plants and two and one-half (2.5) 
ounces of usable marijuana” for medical use.16  Qualifying 
patients under the Act must have been diagnosed by “certain 
medical practitioners as having a debilitating medical condition” 
and must be issued a registry identification card by the DOH.17  
The Act also allows such patients to possess “a reasonable amount 
of unusable marijuana, including up to twelve (12) seedlings” 
which are not counted towards the limits laid out in the Act.18 
Under the Act, primary caregivers19 may also possess “an 
amount of marijuana which does not exceed twelve (12) mature 
marijuana plants and two and one-half (2.5) ounces of usable 
marijuana for each qualifying patient to whom he or she is 
connected through the [DOH’s] registration process.”20  However, 
though a primary caregiver may assist up to five qualifying 
patients, at no time may he or she possess more than twenty-four 
marijuana plants or five ounces of usable marijuana for those 
patients.21  Further, a qualifying patient may have no more than 
two primary caregivers.22 
The affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the Act 
provides that a defendant may assert medical use of marijuana in 
a motion to dismiss criminal charges of possessing marijuana.23  
The Act provides that the charges shall be dismissed following an 
evidentiary hearing at which the defendant must show:  (1) that 
his or her practitioner  has determined in his or her professional 
opinion, and after having done a thorough assessment of the 
patient’s health history and current medical condition, that the 
 15.  Id.at 1115–16.  
 16.  Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Primary caregivers are 
defined under the Act as “a natural person at least twenty-one years of age 
who has been issued a registry identification card from the DOH.”  Id.  
 20.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.   
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benefits of using marijuana for medical purposes would likely 
outweigh the risks, and, (2) that the patient  and the patient’s 
primary caregiver, if any, were “collectively in possession of a 
quantity of marijuana that was not more than what is permitted 
under” the Act.24 
Citing this affirmative defense and dismissal provision, 
Defendants argued that the amount of marijuana found in 
DeRobbio’s home did not exceed what is collectively allowed under 
the Act between a patient (DeRobbio) and his two caregivers 
(Joubert and Mrs. Joubert).25  Refuting the State’s argument that 
the three collectively possessed three greater seedlings than 
allowed under the Act with regard to useable marijuana,26 
Defendants argued that photographic evidence provided by the 
State did not clearly identify which plants would constitute as 
seedlings and which were simply “dead leaves.”27  Further, the 
Defendants argued that the Act does not specify a limit to the 
amount of usable marijuana apart from seedlings, but rather only 
requires the amount of usable marijuana that is possessed aside 
from seedlings be “reasonable.”28 
In objecting to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the State 
argued29 that Defendants violated the possession limits set forth 
under the Act because the Act does not allow for collective 
possession of marijuana among qualifying patients and primary 
caregivers.30  As such, the State contended the entire amount 
marijuana grown and found at DeRobbio’s home must be ascribed 
solely to DeRobbio and could not be split up between DeRobbio, 
Joubert, and Mrs. Joubert or viewed as being possessed 
collectively by the three.31  Accordingly, the amount DeRobbio 
 24.  Id. at 1116–17.  
 25.  Id. at 1117.   
 26.  The Act allows for 12 seedlings per person, so collectively the 
Defendants and Mrs. Joubert could lawfully possess a total of 36 seedlings.  
However, 39 seedlings were found in DeRobbio’s home.  Id at 1115.   
 27.  Id. at 1117.     
 28.  Id. DeRobbio and Joubert further argued that the language 
“collectively in possession” was ambiguous, and, citing precedent from the 
Court, argued that in cases where a criminal statute is deemed ambiguous, 
the criminal information should be dismissed.  Id.  
 29.  The State conceded that both Defendants were valid medical 
marijuana cardholders.  Id.  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  
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possessed placed him in violation of the limits set forth in the 
Act.32  The State also argued that none of the plants could be 
attributed to Mrs. Joubert as a primary caregiver because she 
could not specifically identify which of the plants in DeRobbio’s 
home were hers, she did not actually grow or care for any of the 
plants, and she told police she had never been inside DeRobbio’s 
home.33 
On May 4, 2011, in a bench decision before the Superior 
Court, the hearing justice granted the Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss as to the criminal charges, interpreting the Act as 
allowing collective possession among the Defendants and Mrs. 
Joubert, and thus determining that the Defendants “lawfully 
possess[ed] an authorized amount of marijuana plants and usable 
marijuana.”34  An order dismissing the charges was entered on 
May 16, 2011.35  The State filed a timely appeal.36 
On appeal, the State abandoned its argument that the Act 
does not provide for collective possession among qualifying 
patients and caregivers, but rather focused on the contention that, 
even assuming collective possession was allowed, the Defendants 
were still in violation of the limits allowed under the Act because 
none of the marijuana found in DeRobbio’s home could be 
attributed to Mrs. Joubert.37 Consequently, according to the State, 
the Defendants “could lawfully have possessed only twenty-four 
mature plants,” when in fact thirty-three were discovered in 
DeRobbio’s home.38  The State applied the same line of reasoning 
to Defendants’ possession of the seedlings, arguing that their 
possession exceeded the limits set forth in the Act because none of 
the seedlings could be properly attributed to Mrs. Joubert.39 
The Defendants responded to the State’s argument separately 
 32.  Id.  The State ascribed the same line of reasoning to Joubert, 
arguing that because possession could not be split up amongst the three 
individuals, he too was in violation of the limits set forth in the Act.  Id. at 
1117–18.  
 33.  Id. at 1118. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id.   
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
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on appeal.40  Joubert argued that, assuming there were multiple 
plausible interpretations of the statute, the hearing justice 
“correctly interpreted the Act to defendants’ benefit.”41  DeRobbio 
relied on a similar argument of lenity and added that an 
imposition of criminal liability under the Act would be 
unconstitutional because it does not provide a fair warning to 
criminal defendants.42  The Act, DeRobbio argued, does not 
clearly or unambiguously prohibit collective growth of marijuana, 
nor does it specify the level of involvement or participation that 
each qualifying patient and primary caregiver must provide to 
comply with the Act.43 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
In determining whether the Superior Court erred in granting 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court looked to the plain 
language of the affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the 
Act, noting that the hearing justice was “bound by the terms of 
that provision.”44 Considering the terms of the provision to be 
“abundantly clear,”45 the Court determined that the charges 
brought in a prosecution involving marijuana should only be 
dismissed “following an evidentiary hearing,” that the defendant 
has the burden of requesting, and at which the defendant has the 
burden of proving that the requisite elements of the provision 
have been met.46 
The Court reasoned that because no evidence regarding the 
requisite elements was presented by either of the parties at the 
Superior Court’s hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss, no 
evidentiary hearing was held, thus, the hearing justice’s decision 
to dismiss the charges was “in contravention of the plain terms of 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. at 1119.  
 44.  Id. at 1119–20.  The Court also recognized that a Constitutional 
question may be at issue in this case regarding whether the Act is preempted 
by a federal statute prohibiting the manufacture, distribution or possession of 
marijuana even if it is being used for medical purposes.  However, since 
neither party raised the issue at the lower level or on appeal, the Court 
declined to consider whether the Act would survive preemption.  Id. at 1119.   
 45.  Id. at 1120. 
 46.  Id.  
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the Act.”47  Regarding the dismissal as “premature,” the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court vacated the judgment entered by the 
Superior Court and instructed the hearing justice to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.48 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Court rightfully concluded that the plain language of the 
affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the Act required the 
Defendants to request an evidentiary hearing and prove at the 
hearing that the requisite elements of the provisions have been 
satisfied, thus warranting dismissal of criminal charges associated 
with the possession of marijuana. What this decision fails to 
address, and perhaps rightfully so, as it is not the issue before the 
Court, is the clear ambiguity in the language of the provision. The 
hearing justice recognized the ambiguity of the provision when he 
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, stating that the Act “is a 
poorly-drafted statute . . . [and] a defendant [should not] be 
criminally liable for inartful draftsmanship.”49 
A further indication of the ambiguity of the statute is the 
State’s shift in focus on its arguments between the trial and 
appellate levels.  On appeal, the State abandoned one of its initial 
contentions that the Act was not intended to allow collective 
possession of marijuana amongst qualifying patients and primary 
caregivers. Abandoning this argument suggests that the State’s 
own understanding of the statute was at best questionable. 
The State’s argument on appeal raises another point of 
ambiguity latent in the affirmative defense and dismissal 
provision of the Act that Defendants’ response on appeal also 
addresses:  assuming collective possession is allowed under the 
provision, what level of involvement must a defendant show to 
properly attribute possession to a qualifying patient or primary 
caregiver? Must a qualifying patient and primary caregiver plant, 
grow, care for, and harvest the marijuana for possession to be 
properly attributed to him or her? Or is being registered as a 
patient’s primary caregiver enough? These questions, though 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 1118.   
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recognized in the Court’s opinion, remain unanswered following 
this decision. 
The decision does, however, provide precedent on an 
important procedural aspect of the Act by irrefutably requiring 
that any defendant seeking to invoke the defense and dismissal 
provision of the Act request an evidentiary hearing, and 
subsequently prove at the hearing that the requisite elements of 
the provision have been met.  Though seemingly apparent from 
the plain language of the provision, there was obviously some 
question as to the necessity of the evidentiary hearing if the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court had to speak on the issue.  Following 
this decision, that question has been affirmatively resolved. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plain 
language of the affirmative defense and dismissal provision of the 
Edward O. Hawkins and Thomas C. Slater Medical Marijuana Act 
provides that dismissal of charges in prosecution involving 
marijuana is only appropriate after an evidentiary hearing at the 
request of the defendant, and at which, each defendant has the 
burden of proving that the two requisite elements of the 
affirmative defense and dismissal provision have been met. 
Meghan L. Kruger 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013).  The Rhode 
Island Supreme Court concluded that under the Firearms Act statutory 
definition, for an instrument to qualify as a “firearm,” it must either be 
capable of expelling a projectile or be readily convertible to do so.  The 
defendant in this case, Adrian Hazard, was found to be in violation of his 
probation due to possession of a firearm and attempting to elude the police.  
As the revolver found in the defendant’s car was not within the antique-
firearms exemption allowed under the Firearms Act and could be readily 
converted to expel a projectile, it qualified as a “firearm” under the Act. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On the evening of December 30, 2009, the Providence Police 
received information that there would be a firearm inside of a gold 
Volkswagen within their patrol area.1  Sometime later that night, 
officers spotted a vehicle matching the earlier information 
obstructing the flow of traffic.2  When the officers put on their 
cruiser lights and approached the vehicle it attempted to flee the 
scene.3  This gave way to a brief chase that ended with the vehicle 
being cut off by another police cruiser.4 
Upon stopping the vehicle, the officers found the defendant, 
Arian Hazard (“Defendant”), in the driver’s seat with Carlos 
Washington (“Washington”) in the passenger seat.5  The two men 
were taken into custody, and the officers later found a replica 
Remington 1858 .44-caliber black powder revolver on the floor of 
the vehicle.6 
At the time of his arrest, Defendant was on probation.7  His 
actions on the night of December 30, 2009 gave rise to a probation-
 1.  State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 482 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id.   
 7.  Id.  Defendant was on release from prison following a plea 
agreement entered on November 8, 1996, where he plead guilty to one count 
of manslaughter and one count of carrying a pistol without a license.  As a 
result, Defendant “was sentenced to thirty years for the manslaughter count, 
with fifteen years to serve and the balance suspended, with probation, and a 
consecutive ten-year term, suspended, with probation, for the firearms 
conviction.”  Id. 
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violation hearing.8  At the hearing, Defendant, along with 
Washington and Defendant’s close friend Camille Stokes 
(“Stokes”), gave testimony on the events of the 30th.9  They 
claimed, among other things, that a police officer had approached 
the car with his weapon drawn and that the gun in the car 
belonged to Washington, who brought it unbeknownst to 
Defendant.10  However, Washington’s testimony was in stark 
contrast with the statement that he made earlier to Detective 
Thomas Rawnsley, immediately following his arrest.11  There 
Washington acknowledged that the gun belonged to the 
Defendant.12  Ultimately, the trial justice did not find these 
witnesses to be credible based on “inconsistencies within each of 
their statements” and “each hav[ing] a strong motivation to lie 
based on their close relationships with [D]efendant.”13 
Accordingly, the lower court discerned that the revolver 
belonged to the Defendant.14  The trial justice next had to 
determine whether the revolver fit within the definition of either 
“firearm” or “pistol” under the Firearms Act (“Firearms Act” or 
“the Act”), chapter 47 of title 11.15  First, the trial justice found 
the gun did not qualify as an antique firearm unsuitable for use 
under § 11-47-25.16  Next, the trial justice was satisfied that the 
revolver could “be readily converted to expel a projectile,” which 
qualified it as a “firearm” and “pistol” under the Act.17  After 
announcing that Defendant had violated his probation, the trial 
justice ordered Defendant to serve ten years of the prior 
suspended sentence.18 
Seeing as Defendant was still facing prosecution for recklessly 
operating a motor vehicle, carrying a revolver without a license, 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 482–83. 
 10.  Id.   
 11.  Id. at 483. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. The trial justice described Washington’s testimony as “a 
perjurious effort to take the onus off his half[-]brother.”  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–47–2(3) (2012); § 11–47–2(8) 
 16.  Hazard, 68 A.3d at 483.  Antique firearms, as defined, are “outside 
the ambit of the [A]ct.”  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 484. 
 18.  Id. 
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and possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime 
of violence, the state requested the trial justice revisit his earlier 
interpretation of the Act.19  Through a motion in limine, the state 
asked the trial justice to construe the Act such that a weapon need 
not be able to, or be readily convertible, to expel a projectile to 
qualify as a “pistol” under § 11-47-2(8) and that a pistol is a per se 
“firearm” under 11-47-2(3).20  Also, the state wanted a ruling that 
a “mere frame or receiver,” regardless of whether it can expel a 
projectile or readily be converted to do so, constituted a “firearm” 
under the Act.21  The trial justice denied this motion, holding that 
his initial interpretation of the Act at the probation-violation 
hearing was correct.22 
Both Defendant and the state appealed, on separate grounds, 
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, assigning error to the trial 
justice’s rulings in each of the underlying cases.23  On appeal, the 
Court had to decide whether there had been error in (1) the trial 
justice’s interpretation of the Firearms Act or (2) in the conclusion 
that Defendant had violated his probation.24 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court took a two-pronged approach to the appeals, first 
addressing the trial justice’s interpretation of the Firearms Act 
and then turning to Defendant’s probation violation.25 
 
A.   The Interpretation of the Firearms Act 
The Court first addressed the state’s challenge to the trial 
justice’s interpretation of the term “firearm,” as defined by § 11-
47-2(3).26  The trial justice interpreted the language of the statute 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 484, 499. 
 26.  Id. at 484.  The Act defines a “firearm” as “any machine gun, pistol, 
rifle, air rifle, air pistol, ‘blank gun,’ ‘BB gun,’ or other instrument from which 
steel or metal projectiles are propelled, or which may readily be converted to 
expel a projectile, except crossbows, recurve, compound, or longbows, and 
except instruments propelling projectiles which are designed or normally 
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to mean that the phrase “from which steel or metal projectiles are 
propelled, or which may readily be converted to expel a projectile” 
should apply to all of the preceding instruments.27  The state 
contended that under the last antecedent rule (“LAR”), which 
required that qualifying words and phrases be applied solely to 
the last antecedent in the statute, the qualifying phrase only 
applied to the term “other instrument” rather than all the 
instruments listed.28 
The Court “review[s] questions of statutory interpretation de 
novo.”29  The “ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the 
act as intended by the Legislature,” by looking to the entire 
statutory scheme to interpret an ambiguous terms or those terms 
that, when looked at with “myopic literalism,” do not coincide with 
the purpose of the statute as a whole.30  Particularly, when 
interpreting ambiguities in penal statutes it must be done in a 
way that will “favor . . . the party upon whom a penalty is to be 
imposed.”31 
Here, the Court viewed the state’s reliance on the LAR as 
“sensible as a matter of grammar” but not dispositive of the 
interpretation issue.32  In the one previous case where the Court 
had invoked the LAR, it did so as an aid in reaching its final 
decision, not as a standalone rule.33 
When applied to the present case, the Court found that the 
state’s position failed on three grounds.  First, the Court found 
that the trial justice’s interpretation was the most consistent with 
used for a primary purpose other than as a weapon.  The frame or receiver of 
the weapon shall be construed as a firearm under the provisions of this 
section.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11–47–2(3). 
 27.  Id. at 485. 
 28.  Id. at 485–86. 
 29.  Id. (citing Campbell v. State, 56 A.3d 448, 454 (R.I. 2012)).   
 30.  Id. (citing Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d 736, 740 
(R.I. 2012); Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994, 1002 (R.I. 2012); In re Brown, 903 
A.2d 147, 150 (R.I. 2006)).   
 31.  Id. (citing State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009) (quoting 
State v. Smith. 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I. 2001)).  This is referred to as the “rule 
of lenity.”  Id. at 492. 
 32.  Id. at 487 (describing the LAR as flexible). 
 33.  Id. (citing State v. Brown, 486 A.2d 595, 600 (R.I. 1985) (using 
“intent and purpose of th[e] statute” to determine the terms in their correct 
context)).   
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the structure of the entire statute.34  Second, the Court reasoned 
that since the General Assembly chose to include the word “other” 
in the last antecedent “other instrument,” it appeared to have 
wanted to include all the delineated instruments in a subset to 
which the qualifying phrase would apply.35 If, as the state 
contends, the qualifying clause was only meant to apply to “other 
instruments” then the Legislature could have chosen to include a 
second “or,” one to conclude the first subset and another to which 
the qualifying phrase would apply.36  Finally, the Court held that 
the legislative history of the Act implied that the General 
Assembly intended to make the possession and use of weapons 
that could fire a projectile illegal, and the subsequent history 
showed no intent to broaden this initial thrust.37 
However, although the state’s LAR argument could not “alone 
carry the day” the Court did find that the statute, § 11-47-2(3), 
was ambiguous as it presented two reasonable interpretations.38  
Since the statute in question, the Firearms Act, is penal in nature, 
the rule of lenity compels the Court to resolve any ambiguity in 
favor of the party facing punishment under its application.39  If, 
as the state contended, the General Assembly had intended the 
Act to include weapons which could not expel a projectile then “it 
 34.  Id. at 487. The modifying clause “from which steel or metal 
projectiles are propelled, or which may readily be converted to expel a 
projectile” is found at the end of a single “integrated list” of instruments, and 
as the modifier applies to at least one of the antecedents, it is “more 
plausible” “that it in fact applies to all” of the instruments and not only the 
last antecedent, “other instrument.”  Id.  See also United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 337 (1971) (holding that the qualifying phrase “in commerce or 
affecting commerce” would apply to all the antecedent terms “receives, 
possesses, or transports,” not only the last antecedent).  The Court here relied 
upon this reasoning.  Id. at 487.  
 35.  Id. at 489.  
 36.  Id.  The court compared the present case with State v. Brown, 486 
A.2d 595 (R.I. 1985):  there, where the Court applied the LAR, the General 
Assembly had included the term “or” twice to create two categories of offenses 
that constituted racketeering activity making the invocation of the LAR 
“perfectly consistent with the thrust of the statutory language.”  Hazard, 68 
A.3d at 489 (citing Brown, 486 A.2d at 600). 
 37.  Hazard, 68 A. 3d at 491.  Looking back at the amendments that have 
been made to the Act, the Court commented that “there is nothing . . . that 
suggests [an] inten[t] to extend the . . . prohibitions to instruments that can 
neither fire a bullet nor be readily converted to do so.”  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 491–492. 
 39.  Id. at 492 (citing State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009)).  
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was incumbent upon [them] to express that intent clearly and 
unambiguously.”40  Here, because the General Assembly had not 
done so and the rule of lenity required the Court to interpret the 
statute in favor of a criminal defendant, non-firing weapons had to 
be excluded.41 
Beyond the LAR argument, the state advanced two ancillary 
arguments in support of its position.  First, that the interpretation 
by the trial justice, as it relates to pistols, created a prerequisite 
that the Legislature had deliberately avoided, and second, that 
the last sentence of § 11-47-2(3) was inconsistent with the trial 
justice’s interpretation of the first sentence.42 
As to the first argument, the definition the state relied on in § 
11-47-2(8) was silent on the issue of whether a “pistol” need be 
able to fire a projectile.43  In light of this, the Court reasoned that 
the definition found in § 11-47-2(8) was meant to supplement, 
rather than supplant, the definition found in § 11-47-2(3).44  The 
Court was in “full agreement with the trial justice” in determining 
that that “any pistol that cannot expel a projectile or is not readily 
able to be converted to expel a projectile is not covered under the 
statute.”45 
Secondly, the state contended that the second sentence of § 
11-47-2(3), which provides that “[t]he frame or receiver of the 
weapon shall be construed as a firearm,” does not conform with 
the trial justice’s requirement that a pistol must be “operable or be 
readily converted to operability.”46  However, the Court viewed 
the idea of allowing the second sentence to control the 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. at 492–93.  The last sentence reads that a “frame or receiver of 
the weapon shall be construed as a firearm under the provisions of this 
section.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-2(3). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Hazard, 68. A.3d at 493. 
 45.  Id. at 493–94.  This interpretation was in line with the Court’s 
jurisprudence found in State v. Benevides; there, a pistol that was discarded 
was found to have broken upon being ejected from a vehicle and there the 
state needed to prove the operability of the pistol prior to its ejection as an 
essential element.  425 A.2d 77, 79–80 (R.I. 1981).  Since the state had to 
prove operability there, it must be required under § 11-47-2(3).  Hazard, 68 
A.3d at 495. 
 46.  Id. at 495. 
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interpretation of the first as a “backwards approach.”47 
The Court addressed one final aspect of the trial justice’s 
interpretation requiring that under § 11-47-2(3) “a frame or 
receiver of a weapon must either be capable of expelling a 
projectile or be readily convertible to do so in order to qualify as a 
‘firearm.’”48  The state asserted that the language was “clear and 
unambiguous” with relation to whether a frame or receiver will be 
a weapon.49  Ultimately, the Court did not agree with the state’s 
proposed interpretation, looking to the fact that the limited text 
the state presented from the Act does not define “the weapon.”50  
The Court reasoned that the term “weapon” was defined by the 
first sentence of § 11-47-2(3).51  Therefore, the trial justice was 
correct in determining “that the frame or receiver must either be 
able to expel a projectile or be readily convertible to do so in order 
to qualify as a firearm.”52 
 
B.    Defendant’s Probation Violation 
Defendant asked the Court to vacate the trial justice’s 
determination that he had violated the conditions of his probation 
and remand the matter with instructions for a lesser sentence.53  
To do this the Court would have to overturn both findings that the 
possession of a firearm was a violation of Defendant’s probation 
and that the eluding charge was sufficient to violate the terms and 
conditions of Defendant’s probation.54 
With respect to the Firearms Act violation, the Defendant 
contended that the pistol in question qualified as an “antique 
 47.  Id.  The lack of the operability clause in the second sentence does not 
apply to the items listed in the first.  Id. 
 48.  Id. at 496. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 496.  “The frame or receiver of the weapon shall be construed 
as a firearm under the provisions of this section.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-
2(3).  
 51.  Hazard, 68 A.3d at 498.   
 52.  Id. The Court relied upon the federal case of United States v. 
Wonschik, which was also interpreting a firearms statute to read that the 
frame or receiver must fall within the aforementioned definition.  See 353 
F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004); Hazard, 68 A.3d at 498. 
 53.  Hazard, 68 A.3d at 499. 
 54.  Id. at 499, 501. 
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firearm” as defined in § 11-47-25.55  However, although both sides 
stipulate that the pistol is an “antique firearm” as defined by 18 
U.S.C § 921, which the General Assembly incorporated in § 11-47-
2(1), the Act also required that to be exempt the antique firearm 
must be “unsuitable for use.”56  Here, the testimony of multiple 
parties at trial supported the notion that the revolver could, 
without difficulty, be made suitable for use.57  Thus, the revolver 
was a suitable “firearm” and “pistol” under the Act, supporting the 
trial justice’s determination that the revolver was removed from 
the antique firearms exemption.58 
As the firearm was outlawed by the Act, the trial justice found 
that Defendant had been the one in possession of the revolver.59  
The determination that Washington was lying when he claimed 
possession of the revolver was supported by his previous 
statement to a detective following his arrest.60  Accordingly, there 
was substantial evidence to uphold Defendant’s probation 
violation, and the Court affirmed both the trial justice’s 
determination that the revolver was not exempted by the Act and 
that it was in Defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.61  
Laslty, as a trial justice has wide discretion in sentencing, the 
Court found that the justice here was within his purview in 
sentencing Defendant to ten (10) years.62 
Justices Flaherty and Indeglia filed an opinion both 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.63  In the opinion, they 
concur with the majority’s opinion on the probation issue, but they 
dissent from the Court’s stance on the interpretation issue.64  
They believed that the statute was unambiguous and presented 
policy arguments suggesting that not all the instruments 
 55.  Id. at 499.  If a firearm qualifies as an “antique firearm” under the 
Act then it is exempt from its regulations.  Id. at 500. 
 56.  Id. at 500. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 500–01. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Id. at 501 (reviewing the trial justice’s determination under an 
“arbitrary or capricious” standard).  The Court also affirmed the trial justice’s 
finding that Defendant had eluded police intentionally and that this alone 
was a violation of Defendant’s probation.  Id. 
 62.  Id. (citing State v. Roberts, 59 A.3d 693, 697 (R.I. 2013)). 
 63.  Id. at 501 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
 64.  Id. at 502–04 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
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enumerated in that Act need to be able, or readily convertible, to 
expel a projectile to fall within the legislative intent.65 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Court made a reasonable interpretation of the relevant 
language within the Firearms Act while properly upholding 
Defendant’s probation violation and subsequent sentencing.  With 
respect to the Act, the Court found a well-based rationale both in 
the legislative history and by looking to the statutory scheme as a 
whole to uphold Superior Court Associate Justice Krause’s 
diligent interpretations.  Moreover, the Court put little credence 
in Defendant’s argument for vacating the results of his probation 
violation. In fact, Defendant himself seemed unsure of his 
position, arguing different theories in his papers and at oral 
arguments.66 
In the dissenting opinion, Justices Flaherty and Indeglia 
made a compelling argument for a contrary finding on the 
interpretation issue of whether a firearm needs to be operable or 
readily convertible to do so.67  Perhaps the most compelling of the 
arguments advanced by the dissent was the idea that, as it relates 
to felons, the Act was not meant to include that the “firearm” be 
operable since there is a significant policy concern in keeping 
dangerous weapons out of the hands of felons.68 
The dissent illustrates this disparity with an example of a 
bank robbery in which a blank gun is used.69 One cannot 
rationally expect the victim to discern whether the gun can is 
capable of shooting bullets or merely a blank gun.  Also, the 
possibility for the use of deadly force is still quite high as 
responding police officers or the victim could mistake an 
inoperable weapon for a functioning one and respond 
accordingly.70 
 65.  Id. (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
 66.  See id. at 499. 
 67.  Id. at 501–04  (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting).  
 68.  Id. at 503  (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
 69.  Id.  (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
 70.  Id.  (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed both the trial 
justice’s interpretations of the Firearms Act as well as his 
conclusion that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation, 
resulting in a ten year sentence.71 
 
Wm. Maxwell Daley 
 
 
 71.  Id. at 501. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232 (R.I. 2013).  A defendant who 
wishes to appeal an evidentiary ruling must have raised and articulated the 
issue at trial through more than a general objection in order to preserve that 
issue for appellate review; if the defendant fails to raise the issue at trial, 
then that issue is waived.  However, a narrow exception exists regarding the 
“raise or waive” rule, which allows the error as long as the error is more than 
harmless and originates from a novel rule of law that counsel could not have 
reasonably known about during trial.  The novel rule of law requirement is 
narrowly construed and may arise from a single case  The application of the 
novel rule does not need to be cemented at the time; it is enough that the 
novel rule was established in a single case. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Nashya Moten (“Nashya”), the child of Amie Costa (“Ms. 
Costa”) and Defendant Jeffrey Moten (“Moten”), was almost five 
months old when the events of November 23, 2005 occurred.1  Ms. 
Costa, Moten, and Nashya lived in an apartment in Providence 
with three dogs.2  That morning, Ms. Costa left Nashya at the 
apartment with Moten and went to work.3  When Ms. Costa 
returned to the apartment after work around 3:30 that afternoon, 
Nashya made “weird scream/cry” sounds and when Ms. Costa 
picked her up, Nashya’s “eyes were stuck in the [upper right] 
corner of her head not moving, not following any verbal sounds.”4  
Ms. Costa called her pediatrician who recommended that Ms. 
Costa immediately take Nashya to the hospital.5 
On November 23, Dr. Nancy Harper (“Dr. Harper”) was on 
call at the hospital when a resident telephoned her because the 
resident was “very worried” about Nashya who was currently 
experiencing “seizures and a headache” and her “eyes were 
straight upwards and not moving.”6  Dr. Harper became “quite 
concerned” when she examined Nashya’s CAT scan and observed 
 1.  State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1235 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Dr. Harper is a board-certified pediatrician and a fellow in the Child 
Protection Program at R.I. Hospital; Dr. Harper also testified at trial as both 
a fact and expert witness in the field of child pediatrics and child abuse 
pediatrics.  Id. at 1235–36.   
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“too much fluid around the brain, which is concerning for subdural 
hemorrhages.”7  Dr. Harper consulted with other physicians 
throughout her treatment of Nashya, including an 
ophthalmologist who was on duty that night and performed a 
“dilated eye exam” on Nashya which found that Nashya had 
“extensive retinal hemorrhages that covered the entire back of the 
eye” which could cause blindness.8  Later that night, Dr. Harper, a 
mandatory reporter of child abuse and neglect, contacted the 
Department of Children, Youth and Families to report the 
incident.9  Moten was charged with felony child abuse.10 
Moten gave a statement to police later that night at 12:40 
a.m.11  He stated that he and Nashya took a nap together later 
that afternoon and when he woke up he used the bathroom, 
leaving Nashya in the bed.12  While in the bathroom, he stated 
that he heard the dogs moving around and then heard Nashya fall 
out of the bed and scream.13  Moten told police that Nashya did 
not bleed nor did she have any marks or bruises.14  When Ms. 
Costa came home from work, Moten told her “that the dogs did 
it.”15 
At trial, Dr. Harper testified as a fact witness and also as an 
expert witness.  During Dr. Harper’s testimony concerning the 
ophthalmologist’s report to her, defense counsel objected, which 
the trial judge immediately sustained.16  The prosecutor then 
continued his questioning of Dr. Harper: 
“Q: In other cases, you’ve reviewed eye exams with 
 7.  Id. at 1236–37. 
 8.  Id. at 1237. 
 9.  Id. at 1236. 
 10.  Id. at 1234 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-9-5.3(b)(1)–(c)(4) which 
defines child abuse as “a person having care of a child . . . knowingly or 
intentionally . . . inflicts upon [that] child serious bodily injury”).  Serious 
bodily injury is further defined as “physical injury that . . . [e]vidences 
subdural hematoma, intercranial hemorrhage and/or retinal hemorrhages as 
signs of ‘shaken baby syndrome’ and/or ‘abusive head trauma.’”  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Specifically, Dr. Harper described the exam the ophthalmologist 
performed on Nashya and stated “[h]e completed the evaluation and came 
and talked with me and reported to me that [Nashya] had . . .” when defense 
counsel objected.  Id. at 1236. 
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ophthalmologists, correct? 
“A: That is correct. 
“Q: And do you need this information for a complete 
assessment of Nashya? 
“A: Yes 
“Q: And did you need it to further your information for 
the treatment of Nashya, as well as the diagnosis? 
“A: Yes. 
“Q: And what did he tell you. 
“DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY: Objection 
“THE COURT: Overruled.  You may answer”17 
Dr. Harper then testified about details of Nashya’s condition 
as being “consistent with abusive head trauma” and that there 
was “no medical, organic or other [reason] for her injuries other 
than inflicted injury.”18 
On December 5, 2006, the jury found Moten guilty of first 
degree child abuse.19  Moten’s motion for a new trial was denied, 
and on May 10, 2007, he was sentenced to twenty years, eighteen 
to serve and two years suspended with probation, plus one 
hundred hours of community service.20  Moten appealed, claiming 
that the State violated his constitutional right of confrontation 
when Dr. Harper testified about the ophthalmologist’s report to 
her.21  Moten claimed this testimony was testimonial evidence, 
and therefore, Dr. Harper should not have been allowed to testify 
about the ophthalmologist’s report because Moten did not have an 




 17.  Id. at 1236–37. 
 18.  Id. at 1237. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 1237–38.  The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article 1, Section 10 of the R.I. Constitution “guarantee individuals accused 
of criminal charges the right to confront and cross-examine any adverse 
witness who testify against them.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court reviewed Moten’s appeal de novo because 
of its evidentiary nature and applied its “long adhered to” rule of 
“raise or waive,” denoting that “an issue that has not been raised 
and articulated previously at trial is not properly preserved for 
appellate review.”23  In order to be a properly raised evidentiary 
appeal, “a general objection is not sufficient . . . assignments of 
error must be set forth with sufficient particularity to call the trial 
justice’s attention to the basis of the objection.”24 
Moten’s sole issue raised on appeal was that he was denied 
his constitutional right of confrontation.25  Moten argued that 
when defense counsel objected the second time during trial, that 
objection was based on Moten’s “inability to confront [Dr. 
Harper].”26  The Court, however, did not find this argument 
persuasive because defense counsel merely offered a general 
objection and based on the “raise or waive” rule, “an objection 
without explanation is insufficient to preserve an issue on 
appeal.”27 
Nevertheless, the Court noted that it has established a 
“narrow exception” to the “raise or waive” rule.  First, for the 
exception to apply “the alleged error must be more than harmless, 
and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional 
dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not 
reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.”28  
Moten argued that the novel rule of law in contention here was 
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Crawford v. Washington which established a new approach to 
Confrontation Clause challenges stating that “[w]here testimonial 
evidence is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands . . . 
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”29  
Here, the Court found that Crawford could not be a novel rule of 
law applied to Moten’s case because Crawford was decided more 
 23.  Id. at 1238. 
 24.  Id. (quoting Union Station Associates v. Rossie, 862 A.2d 185, 192 
(R.I. 2004)). 
 25.  Id. at 1238. 
 26.  Id. at 1239. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 1240 (quoting State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001)). 
 29.  Id. at 1240–41 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 
(2004)). 
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than two-and-a-half years before Moten’s trial.30 
Nonetheless, Moten argued that Crawford was not the novel 
rule of law, but that two cases decided after Crawford were 
“intervening decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
[that] established a novel constitutional doctrine.”31  Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts held that affidavits from analysts at a state 
laboratory relating to a defendant’s drug charge were “testimonial 
evidence” under Crawford; Bullcoming v. New Mexico held that 
the admittance into evidence of a certified blood alcohol 
concentration report through the testimony by a scientist who had 
not conducted the actual analysis of the defendant’s blood alcohol 
concentration was testimonial evidence.32  Moten argued that 
both subsequent cases expanded the rule announced in Crawford 
by defining lab reports as “testimonial evidence.”33  However, the 
Court disagreed with Moten’s argument and found that Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming simply applied the rule established in 
Crawford, and therefore, did not constitute a novel rule of law.34  
The Court further noted that Moten’s argument confused a novel 
constitutional rule of law with a recognized rule of law applied to a 
novel fact pattern.35  Moten argued in his brief that “an objective 
witness [would] reasonably believe that the resident’s statements 
would be available for use at a later trial,” and that these 
statements were recognized as testimonial evidence subject to the 
Confrontation Clause test as established in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming.36  However, the Court dismissed this argument 
because that exact contention was formulated in Crawford, and 
therefore, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming simply applied the rule 
already recognized in Crawford.37 
Justice Flaherty and Justice Indeglia dissented in part and 
concurred in part.38  The Justices concurred in the final holding 
majority: that Dr. Harper’s testimony did not violate the 
 30.  Id. at 1241. 
 31.  Id. (referring to Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 
(2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011)). 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 1242. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 38.  Id. at 1243.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
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Confrontation Clause.39  However, the Justices disagreed with the 
analysis the majority employed; the Justices argued that 
Crawford, while it established a new rule of law, left much to be 
determined.40  They further argued that the holding in Crawford 
was vague and did not establish “the precise contours of what is 
and what is not ‘testimonial evidence.’”41 Justice Flaherty 
reasoned that the full application of Crawford was not known 
until after it had been applied in the subsequent cases of 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.42  Therefore, Morten could not 
have reasonably known at trial the full extent of Crawford’s 
application to his case.43  Accordingly, the Justices argued that 
this evidentiary issue “employed novel applications to an 
unsettled rule of law” and suggested the majority should have 
applied the primary purpose test to Morten’s case to determine if 
the statements the ophthalmologist made to Dr. Harper were 
testimonial.44  In their analysis of the ophthalmologist’s report, 
the Justices found that the primary purpose of the report was to 
“resolve an ongoing medical emergency—to wit, damage to the 
baby’s eye sight and the potential threat of blindness.”45  The 
dissenting justices ultimately found the ophthalmologist’s report 
was not testimonial, and Dr. Harper’s testimony concerning the 
report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.46 
 
COMMENTARY 
In holding that Moten did not fall within the parameters of 
the narrow exception of novel rule of law to the “raise or waive” 
rule, the Court construed the exception even more narrowly.47  
The Court’s interpretation of “novel” is extremely restrictive. The 
result of the Court’s interpretation of “novel” will be a drastic 
limitation in the number of cases that are preserved for appeal 
through the novel rule of law exception.  The purpose behind the 
novel rule exception to the “raise or waive” rule is fairness.  Here, 
 39.  Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., concurring). 
 40.  Id. at 1244.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 41.  Id.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 42.  Id. (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 43.  Id. at 1245.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 44.  Id. at 1245–46.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 45.  Id. at 1248.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 46.  Id.  (Flaherty, J., & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 47.  Id at 1240. 
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the effect of the Court’s opinion puts fairness aside in favor of 
efficiency. 
An attorney now has to have the foresight to predict the 
application of the novel rule of law to his current set of facts.  In so 
doing, the Court has drastically narrowed an attorney’s ability to 
appeal and thus, has infringed on the fairness that the “raise or 
waive” rule purports to embody.  Apparently, now, a lawyer has to 
anticipate the application of a novel constitutional rule to his 
specific case before the rule is actually applied in a subsequent 
case in order to preserve the issue for appeal.  Yes, Crawford was 
announced two years before Moten’s case came to trial, but both 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were important and decisive 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that clarified the 
meaning of “testimonial evidence.”48  These two cases not only 
clarified the rule announced in Crawford but expanded the rule to 
include certified forensic and analyst reports with the requirement 
that the person testifying to the reports was the person who also 
conducted the tests.  This definition of “testimonial evidence” was 
not established law at the time of Moten’s trial, and therefore, 
would have been a novel rule of law. 
The dissenting justices pointed out that, at the time of 
Moten’s trial, the rule set forth in Crawford was “unsettled” and 
that such an unsettled rule of law is synonymous with a novel rule 
of law.49  The purpose of the novel rule exception to “raise or 
waive” is that an attorney cannot possibly be held to make a 
particularized objection at trial to a rule that was not known at 
the time of trial.  The Court’s decision in Moten confines the idea 
of “novel” to a completely undeveloped area of law, thereby 




The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an issue or 
objection raised at trial must be articulated and more than a mere 
general objection is required in order to preserve that issue or 
objection for appeal.50 A party who fails to particularize an 
 48.  Id at 1244 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 49.  Id. at 1245 (Flaherty, J. & Indeglia, J., dissenting). 
 50.  Id at 1238. 
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objection at trial is deemed to have waived that issue.51  Also, the 
Court held that the narrow exception to “raise or waive” rule 
states the error must be more than harmless and derive from a 
novel rule of law that counsel could not have reasonably known at 
trial.52  The Court further held the exception does not apply when 
the defendant is merely applying a novel fact to an established 





 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id at 1240. 
 53.  Id. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419 (R.I. 2013).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court addressed whether pleading nolo contendere to a felony 
charge and then, afterward, successfully completing a term of probation was 
a “conviction” for the purposes of the sealing statutes, specifically R.I. Gen. 
Laws §12-1-12 and §12-1-12.1. The Court held that pleading nolo 
contendere to a felony charge followed by a successfully completed term of 
probation did not constitute a “conviction” for the purposes of sealing 
records regarding subsequent dismissed misdemeanor complaints. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In January of 1996, Doris E. Poulin (“defendant”) pleaded 
nolo contendere to one felony count of possession of a controlled 
substance.1  In exchange for her plea, defendant was placed on a 
two year probation and was required to fulfill specific conditions, 
all of which she undisputedly complied with.2  Defendant was 
subsequently charged with a misdemeanor offense, which was 
dismissed in July of 1996.3  Years later, in December of 2009, 
defendant was arrested and charged with an additional 
misdemeanor offense, which was dismissed in February of 2010.4  
In accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws §12-1-12.1, defendant moved to 
have the records related to her two misdemeanor offenses sealed, 
as well as the law-enforcement records relating to these offenses 
destroyed.5  The Sixth Division District Court denied defendant’s 
sealing motions and concluded that “the prior drug offense for 
which defendant was placed on probation was, for the purposes of 
§12-1-12.1, a conviction”; therefore, defendant was barred from 
having her two misdemeanor offenses expunged from her record.6 
 1.  State v. Poulin, 66 A.3d 419, 421 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. Along with defendant’s two-year probation, the plea bargain 
conditions required defendant to complete a substance abuse program and to 
perform 100 hours of community service.  Id. 
 3.  Id. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of 
operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of driving 
under the influence.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 421–22; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12.1(a) (2002) (providing that 
“[a]ny person who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a 
criminal case, including, but not limited to, dismissal or filing of a no true bill 
or no information, may file a motion for the sealing of his or her court records 
in the case, provided, that no person who has been convicted of a felony shall 
have his or her court records sealed pursuant to this section”). 
 6.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12.1(a) (2002).  “The 
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In April of 2013, defendant filed a petition for certiorari to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court against the State of Rhode Island 
(“State”).7  The defendant sought review of a decision from the 
District Court, which denied her motions to seal records relating 
to two dismissed misdemeanor offenses.8 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court granted the defendant’s 
petition for certiorari in order to decide “whether a plea of nolo 
contendere to a felony charge followed by a successfully completed 
term of probation constituted a conviction for the purposes of the 
sealing statutes,” specifically §12-1-12 and §12-1-12.1.9  The 
defendant advanced several arguments in support of her 
contentions.10  The defendant argued “that the plain and 
unambiguous language of the relevant statutes” dictated her 
entitlement to have the court files from her dismissed 
misdemeanor offenses sealed and all the records relating to those 
offenses destroyed.11  The defendant also argued that because the 
sealing and expungement statutes are “separate and distinct in 
both purpose and design” the court should treat each statute 
unrelated to the other.12  Additionally, the defendant asserted 
that the sealing statute does not conflict with the recording 
statutem because the recording statute, alone, imposes a duty of 
record keeping on the Attorney General.13  Comparatively, the 
State argued that pleading nolo contendere to a felony charge 
followed by probation “constitutes a felony conviction” and, thus, 
bars a defendant from receiving any benefits of the sealing 
statute.14  In support of its argument, the State asserted that “the 
trial judge explained that it would not be logical for the definition of 
‘conviction’ to differ as between the sealing and expungement statutes,” 
especially when the two statutes were “somewhat intertwined.”  Poulin, 66 
A.3d at 422 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7.  Id. at 421. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-18-3(a) (2002)  
(providing that “[w]henever any person shall be arraigned before the district 
court or superior court and shall plead nolo contendere, and the court places 
the person on probation pursuant to §12-18-1, then upon the completion of 
the probationary period, and absent a violation of the terms of the probation, 
the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose”). 
 10.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 422. 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
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plain wording and statutory structure of chapter 1 of title 12” led 
to its conclusion, which also was supported by the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s precedent regarding the meaning of conviction.15 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s review of a case granted 
on “certiorari is limited to an examination of ‘the record to 
determine if an error of law has been committed.’”16  In examining 
a record for judicial error, the Court reviews the entire record in 
order to determine if there is legally competent evidence to 
support the justice’s findings.17  The Court “reviews questions of 
statutory construction and interpretation de novo.”18  In addition, 
the Court interprets statutes “literally and gives the words their 
plain and ordinary meanings,” especially when such statutes 
contain clear, unambiguous language.19 
The Court pointed out that, although at their most basic level 
sealing and expungement statutes relate to the destruction or 
elimination of certain criminal records and/or convictions, the 
actual provisions of the two statutory schemes differ in obvious 
ways.20  The Court noted that sealing motions, under §12-1-12 
and §12-1-12.1, are made “with respect to an acquittal and in 
cases that have been dismissed in circumstances amounting to an 
exoneration,” while expungement motions relate to criminal 
dispositions and are available only to first offenders.21  
Furthermore, “[b]y enacting separate and distinct statutory 
 15.  Id. at 422–23.  Specifically, the State argued that chapter 1 of title 
12 leads to the conclusion that a plea of nolo contendere followed by a 
probation does in fact constitute a conviction for the purposes of the sealing 
statute.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 423 (quoting State v. Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I. 
2008)). 
 17.  See id.; Brown v. State, 841 A.2d 1116, 1121 (R.I. 2004) (quoting 
Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 787 A.2d 1191, 1193 (R.I. 
2002)). 
 18.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423. 
 19.  Id.  See also State v. Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 168 (R.I. 2013) (clarifying 
that the Court must consider the entire statute as a whole and that, 
furthermore, individual sections are considered in the content of the entire 
statutory scheme); Curtis v. State, 996 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I. 2010) (noting that 
“it is generally presumed that the General Assembly ‘intended every word of 
a statute to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect’”). 
 20.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 423–24. 
 21.  Id. at 424; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12, 12.1(a)(2002). 
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provisions, the Legislature plainly elected to treat these cases 
differently.”22 
Correspondingly, §12-18-3(a) states that when an individual 
pleads nolo contendere to a felony charge and, in return, receives 
probation, “the plea and probation shall not constitute a conviction 
for any purpose.”23  In essence, the statute forbids the State from 
preventing the sealing of records in a dismissed misdemeanor 
offense case.24  Furthermore, nothing in §12-1-12 or §12-1-12.1 
states that a plea of nolo contendere followed by probation should 
be deemed a conviction.25  Moreover, “a plea of nolo contendere 
followed by probation does not preclude a defendant from sealing 
his or her records.”26  In addition, the Court summarized the 
underlying policy by stating that, “in the sealing context, the 
affected person has been acquitted or exonerated, whereas a 
person seeking to have his or her records expunged has not. Thus, 
sealing should be more widely available to those individuals than 
to those seeking to have their records expunged.”27 
 Here, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere and 
successfully complied with the conditions of her probation 
sentence.28  Accordingly, the Court found that this plea did not 
constitute a conviction for the purpose of the sealing statute.29 
 
COMMENTARY 
This case presents an example of how the interpretation of 
statutes can vary greatly amongst individuals.  The Court reached 
a fair decision regarding the intent of the legislature in creating 
and enacting separate and distinct statutes, one for expungements 
and another for sealings.  The Court reasoned that the intent of 
the legislature in creating and enacting separate and distinct 
statutes was to treat such statutes, and the coinciding cases that 
they will concern, differently.  The Court recognized that each 
statute provides its own set of individual rules, regulations, and 
qualifications, and, if they were to be interpreted similarly, such 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 425 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-18-3(a) (2002)). 
 24.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 425. 
 25.  Id.; see R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1-12, 12.1(a) (2002). 
 26.  Poulin, 66 A.3d at 425. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 426. 
 29.  Id. at 425. 
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interpretation would eliminate the purpose of having two distinct 
statutes.  Furthermore, the Court indicated that, although at a 
fundamental level the two statutes may be confused with one 
another, by examining the two statutes in-depth, the difference 
between the two becomes both evident and significant.30 
Finally, the Court clarified the proper meaning of conviction 
within the statutes at issue.  In clarifying the meaning of 
conviction, the Court provided the necessary guidelines in order 
for a defendant to obtain relief under each statute when sought.  
Now, under the rationale of the Supreme Court, if an individual 
pleads nolo contendere to a felony charge, followed by a 
successfully completed term of probation, such actions do not 
constitute a conviction for the purposes of the sealing statute, and, 
furthermore, that individual may still get the records pertaining 
to his or her dismissed misdemeanor offenses sealed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Court concluded that defendant had not been convicted of 
a felony for purposes of the sealing statutes, met all of the 
statutory requirements of the statutes, and, therefore, was 
entitled to the benefits provided for in those enactments.31 
Accordingly, the Court found that it was an error “to deny the 
defendant’s motion to seal all records pertaining to her two 
dismissed misdemeanor arrests.”32  The Court concluded that the 






 30.  Id. at 424 (clarifying that “a motion to seal is made with respect to 
an acquittal and in cases that have been dismissed, while a motion for 
expungement relates to a criminal disposition”). 
 31.  Id. at 425–26. 
 32.  Id. at 426. 
 33.  Id. 
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Criminal Law.  State v. Santos, 62 A.3d 314 (R.I. 2013).  A police officer 
possessing specific and articulable facts that justify a reasonable belief that a 
suspect is armed and dangerous is justified in conducting a pat-down frisk.  
Similarly, where a police officer has a reasonable belief based on specific 
and articulable facts that a non-arrested suspect is dangerous and may gain 
immediate control of a weapon from a vehicle, the officer may conduct a 
limited search of the vehicle for weapons under the protective-search 
doctrine.  An investigatory detention, distinct from an arrest, may involve 
handcuffing and placing a suspect in the back of a police cruiser, should 
such an intrusion be reasonable under all of the facts and not a ruse to justify 
a search. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
 On April 24, 2010, Officer Bethany Dolock of the South 
Kingstown Police Department pulled over defendant-appellant 
Gary Santos, who was traveling about twenty miles per hour over 
the speed limit.1  Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Dolock 
noticed “several loose bullets in an ashtray to the left-hand side of 
the steering wheel.”2  She “called for backup from the South 
Kingstown Police Department on a radio on her lapel when she 
first observed the bullets . . . ”3  Officer Dolock then “asked the 
driver if he had a weapon; he responded that he did not.”4  She 
reported that she then “detected a strong odor of alcohol 
emanating from the vehicle” and observed “that the driver was 
looking around the car and intentionally looking away from her.”5  
Officer Dolock again asked the driver if he had a weapon, which 
he answered in the negative.6  Officer Dolock stated that the 
driver then turned towards the passenger side of the vehicle, and, 
as she could no longer see his hands, she feared for her own 
safety.7  She partially drew her service weapon, directed the 
 1.  State v. Santos, 62 A.3d 314, 317 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. n.3. 
 4.  Id. at 317.  
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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driver to “put his hands where she could see them,” and told him 
to get out of the vehicle.8  Santos complied.9  Upon Santos exiting 
the vehicle, Officer Dolock reported “a strong odor of alcohol 
coming from Santos’ breath,” and that Santos had “bloodshot, 
watery eyes and a slight sway in his stance.”10 
Officer Dolock conducted a cursory pat-down of Santos’ outer 
clothing for a weapon and found a small pocket knife in one of his 
pockets.11  Officer Dolock asked Santos whether there were any 
more weapons; he said there were not, though he appeared 
hesitant as he looked at his vehicle.12  She placed Santos in 
handcuffs while explicitly informing him that he was not under 
arrest.13  At that time, Trooper Marc Lidsky of the Rhode Island 
State Police passed by the scene and stopped to assist.14  Santos 
did not answer Officer Dolock’s further questions, saying that “he 
would only speak to the trooper because he was in charge.”15 
Two South Kingstown officers arrived as backup as Officer 
Dolock led Santos to her cruiser.16  As soon as she secured Santos 
in the rear of her cruiser, Officer Dolock searched Santos’ vehicle 
for weapons while Trooper Lidsky kept an eye on Santos.17  
Officer Dolock first searched the front passenger’s side of the 
vehicle, where she observed several more loose bullets and what 
appeared to be the butt of a gun.18  She tilted the passenger seat 
forward and discovered a loaded revolver on the floor.19  Still in 
the cruiser, Santos did not respond to Officer Dolock’s questioning 
about documentation for the revolver.20  Santos was escorted out 
of her cruiser where he refused to submit to standard field 
sobriety tests.21  Officer Dolock then arrested Santos for suspicion 
 8.  Id.   
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  See id. n.2. 
 13.  Id. at 317.  
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
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of driving under the influence of intoxicants; she again placed him 
back in her cruiser to transport him to the South Kingstown police 
station for processing.22 
Santos was charged with carrying a weapon while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs (“Count 1”); 
carrying a firearm in a motor vehicle without a license (“Count 2”); 
and unlawfully operating a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor (“Count 3”).23  The trial judge 
granted Santos’ Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal as to 
Count 1 and Count 3, but denied Santos’ motions to suppress the 
revolver and bullets as “fruits of an illegal search” as to Count 2.24  
Following Santos’ renewed motion to suppress, the trial justice 
determined that the search could not be justified as a “search 
incident to arrest,” as “[Santos] was neither free nor mobile and 
was not within reaching distance of the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle.”25  The trial justice found, however, that “there was 
sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle for hidden weapons, 
given the time of night [(8:30 p.m.)], the discovery of bullets in 
plain view, the furtive movement by [Santos], and his purposeful 
failure to look directly at Officer Dolock.”  The trial justice further 
reasoned that, even if probable cause did not exist, the revolver 
would be “inevitably discovered during an inventory search.”26  
On November 18, 2010, a jury entered a verdict of guilty on Count 
2; Santos was sentenced to five years imprisonment, including one 
year to serve and the remainder suspended, with probation.27  
Santos appealed the denial of his motion to suppress.28 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court initially identified four legal 
theories to determine whether Santos’ motion to suppress the 
revolver should have been granted.29  The theories examined, 
respectively, were whether the facts could justify a finding of (1) 
 22.  Id. at 317–18. 
 23.  Id. at 318. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 319. 
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reasonable suspicion under the protective-search doctrine, (2) 
probable cause under the “automobile exception,” (3) inevitable 
discovery during an inventory search, and (4) search incident to 
arrest.30  The state focused on the protective search rationale, 
and, alternatively, contended that the revolver would have been 
inevitably discovered as the result of a search incident to arrest.31  
The trial court’s findings of facts are overturned only when clearly 
erroneous.32  Alleged violations of a defendant’s Constitutional 
rights are independently examined, while evidence in the record is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the state.33 
As neither the defense nor the state “support[ed] the rationale 
of the trial justice, which was based on a finding of probable 
cause,”34 the Court found that the trial justice “erred in stating 
that these facts had to rise to the level of establishing probable 
cause, when the protective-search doctrine only requires 
reasonable belief.”35  Declining to further examine the 
“automobile exception,”36 the Court proceeded to analyze the 
protective search theory, under its “authority to affirm on grounds 
other than those relied on by a trial justice, and because a 
protective search is permitted under a standard that is less 
rigorous than probable cause.”37 
The Court found that Officer Dolock’s pat-down was 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, as she “was reasonable in 
her belief that Santos might be armed and dangerous.”38  The 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 318–19. 
 33.  Id. at 319. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 319–20. 
 36.  Id. at 319.  The Court stated “we do not express any opinion on the 
parties' arguments concerning inevitable discovery pursuant to an inventory 
search, search incident to arrest, or the automobile exception.”  Id. at 323 n.7. 
 37.  Id. at 319 (citing State v. Quaweay, 799 A.2d 1016, 1018 (R.I.2002) 
as to the Court’s authority to affirm on grounds other than those relied on by 
a trial justice). 
 38.  Id. at 320 (citing State v. Aubin, 622 A.2d 444, 445 (R.I.1993); State 
v. Collodo, 661 A.2d 62, 64–65 (R.I. 1995)).  The Court noted the 
circumstances which justified Officer Dolock’s belief, including “observation 
of loose bullets—combined with Santos’ furtive movements, intentional 
avoidance of eye contact, and positioning of his hands in such a way that the 
officer could not see them—as well as the fact that it was approximately 8:30 
p.m., Officer Dolock was alone, . . . ”  Id. 
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exact circumstances and size of the small knife found through the 
pat-down were not discussed.  The Court likewise noted that “an 
officer may conduct a limited search of an automobile for weapons 
when the police officer ‘has an articulable suspicion to believe that 
the suspect may be armed and dangerous’ and that the suspect 
has the ‘present ability to obtain a weapon.’”39  Given the 
circumstances previously mentioned, including the discovery of a 
small knife in Santos’ pocket when he repeatedly stated that he 
did not have a weapon, the Court found that “Officer Dolock 
possessed specific and articulable facts that justified her decision . 
. . to conduct a limited sweep of Santos’ vehicle for weapons.”40 
The Court next examined Santos’ argument that “even if 
there was a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, 
there could be no reasonable belief that he had a present ability to 
obtain a weapon because he was handcuffed and secured in Officer 
Dolock’s cruiser.”41  The Court found that the “present ability to 
obtain a weapon” element of a protective search of a vehicle was 
satisfied under the rationale of Michigan v. Long.42  The Court 
cited the United States Supreme Court in Long, which stated that 
“a suspect could break away from the officer and retrieve a 
weapon in the vehicle or may be permitted to re-enter the vehicle 
before the investigation is over and gain access to a weapon.”43  
The Court applied this logic to Santos:  “In addition to the danger 
that Santos might break away before the conclusion of the field 
sobriety tests, there was also a possibility that Santos would 
return to his vehicle and secure the revolver if Officer Dolock 
elected to release him after administering the tests to him.”44 
The defense presented two alternative arguments that the 
Court rejected.45  First, Santos argued that being handcuffed and 
placed in the back of Officer Dolock’s cruiser transformed the 
 39.  Id. (citing State v. Milette, 727 A.2d 1236, 1239–40 (R.I.1999) and 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983)). 
 40.  Id. at 321. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id.   
 43.  Id. (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1047, 1051–52). 
 44.  Id. (citing Milette, 727 A.2d at 1239 “when a police officer compels 
the exit of an individual from a vehicle in order to conduct a Terry frisk, the 
officer remains vulnerable to the possibility that the individual, if not 
arrested, will be free to retrieve any weapons within his car”). 
 45.   Id. at 322. 
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investigatory stop into a “de facto arrest, which required probable 
cause.”46  The Court stated that the applicable standard is 
“whether a detention is an investigative detention or an actual 
arrest depends on the reasonableness of the intrusion.”47  The 
Court found that Santos was secured to the extent reasonable 
under the circumstances and only long enough for Officer Dolock 
to conduct the search of Santos’ vehicle.48  Second, Santos argued 
that Officer Dolock’s decision to conduct a Terry search, instead of 
placing him under arrest for driving under the influence, suggests 
improper manipulation of the circumstances to justify the 
search.49  The Court also rejected this argument, finding that 
“Officer Dolock acted reasonably, and did not deliberately wait to 
arrest Santos.”50  Finally, the Court concluded that there was 
“sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt”51 that 
Santos “knowingly possessed the revolver and intentionally 
exercised control over it.”52 
 
COMMENTARY  
The Court correctly found that Officer Dolock had an 
“articulable suspicion to believe that the suspect may be armed 
and dangerous” for the purpose of a “brief pat-down.”53  The Court 
also correctly determined that Officer Dolock’s handcuffing and 
placing of Santos in the back of her police cruiser was reasonable 
and did not transform the investigatory detention into a de facto 
arrest.54  However, the Court may have improperly expanded 
upon the holdings of Milette and Long, contrary to the rationale of 
Gant, under the facts of the instant case.55 
In Gant, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of protecting individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights 
 46.    Id. (emphasis in original).   
 47.    Id. 
 48.    Id. 
 49.    Id. 
 50.    Id. at 323. 
 51.    Id. at 324. 
 52.    Id. at 323. 
 53.    Id. at 320. 
 54.    Id. at 322. 
 55.    See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 342–47 (2009); Milette, 727 A.2d 
at 1239–40; Long, 463 U.S. at 1033. 
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during automobile searches.56  The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly 
stated in Gant that the Long exception for protective searches 
“permits an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment 
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual [] is 
‘dangerous’ and might access the vehicle to ‘gain immediate 
control of weapons.’”57  Long’s protective searches are permitted in 
a narrow set of circumstances discussed in Gant; to expand 
protective searches beyond such narrow circumstances may 
infringe on Fourth Amendment protections of individual rights.58  
In discussing the dangers of police overreach in conducting 
searches incident to arrest, the majority in Gant approvingly 
quoted concerns for individual rights voiced in Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Gant:  “although it is improbable that an arrestee 
could gain access to weapons stored in his vehicle after he has 
been handcuffed and secured in the backseat of a patrol car, cases 
allowing a search in ‘this precise factual scenario . . . are 
legion.’”59 
In the instant case, Officer Dolock no longer had a reasonable 
suspicion that Santos “might access the vehicle to gain immediate 
control of weapons” once he was handcuffed, placed in the back of 
the cruiser, and three other officers arrived on the scene to help 
control the one suspect.  At this time, a field sobriety test could 
have been conducted without the risk of Santos gaining access to a 
weapon stored in his vehicle.  While the United States Supreme 
Court in Long reasoned that “if the suspect is not placed under 
arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will 
then have access to any weapons inside,” Officer Dolock stated 
that she had not yet decided whether to arrest Santos.60  Officer 
Dolock ultimately arrested Santos after his refusal to submit to 
field sobriety tests for “suspicion of driving under the influence of 
 56.   Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest 
only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment 
at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 
evidence of the offense of arrest. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.  When these 
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be 
unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception 
to the warrant requirement applies.  Id. 
 57.  Gant, 556 U.S. at 346–347. 
 58.  See id. (citing Long, 463 U.S. 1032). 
 59.  Id. at 342. 
 60.  See Long, 463 U.S. at 1052; Santos, 62 A.3d at 317. 
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intoxicants.”61  Unlike a scenario in which Officer Dolock 
remained the lone officer, or had decided not to arrest Santos, a 
search of the vehicle was not apparently necessary for protection. 
Therefore, a better approach would have been for the Court to 
decline application of the protective search exception. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an officer with a 
reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous, 
based on specific and articulable facts, may conduct a brief pat-
down.  The protective-search doctrine likewise justified a limited 
search of a vehicle for weapons where an officer had a reasonable 
suspicion justified by specific and articulable facts that a suspect 
was dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon from 
the vehicle.  A suspect may be considered under “investigatory 
detention,” as opposed to under arrest, if intrusions such as 
handcuffs and placement in the back of a police cruiser are 




 61.  Santos, 62 A.3d at 317. 
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Family Law.  Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259 (R.I. 2012).  Participants in 
the Family Court’s Truancy Court Diversion Calendar Program brought suit 
claiming that through the administration of the Truancy Court their 
constitutional rights were being violated.  The Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island found that the recently issued Family Court Administrative Order 
2010-2 coupled with current law rendered the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
challenges moot.  Further, the Court held the case was not subject to an 
exception of the mootness doctrine. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
In September of 1999, the chief judge of the Family Court 
founded the Truancy Court Program to allow “Family Court 
magistrates to conduct court sessions at schools with frequently 
truant children.”1  The Family Court intended the Truancy 
Program “to facilitate collaboration between the Family Court, 
schools, and service providers” in order to guarantee that parents 
and children were able to receive services efficiently and 
effectively in their own communities.2 
In March of 2010, the fifteen students and their parents who 
participated in the Family Court’s Truancy Court Diversion 
Calendar Program (collectively “the plaintiffs”), brought suit in 
Superior Court against the chief judge, five magistrates, and two 
administrators of the Family Court, as well as five municipalities 
and the public school districts for those five municipalities (“the 
defendants”).3  The plaintiffs alleged that all of the defendants 
were operating the Truancy Court in violation of the law.4  The 
 1.  Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 259, 265 n.9 (R.I. 2012) (explaining 
“[a] determination of truancy qualifies a child as ‘wayward.’  R.I. GEN. LAWS 
1956 § 14-1-3”).  
 2.  Id. at 260, 265. 
 3.  Id. at 263–64.  In the “initial complaint, Jeremiah S. Jeremiah was 
the Chief Judge of the Family Court.  After Chief Judge Jeremiah retired, 
plaintiffs amended the complaint to substitute the then-acting and now 
presiding chief judge of the Family Court, Chief Judge [] Bedrosian.”  Id. at 
260 n.1.  For an additional, more detailed factual background regarding the 
particular events that lead to the plaintiffs’ bringing suit, see Boyer v. 
Jeremiah, No. 2010-1858, 2010 WL 4041812 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2010).  
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plaintiffs’ complaint alleged ten constitutional violations.5  The 
plaintiffs brought the lawsuit as a proposed class action and civil 
rights lawsuit; they demanded declaratory and injunctive relief.6 
Subsequently, in May of 2010, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint and moved to strike three of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.7  The trial justice heard oral arguments on defendants’ 
motions to dismiss and motion to strike.8  Before the trial judge 
ruled on the motion, the Chief Judge of the Family Court, Judge 
Bedrosian, issued the Family Court Administrative Order 2010-2 
(“the Order”).9  The Order laid out “written procedures that 
dramatically reformed the Truancy Court Diversion Calendar 
Program.”10  For example, the Order “mandated that ‘all truancy 
petitions shall be referred to the RI Family Court Intake 
Department for a preliminary investigation,’” and if the 
department determined, following the preliminary investigation, 
that there was insufficient evidence to bring the student within 
the Truancy Court’s jurisdiction, then the petition would not be 
administration of the Truancy Court violated “the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and article 1, 
section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution, the Rhode Island General Laws, 
the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings, and the Supreme Court 
Rules of Judicial Conduct.”  Id.  
 5.  Id. at 272.  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants:  
(1) did not provide sufficient notice of conduct that would result in a 
child's referral to Truancy Court; (2) deprived children of a 
preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the truancy petition; 
(3) failed to serve summonses and copies of truancy petitions; (4) 
failed to properly arraign children; (5) improperly permitted children 
to waive their constitutional rights; (6) deprived children of a right to 
counsel; (7) issued orders without personal jurisdiction; (8) did not 
transcribe or record the Truancy Court proceedings; (9) deprived 
children of a meaningful opportunity to be heard by not appointing 
interpreters; and (10) deprived children of a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard by engaging in ex parte communications with school  
officials. 
 Id.  
 6.  Id. at 266 (seeking declaratory relief as provided for under § 9-30-1 
and injunctive relief as provided for under Rule 65 of the Superior Court 
Rules of Civil Procedure).   
 7.  Id. at 267.   
 8.  Id.  The administrative and judicial defendants filed separate 
motions to dismiss, but only the judicial defendants filed a motion to strike.  
See id. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id.  
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authorized.11  The Order “also added a threshold requirement that 
a student must ‘[have] . . . 10 days of absences and/or . . . [be] 
habitually late or absent from school’ before the Intake 
Department could refer a case to the truancy calendar.”12  Despite 
the after-enacted order, the trial justice denied the defendants’ 
motions to dismiss without prejudice.13  The defendants filed 
petitions for writ of certiorari, which the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court granted on December 10, 2010.14 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
On writ of certiorari, the Court analyzed whether the claims 
were justiciable; to be justiciable, a “court must have subject-
matter jurisdiction over the issues raised in the complaint, 
plaintiffs must have standing, and the issues must not be moot.”15  
Initially, the Court assumed that the Superior Court had subject-
matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs had standing to sue when 
the initial complaint was filed, and that the defendants were not 
immune from suit.16  The Court focused its analysis on whether 
the plaintiffs’ claims were moot.17  The Court noted that a 
plaintiff must retain a personal stake in the outcome of a case 
throughout the litigation or the controversy will become moot, and 
thus, the case will no longer be justiciable.18  The Court also noted 
that “the passage of a new law or an amendment to an existing 
law may moot a case.”19 The Court focused on how the ten alleged 
constitutional violations pertained to the issue of mootness.20 
 
 
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 268.  
 14.  Id. at 268–69.  
 15.  Id. at 270.  
 16.  Id. at 270–71 (citing in relevant part Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 
F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[S]tanding is based on the facts as they existed at 
the time the complaint was filed.”)).  
 17.  See id. 
 18.  Id. at 271. 
 19.  Id. at 272 (citing Midwest Media Property, L.L.C. v. Symmes 
Township, Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 20.  Infra note 6; id. at 270. 
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A.    Mootness 
The Court found that the Order mooted the issue of notice 
because by setting a minimum number of ten truancies before a 
student could be brought before the Truancy Court, the Order put 
a person of average intelligence on notice about the number of 
absences that it would take to result in a referral to the truancy 
program.21  Further, the Order detailed how and when a child and 
his or her parent would receive notice; it provided that “if the 
Intake Department determine[d] a petition is suitable for the 
Truancy calendar, then the petition ‘w[ould] be assigned to the 
appropriate school location,’ and ‘written notice’” would be 
provided.22  While “an intake investigation [was] not required as a 
step in an accusatory proceeding of delinquency or waywardness,” 
the intake investigation serve[d] to protect the juvenile from 
“‘arbitrary bureaucratic actions.’”23 The Order provided for 
procedures to “safeguard children from arbitrary bureaucratic 
action” by mandating a preliminary investigation.24  Thus, the 
Court found the Order mooted the issue of depriving the child of 
preliminary investigation.25 
The Court also determined that the issue of a summons was 
 21.  See id. at 273–74.  “Vagueness challenges under the [D]ue [P]rocess 
[C]lause rest principally on lack of notice . . . [A] statute is unconstitutionally 
vague if it compels ‘a person of average intelligence to guess and to resort to 
conjecture as to its meaning and/or as to its supposed mandated application.”  
See id. at 272–73 (quoting Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 582–83 (R.I. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 22.  Id. at 273.  The written notice: 
informs the parents that the child [was] referred to the Family Court 
on a wayward status offense of truancy[,] . . . that the child has been 
prescreened to enter the Truancy Diversion Program[,] . . . [and] 
[t]he notice explains that the parents will have the opportunity to 
provide valid excuses for absences . . . at the hearing.  Finally, the 
notice briefly describes the Diversion Program and sets the location, 
time, and date of the initial meeting with a magistrate.  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23.  Id. at 274. 
 24.  See id.  The Order provides that “all truancy petitions shall be 
referred to the RI Family Court Intake Department for a preliminary 
investigation[,]” and the Order also clarifies how the Intake Department shall 
determine if sufficient evidence and documentation exists in order to bring 
the juvenile in the jurisdiction of the Family Court.  Id. at 274. 
 25.  See Administrative Order 2010-2 Intake Department-Duties § 8-10-
22; Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 274. 
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moot, as the Order directed that a child could “choose” to 
participate in the Truancy Program, and thus, the child’s 
appearance would be voluntary, so a summons would not be 
required.26  The Court noted the Order elaborated that if the child 
or parent did not appear at the Truancy calendar, then the Court 
could issue a summons; further, if the parent and child did not 
each agree to participate in the Truancy Diversion Program, then 
they would be referred to the formal juvenile calendar and the 
Court would issue a summons.27 
On review, the Court found that the after-enacted Order set 
forth substantive procedural requirements for the arraignment 
that mirrored the arraignment procedures of Rule 9 of the Family 
Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings.28  Thus, the Order mooted 
the plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants violated their due process 
rights by failing “to provide adequate information regarding 
individual rights at the arraignment, as is required by Rule 9 of 
the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings.”29  Prior to the 
issuance of the Order, each child who participated in the Truancy 
Program was required to sign a “Waiver of Rights Form,” which 
waived the child’s right to a trial, “‘right to an appeal to the 
Supreme Court from any decision or finding of delinquency or 
waywardness,’” and right to appeal any sentence imposed by the 
Court after such finding or admission of sufficient facts.30  The 
Court determined, after the Order, a child needs to sign only the 
“Participant Guidelines” form as in the Order there is no reference 
to the “Waiver of Rights” form; today, “no child is required to sign 
 26.  See Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 275 (citing Theta Properties v. Ronci 
Realty Co., 814 A.2d 907, 912-13 (R.I. 2003)). 
 27.  Id. at 275.  
 28.  See id at 276.  The Order identifies the arraignment as the first 
meeting between the parent, child, and magistrate.  Id.  The Order states 
that, at the “arraignment,”  
“the Magistrate will read the truancy petition and will explain the 
Rhode Island compulsory school attendance laws as well as the 
requirements of the Truancy Diversion Program consistent with the 
document entitled Participant Guidelines.  The Magistrate also will 
explain the child’s right to trial as well as the option for the Truancy 
Diversion program consistent with the form entitled Participant's 
Forum Choice.”   
Id. (emphasis in the original).  
 29.  See id. at 276–77.  
 30.  Id. at 277 (citing in relevant part § 14-1-16; Rule 6(e)).   
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such a form.”31  Accordingly, the Court held that the Order 
mooted the issue of impermissibly allowing children to waive their 
constitutional rights.32  The Order directed magistrates to advise 
the child and parent “of their right to hire an attorney” and 
illustrated “how the child or parent [may] obtain assistance of 
counsel.”33  The Court was satisfied that the Order addressed the 
plaintiffs’ concerns about the method used to inform Truancy 
Court participants of the right to counsel; thus, the Order mooted 
the issue of depriving children of a right to counsel.34 
The Order specified “that participation in the Truancy 
Diversion Calendar [was] voluntary” and that “the magistrate 
must ‘explain the child’s right to trial, as well as the option [to 
participate in] the Truancy Diversion Program.’”35 If any 
participant contests jurisdiction, then the case would be referred 
to the formal juvenile calendar and a summons would be issued.36  
Consequently, the Court held that the Order remedied any 
failings existent in establishing personal jurisdiction within the 
Truancy Court over participants, and thus, mooted the issue.37 
Further, the Order required that “‘[all] Truancy Diversion 
Programs hearings will be recorded;’” [and] the Court determined 
audio recording was sufficient.38  The Order made it perfectly 
clear that the Truancy Court would record all hearings, and 
therefore mooted the plaintiffs’ challenge about failing to 
transcribe or record the proceeding.39  The Order also clarified 
that magistrates have discretion to determine when the Truancy 
Court ought to make an interpreter available for a child who may 
not be sufficiently fluent in English.40  As this Court has held, the 
trial justice is given wide discretion to determine when an 
 31.  Id. at 277. 
 32.  Id. at 278.  
 33.  See id. at 277–78.  The Order laid out that if the parent “[could not] 
afford an attorney, the case [would] be scheduled on the formal juvenile 
calendar,” and in this event the child could be referred to the services of the 
public defenders or court-appointed counsel.  Id. at 278.  
 34.  See id.  
 35.  Id. at 278 (citation omitted).  
 36.  Id.  
 37.  See id. at 279. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 279. 
 40.  Id. at 280.  
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interpreter is appropriate;41 thus, this Court held that the Order 
provided for constitutional access to interpreters and that the 
complainants’ constitutional challenge was moot.42  As to the final 
constitutional challenge, while the Order did not address the issue 
of ex parte communication, the Court was confident “that the 
judicial officers of the Family Court [would be] faithful to the law 
on ex parte communication.”43 The earlier Truancy Court 
procedures were not affecting any ongoing truancy petitions; 
therefore, the Court held that the “plaintiffs’ request that the 
Superior Court declare the previous [Truancy Court] procedures 
unconstitutional and enjoin the Family Court from enforcing the 
prior procedures ha[d] become moot” because the plaintiffs did not 
have a stake in a continuing controversy.44 
 
B.    Exceptions to Mootness 
While the Court held that the Order and existing law mooted 
and/or obviated the plaintiffs’ ten constitutional challenges, that 
did not end the Court’s analysis. 45  The Court then discussed if 
the Truancy Program was subject to any exception to the 
mootness doctrine, as the Court “will review an otherwise moot 
case only when the issues are ‘of extreme public importance, 
which are capable of repetition but which evade review.’”46  If the 
issue in this case (students’ and parents’ rights allegedly being 
violated by a program aimed at helping them) was one of extreme 
public importance, then the chief judge of the Family Court 
addressed the issues by issuing the Order, which contained proper 
procedures for the Truancy Court to protect participants’ rights.47  
 41.  Id. at 280 (citing State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 798 (R.I. 2004)). 
 42.  See id.  
 43.  Id. at 280.  “Under the Administrative Procedures Act, Department 
of Human Services (DHS) hearing officers were prohibited from engaging in 
ex parte communications concerning adjudicatory facts with DHS staff 
members and outside resources about medical assistance applicants’ pending 
cases without giving applicants an opportunity to challenge the information 
gleaned through such communications.”  See also id. at 280 n.35 (citing 
Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819–21 (R.I. 2007)). 
 44.  Id. at 280, 283. 
 45.  Id. at 280.  
 46.  Id. at 281 (citation omitted) (quoting Campbell v. Tiverton Zoning 
Board, 15 A.3d 1015, 1022 (R.I. 2011)).   
 47.  Id. 
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While there may be an exception to the mootness doctrine “if there 
is a substantial likelihood that the challenged statutory language 
will be reenacted,” here, the Court found that the defendants did 
not show any intention to reenact the earlier administrative 
language;48 therefore, the Court held that the defendants’ 
injunctive and declaratory relief are mooted.49  The Court noted 
that the plaintiffs offered “no reason to expect that the Family 
Court would repeat the alleged constitutional violations that were 
superseded by the Order,50 and the Court reasoned that even if 
the matter is capable of repetition it would not evade review as 
the rulings of the Truancy Court are reviewable as a matter of 
law.51  The Court found that this case was not subject to any 
exception to the mootness doctrine, and therefore, this Court could 
not decide this case on its merits.52 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly acknowledged that 
justiciability is a threshold issue that must be satisfied before a 
court can decide a case on the merits.53  Here, the after-enacted 
Order undoubtedly had an effect on the plaintiffs’ stake in the 
case.  Prior to the Order, there was no clear standard for the 
number of absences from school that were required to potentially 
incur liability for truancy, a child facing truancy charges had to 
sign a “Waiver of Rights Form,”54 and a child had no guarantee 
that the Intake Department would perform a preliminary 
investigation or that the Truancy Program hearings would be 
recorded.55  However, in the wake of the Order, the Family Court 
 48.  Id.  “‘When a party challenges an ordinance and seeks injunctive 
relief, a superseding ordinance moots the claim for injunctive relief.’”  Id. at 
282 (quoting Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, Georgia, 
654 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011)).  
 49.  Id. at 281. 
 50.  Id. at 282.  
 51.  See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-10-3.1 (d), (e) (West)). 
 52.  Id. at 282. 
 53.  Id. at 271–72 (citation omitted). 
 54.  See id. at 273.  In the “Waiver of Rights Form,” the child waived his 
right to a trial by a judge and right to appeal a guilty verdict or any sentence 
imposed.  Id. at 277.  
 55.  Id. at 274, 279.  
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took care of these and other alleged procedural problems within 
the administration of cases in Truancy Court; the Order clarified 
the role of the Truancy Diversion Program, the duties of the 
Intake Department, magistrates, and administrators, and the 
options available to the parents and children invited to participate 
in the Truancy Diversion Program.56  Thus, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court was right to focus on the issue of mootness. 
From the holding, it appears that the Court has faith in the 
Family Court and trusts them not to reenact the questionable 
procedures that were in place before the issuance of the Order.57  
The Court noted that if a Government’s “self-stop” of allegedly 
illegal conduct appears genuine, then it provides a safe basis for a 
dismissal based on mootness.58  Perhaps the Court trusted the 
magistrates also because the Court wanted to support the Truancy 
Program as even the Order sets forth a laudable goal for the 
program.59  If the Court found the Truancy Court procedures 
inadequate because the procedures did not address ex parte 
communication, then it could have undermined a program that is 
aimed at providing children the ability to receive necessary 
services within their community.60 
Also, the Court was aware that in the plaintiffs’ initial 
complaint, the plaintiffs sued six municipalities; all of the 
municipal defendants except Providence agreed to stop 
participating in the Truancy Program.61  Consequently, in the 
amended complaint, the plaintiffs added four more municipal 
defendants.62 If the Court was not to analyze the justiciability of 
the plaintiffs’ claims and allowed the case to continue in Superior 
Court, then it is possible that more municipalities would agree to 
stop participating in the Truancy Program as a result of the 
 56.  See id. at 268, 274, 280.  
 57.  Id. at 282.  
 58.  Id. at 281 (citing Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 674 F.3d 
974, 981(6th Cir. 2012)).   
 59.  The Order set forth that “[t]he purpose of the Rhode Island Family 
Court Truancy calendar [was] to reduce truancy statewide,” and “ensure that 
students not only attend[ed] school but also receive[d] the rehabilitative 
services and educational services that [would] help to assure school 
attendance and academic success.”  Id. at 265.  
 60.  See id. at 263.  
 61.  Id. 264 n.5.  
 62.  Id. at n.5.  
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suit.63  As the Truancy Program is aimed at reducing truancy and 
providing truant children with needed services, ceasing to offer 
the Truancy Program would harm children and the Rhode Island 
education system.64  Lastly, the Court stressed in its analysis of 
many of the constitutional challenges that participation in the 
Truancy Diversion Program is voluntary, and the Order specified 
that a magistrate, at an arraignment, will inform the child and 
parent of their option to participate in the program, or if they do 
not wish to participate in the program, the case will be referred to 
the formal juvenile calendar.65  Correctly, the Court may have 
been eager to end this case because the new procedures contained 
in the Order addressed the constitutional challenges, and 
municipalities deciding as a result of this case to stop offering the 
option for truant children to participate in the Truancy Program, 
detracts from the Rhode Island diversion and development 
programs intended to benefit delinquent children.66 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court quashed the Order of the 
Superior Court and remanded the record to that tribunal, with 
directions to enter a final judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ civil 
action as moot, because the issuance of Family Court 
Administrative Order 2010-2 coupled with other existing law 
removed any controversy in which the plaintiffs have a stake. 
Alicia Bianco 
 
 63.  See id.  
 64.  See “Truancy Court,” Official Website of the City of Warwick, Rhode 
Island;http://www.warwickri.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=845&Itemid=176 (last visited Nov.16, 2013).  
 65.  See Bedrosian, 57 A.3d at 275.  
 66.  See Juvenile Justice in RI: Issue Brief RHODE ISLAND KIDS COUNT 1,  
1, 8  &  9  (July 2009), available at http://www.tapartnership.org/events 
/webinars/webinarArchivespresentationSlides/20100811_juvenileJusticeIb.pd
f (Discussing how Rhode  Island development and diversion programs benefit 
juveniles in Rhode Island).  
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Family Law.  McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810 (R.I. 2013).  In a 
divorce action, a trial justice must determine the value of a closely held 
corporation before assigning portions to the parties.  In assigning a minority 
share of a closely held corporation, a trial justice must apply a minority 
discount or a discount for lack of marketability. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On February 14, 1989, Hope Billings McCulloch (“Hope”) and 
James Robert McCulloch (“James”) were married.1  On June 16, 
2006, following a separation in early 2005, Hope filed a complaint 
for an absolute divorce.2  Thereafter, on May 7, 2007, James filed 
an answer and counterclaim.3  Both parties listed “irreconcilable 
differences which caused the irremediable breakdown of the 
marriage” as grounds for divorce.4 
On October 17, 2008, Hope and James entered into a consent 
order that incorporated numerous agreements and stipulations 
the parties agreed to during prior proceedings.5  The consent 
order set the valuation date of marital assets “as of the date of 
trial” and stated neither party can challenge any valuation based 
on the date of the valuation (or appraisal) or “any change in 
circumstances surrounding the valued assets . . . unless such 
change of circumstances is determined by the trial justice to be an 
extraordinary change in circumstances that could not have been 
contemplated by the parties.”6 
 1.  McCulloch v. McCulloch, 69 A.3d 810, 813 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. at 813–14. 
 3.  Id. at 814. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  
 6.  Id.  The Court noted the following “pertinent” provisions of the 
consent order:  
31. Neither party shall challenge: a) the date of valuation of any 
appraisal of real estate, equipment, machinery or the parties' 
possessions by any expert after October 1, 2007, or b) the date of the 
valuation of Microfibres, Inc. by any expert after October 1, 2007.  
32. For purposes of the rule that marital assets should be valued as 
of the date of trial unless there are compelling circumstances 
warranting a deviation, and by agreement of the parties, the dates of 
appraisals and valuation referenced in paragraph 31 above shall be 
considered as if they were appraised on the date of trial. 33. Nothing 
in paragraphs 31 or 32 above shall impair or prejudice the rights of 
either party to challenge any valuation or appraisal on the merits, 
other than based on:  1) the date of the valuation or appraisal, or 2) 
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The core issue throughout the proceedings in the Family 
Court was the distribution of the stock of Microfibres, Inc. 
(“Microfibres”) and Microfibres Partnership Limited (“MPL”).7  
James is the president and chief executive officer of Microfibres, 
which manufactures fabric, and MPL, which is an affiliated 
company that owns certain equipment and real estate in North 
Carolina.8  At trial, the chief financial officer of Microfibres, Mary 
Ann Beirne, testified that Microfibres planned to purchase a 
controlling interest in a company in China (“the China venture”), 
and if the plan “were to fall through,” Microfibres would be 
devastated.9 
In order to determine the value of Microfibres and MPL, three 
experts testified at trial.10  First, on behalf of Hope, Peri Ann 
Aptaker (“Aptaker”), a certified public accountant (“CPA”), 
testified that as of December 31, 2007, the fair market value of 
Microfibres was $126,365,000.11  Aptaker further testified she 
could not value the China venture because she had no data to 
calculate an impact, if any, the venture would have on 
Microfibres.12  The second expert was John Brough, Jr. (“Brough, 
Jr.”), CPA, and testified on behalf of James.13  Contrary to 
Aptaker, Brough, Jr. concluded Microfibres was worth 
$106,000,000, but similarly testified there was no information to 
place value on the China venture, which was not closed as of 
any change in circumstances surrounding the valued assets from 
February to May 27, 2008, unless such change of circumstances is 
determined by the trial justice to be an extraordinary change in 
circumstances that could not have been contemplated by the parties, 
provided, however, that the party in possession of any asset shall not 
claim, contend or urge that any such extraordinary change of 
circumstances shall have occurred with respect to any such asset 
unless he or she has disclosed such change of circumstances 
promptly and in no event more than three business days after the 
change in circumstance having occurred.   
Id. 
 7.  Id. at 813. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. at 814.  More specifically, the company in China performed 
printing and dyeing.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 815. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 814. 
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December 31, 2007.14  The last expert, Jay Fishman (“Fishman”), 
was a neutral, court-appointed expert.15  Fishman testified that 
since the December 31, 2007 valuation date, there had been a 
collapse in the financial market that impacted consumer spending 
and the loss of millions of jobs.16  Fishman also concluded that, 
like Aptaker and Brough, Jr., he received insufficient information 
to value the China venture and, therefore, as of December 31, 
2007, he was also unable to value the China venture.17 
On April 9, 2009, James submitted a post-trial memorandum 
in which he argued the trial justice could not reasonably place a 
value on Microfibres based on the experts’ testimony at trial 
regarding the downturn of worldwide economy that occurred after 
the valuation date contained in the consent order.18  James 
contended the economic crisis was “an extraordinary circumstance 
that was not anticipated by the parties” and therefore, the 
“arbitrary valuation date” should not be utilized.19  On August 7, 
2009, while conducting a hearing on an unrelated motion, the trial 
justice informed the parties he planned “to order a re-valuation of 
Microfibres as of a more current date.”20  In response, on August 
21, 2009, Hope filed an “objection to and motion for 
reconsideration of the trial justice’s decision to revalue 
[Microfibres].”21  On August 27, 2009, the trial justice held a 
hearing on Hope’s motion, denied the motion, and ordered the 
companies to be revalued as of September 1, 2009.22  However, on 
January 19, 2010, the trial justice ordered the parties to suspend 
their revaluation efforts because “he had decided to equitably 
distribute the stock of the companies without placing a value on 
them.”23 
On August 17, 2010, the trial justice issued his written 
decision granting the parties an absolute divorce.24 After 
awarding Hope and James joint custody of Lucas, their son, the 
 14.  Id. at 815. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 824. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. at 815. 
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trial justice focused on the equitable assignment of the marital 
property.25  Excluding Mircofibres and MPL, the trial justice first 
examined each factor26 set forth in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1(a) and 
then awarded each party fifty percent of their bank and 
investment accounts and divided the property.27 
The trial justice then turned to the “knotty” issue of the 
equitable distribution of Microfibres and MPL.28  The trial justice 
declared that the stock in Microfibres is a marital asset, but only 
49.9967 percent of MPL was marital property since the remainder 
had been gifted to James.29  Rather than valuing the companies 
and assigning a portion of that value to each party, the trial 
justice ordered an in-kind distribution30 of stock of Microfibres 
 25.  Id.  
 26.  Under § 15-5-16.1(a): 
In determining the nature and value of the property, if any, to be 
assigned, the court after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party 
shall consider the following: 
(1) The length of the marriage; 
(2) The conduct of the parties during the marriage; 
(3) The contribution of each of the parties during the marriage in the 
acquisition, preservation, or appreciation in value of their respective 
estates; 
(4) The contribution and services of either party as homemaker; 
(5) The health and age of the parties; 
(6) The amount and sources of income of each of the parties; 
(7) The occupation and employability of each of the parties; 
(8) The opportunity of each party for future acquisition of capital 
assets and income; 
(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training, 
licensure, business, or increased earning power of the other; 
(10) The need of the custodial parent to occupy or own the marital 
residence and to use or own its household effects taking into account 
the best interests of the children of the marriage; 
(11) Either party’s wasteful dissipation of assets or any transfer or 
encumbrance of assets made in contemplation of divorce without fair 
consideration; and 
(12) Any factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and 
proper. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (2013). 
 27.  McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 815–816 n.3 (citing § 15-5-16.1(a)). 
 28.  Id. at 817. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  An in-kind distribution refers to the allocation of a portion of the 
actual asset, as opposed to the sum of money representing the value of the 
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and an in-kind distribution of a partnership interest in MPL.31  
The trial justice stated he was unable to accurately place a value 
on the companies and found the fair and equitable method was to 
assign Hope a portion of the corporate stock, rather than a sum of 
cash.32 
In deciding what portion of stock to assign to Hope, the trial 
justice examined Hope’s “contribution” to the companies and the 
factors announced in § 15-5-16.1.33 
[T]he trial justice found that Hope made little or no 
contribution to [Microfibres or MPL].  It was a family 
business in the family of [James] for multiple 
generations. * * * Notwithstanding th[e] finding [that 
Microfibres was a marital asset], [Hope] ha[d] in no 
significant way done anything to contribute towards the 
acquisition, preservation or appreciation or the corporate 
assets.34 
The trial justice continued, stating the “limit” of Hope’s 
contribution was decorating a property owned by the corporation, 
but Hope “served as a homemaker and as such [wa]s entitled to a 
share of the marital assets.”35 Nevertheless, the trial justice 
continued, declaring “it would be completely inequitable” for Hope 
to receive a portion of Microfibres equal to James, “whose blood, 
sweat and tears and contributions by his family ha[d] been the 
reason for both the past success and what hopefully w[ould] be the 
future success of th[e] company.”36  Thereafter, the “trial justice 
awarded Hope 25 percent” of the stock in Microfibres and 25 
percent of that portion of MPL determined as marital property, 
leaving the remainder 75 percent of those assets to James.37 
 
 
asset.  See Stephen W. Schlissel, The Hazards of “In-Kind” Distributions of 
Closely-Held Stock in Divorce Actions, 17 J. Am. Acad. Matrimonial Lawyers 
381, 383 n.11 (2001). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 818. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 36.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37.  Id. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Supreme Court consolidated Hope and James’s appeals 
from the Family Court decision.38  Hope’s appeal presented eight 
reasons the trial justice erred in his decision.39  The Court began 
with Hope’s contention that the trial justice incorrectly 
determined the percentage of MPL that was marital property.40  
Because it was undisputed that Microfibres owned 10 percent of 
MPL and James conceded 49.9967 percent of MPL is marital 
property, it was the remaining 40.0033 percent of MPL at issue.41  
Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the Court upheld the 
trial justice’s finding that James owned 20 percent of MPL before 
marriage, and thus was not part of the marital estate, since the 
record supported the finding.42  Specifically, the Court stated the 
trial justice’s finding regarding the 20 percent interest “was 
perhaps not as explicit as it could have been,” but there was no 
error because the trial justice chose to accept James’s testimony 
that James had a 20 percent interest in MPL prior to marriage.43 
Regarding the remaining 20.0033 percent of MPL at issue, the 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 819–20.  Hope’s eight reasons were the following:  
(1) in his determination of the percentage of MPL that was marital 
property; (2) by declining to place a value on Microfibres before 
dividing the marital estate; (3) by disregarding the consent order 
that set forth the date as of which the marital property was to be 
valued; (4) by assigning Hope 25 percent of Microfibres, thereby 
making her a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation; (5) 
by declining to award Hope alimony; (6) by awarding Hope only 
$1,000 per week in child support; (7) by declining to award Hope fees 
for her attorneys, experts, and the supervisor of James's visits with 
Lucas; and (8) by declining to order the disclosure of certain 
documents and information concerning James's will, trusts, and 
estate plans. 
Id. 
 40.  Id. at 819.  The Court notes the three-step procedure for the 
equitable distribution of property in a divorce action.  Id. at 820 (stating the 
three steps, “(1) determining which assets are marital property; (2) 
considering the factors set forth in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1(a); and (3) 
distributing the property”). 
 41.  Id. at 820. 
 42.  Id. at 819–20.  The Court grants the trial justice “broad discretion” 
regarding the equitable distribution of marital assets and the Court will not 
overturn the distribution unless the trial justice abused his or her discretion.  
Id. at 818–19. 
 43.  Id. at 820–21. 
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Court applied the abuse of discretion standard and found no error 
in the trial justice’s finding that James’s father gifted the 20.0033 
percent to James, and therefore, that portion was not marital 
property.44  The Court relied on the existence of three documents, 
within the record, that were labeled as deeds of gift.45  
Additionally, the Court noted that the record was without 
evidence to disprove the transfer of the 20.0033 percent interest 
was a gift.46 
Hope’s second argument considered on appeal was whether 
the trial justice erred in assigning percentages of Microfibres and 
MPL before placing a value on them.47  While the Court did not 
accept Hope’s argument that § 15-5-16.1 required a value to be 
placed on all marital property before the property was assigned, 
the Court nevertheless held the trial justice abused his discretion 
when he failed to value Microfibres and MPL before assigning 
them.48  The Court reasoned, first, that Microfibres and MPL 
“constitute such an enormous portion of the marital estate.”49  
Relying on the parties’ experts, the Court explained the value of 
the companies as of December 31, 2007 was between $106 million 
and $126 million.50 Additionally, even though the value of 
Microfibres and MPL may have swayed since that date, it could 
not be disputed that the companies created “the vast majority of 
the marital estate.”51 
“More importantly,” the Court held the trial justice abused his 
discretion when he did not “place a value on the specific portions 
of Microfibres and MPL that he assigned to the parties” because 
“he assigned the parties unequal percentages, thereby rendering 
Hope a minority shareholder of a closely held corporation.”52  The 
Court explained that without knowing the values of the portions 
assigned to each party, it could not review whether the entire 
 44.  Id. at 821. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 822.  Hope argued § 15-5-16.1(a) creates a “statutory 
obligation” that a trial justice to measure the worth of all marital property 
before it is assigned.  Id. at 821. 
 49.  Id. at 822. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id.  
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distribution was equitable.53  The Court recognized “assignment 
of stock in a closely held corporation, which makes one spouse a 
minority shareholder, is generally disfavored and should be 
avoided whenever possible.”54  By not placing value on Microfibres 
and MPL before assigning them to each party when the trial 
justice assigned Hope 25 percent of the Microfibres and MPL, a 25 
percent minority share would “likely not be the equivalent of 25 
percent of the total value of the company.”55  The reason for this 
discrepancy was twofold:  (1) because the stock in a closely held 
corporation lacks liquidity since there is no established public 
market for the stock; and (2) because a minority shareholder lacks 
control over the company and thus, the value of stock “is diluted in 
comparison to that of a majority shareholder.”56  Therefore, the 
Court continued, a minority discount or a discount for lack of 
marketability were “appropriate, and even necessary, when 
valuing an in-kind distribution of a minority share of a closely 
held corporation in a divorce action.”57  Alternatively, the Court 
stated the trial justice could award Hope the cash equivalent of 
the equitable ownership interest in the companies, and such 
discounts would not be required.58 
Without the value determinations of the companies, the Court 
declined to address Hope’s assertion that an assignment of 25 
percent of Microfibres and MPL was inequitable since the value 
could not be compared to the remainder of the marital estate.59  
Because the Court was unable to fully review the distribution of 
the marital estate, the Court further declined to review Hope’s 
contentions regarding alimony and child support.60 
Turning to Hope’s argument that the trial justice erred when 
he ignored the October 17, 2008 consent order, in which the 
parties agreed to a valuation date for the marital property, the 
Court held “the manner in which the trial justice made his 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id.  However, the Court takes note that it is not always error when 
the distribution of stock in a closely held corporation results in one spouse as 
a minority shareholder.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 822–23. 
 57.  Id. at 823.   
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. at n.6 (noting the analysis for both issues depends on the trial 
justice’s assignment of marital property on remand). 
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decision to disregard the valuation date was error,” but the error 
did not require the matter be remanded for a rehearing.61  
Pursuant to paragraph thirty-three of the consent order, James 
challenged the valuation date based on a change in 
circumstances.62  However, the trial justice never formerly ruled 
on James’s posttrial memorandum, but rather “deviated from the 
terms of the consent order,” constituting error.63  Nevertheless, 
the Court reasoned that remanding the matter would not likely 
change the trial justice’s decision to abandon the valuation date 
contained in the consent order.64 
The Court next turned to Hope’s argument regarding 
reimbursement of fees based on James’s conduct in the case.65  
Interpreting Hope’s request for attorney fees as a sanction on 
James, the Court noted such a remedy is only available in three 
narrow instances, of which only the third applies here: “when a 
party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons.’”66  Applying abuse of discretion review, the 
Court reasoned Hope failed to show that James “acted in bad 
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”67  
Regarding Hope’s argument that James should be required to 
reimburse the marital estate for the hired experts and for the 
costs of the supervised visits between James and their son, the 
Court found no error.68 
In response to Hope’s last argument that the trial justice 
erred when he denied her request that James disclose certain 
documents about his will, trusts, and other estate plans, the Court 
 61.  Id. at 825.  
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. (noting the sanctity the law confers upon consent orders). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 826. 
 66.  Id.  (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991)).  
The other two narrow circumstances in which the Court has exercised its 
“inherent power to fashion an appropriate remedy that would serve the ends 
of justice” are:  “(1) pursuant to the ‘common fund exception’ that ‘allows a 
court to award attorney’s fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly 
benefit others[,]’* * *; (2) ‘as a sanction for the willful disobedience of a court 
order[,]’ * * *.”  Id.  The Court states Hope did not argue these two 
circumstances exist.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 826–27 (quoting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46). 
 68.  Id. at 827 (reasoning Hope did not cite a case or legal authority to 
support her argument). 
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found no abuse in the trial justice’s discretion.69  The Court 
reasoned the trial justice was within his broad discretion to deny 
Hope’s discovery request for James’s will and estate plans.70  
Moreover, review of the trial justice’s denial of Hope’s motion to 
compel disclosure of James’s trusts was premature because the 
Court was already requiring a new equitable distribution of the 
marital estate.71 
Lastly, turning to James’s protective and conditional cross-
appeal, the Court upheld the trial justice’s finding that the 
transfer of stock of Microfibres was a sale, not an inheritance.72  
Responding to James’s contention that he and his father intended 
the transfer of stock as an inheritance, the Court stated, “[w]hen a 
contract is unambiguous, * * * the intent of the parties becomes 
irrelevant.”73  The evidence documenting the transfer of stock 
used the terms “purchase” and “sale” and “included all indicia of a 
sale,” thereby making the parties’ intent irrelevant.74  Thus, the 
Court concluded, “the transfer of Microfibres stock was, in fact, a 
sale.”75 
COMMENTARY 
At a glance, requiring the trial justice to place a value on “an 
in-kind distribution of a minority share of a closely-held 
corporation in divorce action,” precluded the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court from considering whether the trial justice’s 
distribution was truly equitable.76  However, the Court’s ultimate 
holding, that required a trial justice to place a value on the closely 
held corporation before portions of it were assigned to each spouse, 
presented equitable goals.  The Court held that a trial justice’s 
assignment of unequal percentages (of a closely held corporation), 
which rendered a spouse a minority shareholder, was an abuse of 
 69.  Id. at 827–28. 
 70.  Id. at 828. 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Id. at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73.  Id. (quoting Vincent Co. v. First National Supermarkets, Inc., 683 
A.2d 361, 363 (R.I. 1996)). 
 74.  Id. at 830. 
 75.  Id. at 829. 
 76.  See id. at 823 (stating, “because we are satisfied that this case 
required these value determinations, we decline to address Hope’s contention 
that an assignment of only 25 percent of Microfibres and MPL to her was 
inequitable . . . ”). 
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discretion.77  This line of reasoning stemmed from the equitable 
precept that a minority share of a closely held corporation was 
likely not the equivalent percentage of the total value of the 
company.78  The case illustrates this point:  if Hope was assigned 
a 25 percent minority share in the company, then she would be 
assigned illiquid assets with no ready market and left with no 
control over the company.79  Essentially, the Court rejected the 
trial justice’s assignment because it was inequitable—though the 
Court does not use this term—and, therefore, mandated 
application of a minority discount or a discount of marketability.80 
On the other hand, by remanding the case to determine 
values of the companies before portions are assigned, the Court’s 
decision avoided the analysis of equitable factors in § 15-5-
16.1(a).81  While review of the trial justice’s application of the 
enumerated factors would be premature, the Court’s disregard for 
the analysis beckons questions relating to the notions of fair and 
equitable distribution of marital assets.82  For instance, when the 
trial justice applied the factors from § 15-5-16.1(a), he “awarded 
each party 50 percent of their bank and investment accounts and 
50 percent of one of their country club memberships.”83  Further, 
other assets were divided fairly equally, as Hope was assigned one 
home and its contents, two automobiles in her possession, and all 
jewelry in her possession, and James was assigned two homes and 
their contents, two vacant lots, a remaining golf club membership, 
and the jewelry in his possession.84  While the trial justice 
assigned other assets equally, he awarded Hope only 25 percent of 
the stock in the companies.85  The discrepancy begs the question 
of what else the trial justice considered beyond the enumerated 
factors in § 15-5-16.1(a). 
The trial justice’s statements provide a backdrop for factors 
 77.  Id. at 822. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id. at 823. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. (noting the Court cannot review whether Hope’s 25 percent 
assignment is equitable in comparison with James’s 75 percent until value is 
placed on the companies). 
 83.  Id. at 817. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 818. 
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he considered outside of those enumerated in § 15-5-16.1(a).86  
Specifically, the trial justice mentioned the fact that Microfibres 
“was a business in the family of [James] for multiple generations” 
and “that it would be completely inequitable” for Hope to receive 
an equal portion of the companies as James, “whose blood, sweat 
and tears and contributions by his family ha[d] been the reason 
for both the past success and what hopefully w[ould] be the future 
success.”87  Therefore, the trial justice’s statements provided two 
considerations outside of those enumerated in the statute:  (1) the 
fact that the companies were family businesses; and (2) which 
party’s family the businesses were associated with.88  It could be 
inferred that the trial justice’s contemplation of the fact 
Microfibres and MPL were James’s family businesses led him to 
award Hope 25 percent of the stock in the Microfibres and MPL 
since, after consideration of the statutory factors, he divided other 
marital assets fairly equally.89 
The Court’s opinion did not confront the trial justice’s analysis 
of § 15-5-16.1(a), thereby tacitly allowing the family courts to 
apply both the enumerated factors therein, but also any other 
considerations the trial justices see fit.90  The trial justice 
recognized Hope contributed to the couple’s income and that she 
“played the role primarily of homemaker,” but found that Hope 
“made little or no contribution to [Microfibres or MPL]” and 
subsequently awarded Hope only 25 percent of the stock in the 
companies, while dividing other marital assets equally.91  
Further, the trial justice undermined Hope’s contributions as 
homemaker when he considered the fact that James hired a nanny 
or household help “in order to reduce the homemaker’s 
responsibilities” and that James also contributed to the cooking 
and child care.92  The trial justice’s analysis inferred that Hope 
did not contribute enough, whether as homemaker or to the 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  This analysis focuses on Hope’s assignment of 25 percent in the 
companies in comparison to the equal distribution of other marital assets, 
rather than the value of the 25 percent assignment itself. 
 90.  McCulloch, 69 A.3d at 823 (stating, “this case required value 
determinations” and thus declining to review whether the assignment was 
equitable). 
 91.  Id. at 816, 818. 
 92.  Id. at 816. 
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companies, to entitle her to an equal portion in the companies as 
James.  Perhaps, if James did not hire a nanny, or, if Hope 
performed all of the family’s cooking, the trial justice’s assignment 
would have been different.  It may be possible the trial justice 
merely believed James was entitled to a substantially larger 
portion of the companies because they began through his family.  
Despite these speculations, the Court remanded the case in order 
to place a value on Microfibres and MPL and trial justices are 
thus left to choose how much weight to give to the factors in § 15-
5-16.1(a) and whether to give weight to outside factors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held a trial justice must 
value a closely held corporation before assigning portions to the 
parties in a divorce action.93  Further, in a divorce action, a 
minority discount or a discount for lack of marketability must be 
applied in the distribution of a minority share of a closely held 
corporation or the spouse receiving the minority share would be 
assigned “illiquid assets that have no ready market” and “left with 




 93.  Id. at 822–23. 
 94.  Id. at 823. 
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Insurance Law.  American States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831 (R.I. 
2013). Contractual provisions in uninsured/underinsured auto insurance 
policies that attempt to limit the period in which the insured has to file a 
claim against the insurer to a period lesser than the statutory period and start 
the limitation from the date of the accident are unenforceable because they 
are against public policy. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Joann LaFlam (“LaFlam”) claimed that she suffered serious 
injuries when she was involved in an automobile accident on April 
25, 2007.1  The car that LaFlam was driving was insured through 
her employer with a policy from American States Insurance 
Company (“ASIC”).2  The policy included coverage for up to one 
million dollars in protection from uninsured (“UM”)/underinsured 
motorists (“UIM”).3  Within the policy was a time-bar clause that, 
in part, stated that any legal actions brought under the policy 
must be brought within three years from the date of the accident.4 
On April 3, 2008, LaFlam sent notice to ASIC that she may 
have a claim under the UIM coverage.5  ASIC then asked LaFlam 
for information regarding the claim and made several similar 
information requests through May of 2009.6 LaFlam was 
contractually obligated to seek authorization from ASIC before 
settling her UIM claim.7  So on January 25, 2010, she sent the 
authorization request, which was approved by ASIC on February 
18, 2010.8  LaFlam then settled her claims against the UIM 
tortfeasors.9  On May 19, 2010, LaFlam demanded one million 
dollars from ASIC as payout for her UIM coverage.10 
Rather than simply denying the claim, on August 25, 2010, 
ASIC filed an action in the United States District Court for the 
 1. American States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831, 832–33 (R.I. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 833. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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District of Rhode Island for declaratory-judgment.11  ASIC sought 
a declaration stating that any legal claim LaFlam may have 
against ASIC under the policy was time-barred because it was 
now over three years since the date of LaFlam’s accident which 
was April 25, 2007.12  The parties each submitted a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, the main issue of which was whether 
the time-bar clause was enforceable or not based on public policy 
grounds.13  The District Court found that the time-bar clause did 
not violate public policy and was, therefore, enforceable under 
Rhode Island law.14 
LaFlam appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit and moved for certification of two questions to 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15 The first question was 
whether or not a three-year time limit to bring a claim under 
UM/UIM coverage violated public policy.16  The second question 
was whether or not the time limit to bring an UM/UIM claim 
begins before the insured knows for certain she will make an 
UM/UIM claim.17 The First Circuit decided that the two questions 
were interrelated because a short time limit may bar a person 
from filing a claim since time may run out before the person 
knows that she even has a claim.18  The Court of Appeals, 
therefore, combined the two questions into one, certifying them to 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court by asking if under “the UM/UIM 
statute and Rhode Island public policy, would Rhode Island 
enforce the two provisions of the contractual limitations clause in 
this case?”19 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed to answer the 
question which essentially asked whether ASIC’s requirement 
that LaFlam initiate legal action within three years from the date 
of the accident was enforceable and in accordance with Rhode 
Island Public Policy.20 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 833–34. 
 15. Id. at 834. 
 16. Id. at 833 n.5. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 834. 
 19. Id. at 838. 
 20. Id. at 834, 838. 
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Court held that the time-bar clause included in ASIC’s 
UM/UIM coverage was unenforceable because it was against 
public policy.21  The Court came to this holding by first examining 
the purpose of the RI Statute requiring insurers to offer UM/UIM 
protection as well as the history of rulings surrounding the statute 
in order to get a better picture of the public policy considerations 
involved in this case.22  The Court then examined the effects of a 
time-bar clause that begins running on the date of an accident, 
and how it would work against those policy considerations.23  The 
Court concluded by making it clear that the three-year time-bar 
clause was unenforceable because it began to run before LaFlam 
had a cause of action against ASIC and because it shortened the 
statutory limitations period.24 
 
A.   The Public Policy of UM/UIM Coverage 
The Court began its exploration of public policy by stating the 
purpose and limitations of the statute requiring insurers to offer 
UM/UIM coverage.25  The Court cited several cases that have 
explained the legislature’s primary purpose in enacting the 
statute was that insured motorists are indemnified when involved 
in an accident with an underinsured or uninsured motorist.26  The 
Court went on to explain that these UM/UIM contracts should be 
interpreted with respect to the public policy considered by the 
legislature.27  Accordingly, if contract provisions work to restrict 
coverage, those contract provisions will be void.28  That is not to 
say that all limitations to recovery are void, however, reasonable 
limitations that work to protect insurers have been upheld.29 
 21. Id. at 845. 
 22. Id. at 835–38. 
 23. Id. at 835–45. 
 24. Id. at 845. 
 25. Id. at 835 (referring to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1). 
 26. Id.; see also Henderson v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 35 A.3d 902, 906 
(R.I. 2012); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Viti, 850 A.2d 104, 107 (R.I. 
2004); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Graziano, 587 A.2d 916, 917, 919 (R.I. 
1991). 
 27. LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 839. 
 28. Id. at 836. 
 29. Id. at 836–37. 
 
AMERICANSTATES.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:18 PM 
960 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:957 
 
B.    Effects of a Time-Bar Clause That Accrues at the Date of 
Accident 
The Court then turned its attention to what it found to be the 
most troubling part of ASIC’s time-bar clause:  the date the 
limitations period begins.30  There were no Rhode Island cases 
specifically on point as to when UM/UIM cause of actions accrue, 
so the Court first addressed ASIC’s argument that starting the 
limitation period on the date of the accident was analogous to 
prior Rhode Island case law that established that prejudgment 
interest on UM/UIM claims begin to accrue on the date of the 
accident.31  If the insurer’s contractual duties began to run at that 
date, ASIC argued, the limitations period should begin at that 
date as well.32  The Court rejected the analogy by distinguishing 
the “very different” issues of the date when prejudgment interest 
begins accruing and when UM/UIM causes of action accrue.33 
The Court then examined the law in other jurisdictions as to 
when the limitation period starts to run and made the decision to 
adopt the majority approach.34  The majority of jurisdictions have 
held that the limitations period began on the date the insurer 
denied coverage benefits.35 This makes sense, because, as 
accepted by the Court, UM/UIM claims are actions in contract.36  
They concluded that the limitations period should, therefore, 
begin to run at the time of injury of the insured by the insurer, 
and the insurer does not injure the insured until a breach of the 
insurance contract occurs.37 
ASIC attempted what the Court called a “doomsday scenario” 
argument by arguing that an insured could simply put off filing 
the claim for years while prejudgment interest accrued.38  The 
Court quickly rejected this argument by recognizing that 
insurance companies have the means to protect themselves from 
 30. Id. at 838–39. 
 31. Id. at 839. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 840. 
 37. Id. at 841. 
 38. Id. 
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stale claims.39  Further, the Court found it unlikely that an 
injured person would want to put off getting “fully compensated 
any longer than necessary.”40 
As a last-ditch effort, ASIC then argued that the time should 
begin ticking on the time-bar clause when the insured finds out 
the limit of the tortfeasor’s insurance policy coverage.41  ASIC 
explained that it was at this point an insured would know if the 
UM/UIM coverage would be invoked.42  The insured could then 
file suit against the insured and have the proceedings stayed until 
after a settlement or judgment is rendered against the 
tortfeasor.43 
The Court explained that such a scheme would be inefficient 
and may not always work because an insured might end up being 
awarded more than initially expected.44  If the initially expected 
award is within the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage, the insured 
would not have filed a claim against the insurer.45  But if the 
insured is awarded more than initially expected, and beyond the 
tortfeasor’s coverage limit, the insured would not be able to 
recover the amount above the tortfeasor’s coverage limit if the 
insured’s UIM coverage is time-barred.46 Further, the Court 
explained that requiring a lawsuit to be filed before a controversy 
exists would be expensive, time consuming, and utterly pointless 
except for the reason of allowing insurers to escape payment.47 
Having dispatched all of ASIC’s arguments and joining in the 
majority approach to UM/UIM contract disputes, the Court 
examined if the clause at issue could coexist in light of Rhode 
Island public policy.48  Would public policy support UM/UIM 
contracts that both shorten the limitations period from the 
statutory period and start that limitations period running on a 
date before the insured has a cause of action against the 
 39. Id. at 841–42. 
 40. Id. at 842. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 842–43. 
 45. Id. at 842. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 844. 
 48. Id. 
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insurer?49  The Court answered in the negative.50  ASIC’s policy 
would have had LaFlam file suit before ASIC even breached the 
contract.51 The Court held that a policy such as this 
“impermissibly restricts” and “frustrates public policy” with 
respect to the UM/UIM statute.52 
 
COMMENTARY 
In terms of the public policy of fairness to the insured, this 
case was certainly decided correctly, but the decision is less clear 
when viewed in terms of economic policy.  The legislature’s public 
policy concern when enacting the UM/UIM statute was so that an 
insured can be indemnified from UM/UIM drivers.53  But implicit 
within that policy seems to be a concern that insurance actually 
indemnify an insured, and that insurance not be cost prohibitive.  
The Court’s holding in this case will most likely increase the cost 
of UM/UIM insurance and work against the same public policy 
used to uphold their decision against ASIC.  The only economic 
argument raised was brushed aside by the Court as a “doomsday 
scenario,” and probably did not receive the consideration it 
deserved.54  Even after an in-depth consideration of the economics 
at play here, the holding probably would not have been any 
different under the facts of this case.  However, decisions like the 
one made in this case work to increase liability costs to insurers, 
and therefore, increase premiums to the insured, the economics of 
which may create a conflict between the ruling here and the 
legislature’s stated policy purpose. 
As far as fairness and justice policy concerns, this was an easy 
decision to make.  If ASIC had been allowed to escape liability by 
requiring that LaFlam file a legal claim before LaFlam knew that 
a claim would ever accrue against ASIC, it would have just 
seemed wrong.  This is especially true considering LaFlam kept 
ASIC up to date on the status of the claim against the tortfeasor 
for years until the settlement.55  The claim from LaFlam, 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 845. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 835. 
 54.  See id. at 841–42. 
 55.  Id. at 833. 
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therefore, came as no surprise to ASIC.  What was surprising, 
however, was that ASIC initiated court proceedings considering 
how easily the Court dismissed ASIC’s arguments and came to a 
decision. 
There is one argument that the Court should have explored 
deeper.  The argument referred to is the “doomsday scenario” 
envisioned by ASIC in which the insured sits on their claims for 
years accruing prejudgment interest instead of pursuing the 
claim.56  A deeper exploration probably would not have changed 
the outcome in this case—the facts in this case made ASIC’s 
“doomsday scenario” look especially weak57—but would have 
provided some guidance to courts in the future when it comes to 
economic considerations in closer cases. 
The Court’s dismissal of this argument was based on the idea 
that an injured person in need of recovery would not put off 
making a claim and on the fact that an insurer has the means to 
protect themselves from those who delay making claims.58  While 
the Court was probably correct about people in need of recovery 
seeking recovery as soon as possible, not everyone will need 
recovery so quickly. 
Now that the limitations period begins on a later date than 
the accident date, there will likely become situations in which an 
injured person who does not need to recover as soon as possible 
puts off making a claim in order to accrue interest.  Indeed, it is 
those who can afford to pay for high UM/UIM coverage who would 
be most able to wait some time without making a claim and who 
would consider the economic benefits of the statutory interest rate 
in making the decision on when to file the claim.59 
 56.  See id. at 841. 
 57.  See id. at 833.  LaFlam filed suit against ASIC only three months 
after the three-year limitation period expired.  Id.   
 58.  See id. at 841–42. 
 59.  The statutory interest rate for civil claims is 12% from the date the 
cause of action accrues; compare this to the 2.4% expected market rate of 
return in the United States.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-21-10 (West); 
GuruFocus, Global Market Valuations and Expected Returns – Sept. 4, 2013, 
NASDAQ (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/article/global-
market-valuations-and-expected-returns-sept-4-2013-cm272928.  While most 
people do not have the means to wait for recovery, there do exist some for 
whom it makes good economic sense to delay making a claim as long as 
possible while interest accrues.  Even if the insurer has the “means” to 
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While the Court was correct that ASIC’s “doomsday scenario” 
will not likely provide enough “doom” to Rhode Island to rule in 
favor of ASIC, it can be said with almost equal certainty that the 
Court’s ruling is something for insurers to consider when setting 
Rhode Island car insurance prices.  To add even further to an 
insurer’s considerations, it can be gleaned from this case that 
there exists some instability in the regulatory environment for 
insurance contracts.  After this case, insurers will need to increase 
policy prices to offset for the potential higher interest costs as well 
as any costs that may arise from the perceived regulatory 
instability. 
Insurers will need to protect themselves from the costs that 
will sprout from this decision.  Accordingly, the losses will need to 
be set off against higher insurance premiums.  Considering that 
the price of an insurance policy is the only barrier to buying more 
insurance, it follows that insurance prices restrict the coverage 
that gets purchased.  It then further follows that the higher the 
price of insurance, the more that insurance gets restricted.  Rhode 
Island already ranks among the top states for the highest car 
insurance costs.60  The holding in this case will almost certainly 
increase those prices and restrict coverage even more.  The 
question becomes: Is Rhode Island public policy really better 
supported with even higher car insurance prices? 
The price increase that results from this ruling will most 
likely be slight.  The Court was right that there probably will not 
be many people sitting on claims while interest accrues.61  
Similarly, any regulatory instability might be so slight that 
insurance companies will probably not increase insurance prices 
noticeably.  As such, the rate increase that results from this case 
will not be the “straw that breaks the camel’s back” as far as 
people being able to afford UM/UIM coverage.  This does not 
mean, however, that economic policy should not be a consideration 
in making these rulings. 
The fact is that there will never be any certain case “that 
protect itself from delays, those “means” likely cost more than the time-bar 
clause in LaFlam’s insurance contract. 
 60.  Chris Persaud, Chart: Car-Ownership Costs by State, BANKRATE 
(Aug. 21, 2013), available at http://origin.bankrate.com/finance/auto/carowner 
ship-costs-by-state.aspx. 
 61.  LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 842. 
 
AMERICANSTATES.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:18 PM 
2014] SURVEY SECTION 965 
breaks the camel’s back.”  There will always be cases like this that 
simply add another “straw.”  But even though the individual 
“straws” will not cause a mass exodus of insurance customers 
dropping their car insurance coverage, it is likely that the “straws” 
will cause a few people that simply cannot afford to pay more to 
drop or lower their UM/UIM coverage.  Furthermore, there will be 
those who, when purchasing auto insurance, decide against 
purchasing UM/UIM coverage or choose to purchase less than 
they feel they need because of the cost.  In these cases, this 
holding in this case will lead to less indemnification of the insured, 
which is actually against the same public policy that the Court 
used here to rule in favor of LaFlam.62 
That is not to say the Court’s decision was incorrect.  Indeed, 
the sense of injustice that arose from what ASIC was trying to get 
away with was palpable, while any economic concerns seem slight.  
The problem, though, is that economic concerns will usually 
always seem slight.  But that does not mean they do not deserve 
consideration.  This is especially true for a case like this in Rhode 
Island where the cost of car insurance is already among the 
nation’s highest.  If they have not already done so, at some point 
in the future, public policy concerns in regard to indemnification 
for a policy holder are going to run square into conflict with public 
policy concerns in regard to a person being able to afford to even 
be a policy holder. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was asked whether under 
“the UM/UIM statute and Rhode Island public policy, would 
Rhode Island enforce the two provisions of the contractual 
limitations clause in this case?”63  The Court answered this 
question in the negative.64  The Court found that provisions in 
UM/UIM auto insurance policies that limit the period in which an 
insured can file a claim against the insurer and which begin the 
limitation period on a date before the insured accrues a claim 
against the insurer are unenforceable.65  Rhode Island public 
 62.  Id. at 835. 
 63.  Id. at 838. 
 64.  Id. at 845. 
 65.  Id. 
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policy with respect to UM/UIM coverage works to ensure 
indemnification of the insured, and time-bar clauses that 
“impermissibly restrict” and “frustrate” the public policy 
considerations are void.66 
 
Jeffrey Thomas Waltemate 
 
 66.  Id. 
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Property Law.  Wellington Condo. Ass’n v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n, 
68 A.3d 594 (R.I. 2013).  A dominant estate owner brought an action against 
a servient estate owner alleging the creation of an express and implied 
easement over a right of way.  The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that 
the “condominium declaration did not create [an] express easement for 
access to [the] alleged dominant estate owner’s tennis courts.”1  The Court 
remanded the issue of an implied easement by grant due to insufficient 
evidence and ordered fact-finding to determine whether or not the implied 
easement was apparent, permanent, and necessary for the enjoyment of the 
dominant estate. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Wellington Condominium Association, Wellington Hotel 
Association, John Rizzo, Arthur Leonard, and Frederick 
Howayeck (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) appealed a judgment denying 
an easement over a parcel of land owned by Wellington Cove 
Condominium Association, Wellington On The Harbor 
Condominium Owner’s Association, and Harrington Court 
Condominium, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”).  The properties at 
issue in this case were neighboring condominiums located on 
Narragansett Bay in Newport, Rhode Island, and were formerly 
owned by the Wellington Hotel Associates (“declarant”) as a 
unified parcel.2  Over several years the adjacent properties were 
developed as condominium projects “in a somewhat piecemeal 
fashion.”3  “In 1986, the declarant filed and recorded a declaration 
of condominium,” which “provided that the property could be 
developed in phases and, further, that portions of the property 
could be withdrawn from the condominium.”4 The declarant 
utilized this provision of the declaration and assigned its right to 
withdraw Phases IV and VI to Newport Partners.5 In 1992, 
 1.  Wellington Condo. Ass’n  v. Wellington Cove Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d 
594, 596 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id.  The title of this declaration was “Wellington Yacht & Racquet 
Club on Newport Harbor – A Condominium.” 
 5.  Id.  “Phase IV consisted of a parcel of land adjacent to Kirwins Fifth 
Ward Land and the west side of the property’s tennis courts.  Phase VI was 
designated for a marina adjacent to Phase IV.  The tennis courts [were] part 
of plaintiff’s condominium.”  Id. at n.5. 
 
WELLINGTON.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:25 PM 
968 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:967 
Newport Partners, as a “successor declarant,” withdrew Phases IV 
and VI.6  The remaining property after the withdrawal of Phases 
IV and VI constitutes Plaintiff’s premises and the withdrawn 
parcels are Defendants’ premises.7  This severance is “dispositive 
of the issues in this appeal.”8 
Following the withdrawal, Phases IV and VI were conveyed to 
various new owners.9  “On March 13, 1997, Newport Partners 
conveyed the withdrawn parcel to Newport Partners LLC,” who 
subsequently created “Wellington on the Cove Condominium.”10  
The record disclosed that when Newport Partners withdrew 
Phases IV and VI, “the claimed right of way consisted of a gravel 
road which ran across the withdrawn parcel and alongside tennis 
courts belonging to [P]laintiffs’ condominium.”11  The claimed 
right of way was used by Plaintiffs to access their tennis courts 
and a point of access to Kirwins Fifth Ward, as its alternative 
entrance on Harrington Street was blocked by a chain and 
recently, since 2008, a gate, which was occasionally locked.12  The 
right of way was “paved around 1999 or 2000 by the developers of 
the condominiums on Defendants’ premises.”13  In “the summer of 
2005, a chain barrier was placed between two poles, positioned at 
the southern end of the claimed right of way, which impeded 
access by vehicle and foot traffic.”14  Defendants refused to remove 
the barrier despite protests by Plaintiffs.15 A year later, 
Defendants replaced the chain with “heavy plastic barriers which 
blocked vehicular traffic, and impeded pedestrian traffic.”16  
“[P]laintiffs filed an action against defendant[s] [and] alleg[ed] 
that, according to the condominium declaration, [P]laintiffs had 
 6.  Id. at 596.  “Under Article 14, section 14.1 of the declaration—
‘Reservation of Rights’—one of the rights reserved to the declarant and ‘its 
successors and assigns’ is the right ‘to withdraw real estate from the 
Condominium.’”  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 596–97. 
 8.  Id. at 597. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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an express easement over the right of way.”17  They additionally 
argued they maintained an “implied or prescriptive easement over 
the right of way.”18 
In June of 2010, a two-day bench trial commenced.19  The 
trial judge found that “[P]laintiffs had failed to prove that the 
declaration and its amendments reserved an express easement 
over the claimed right of way,” and “‘that there [was] no amenity 
located in, by, along or adjacent to Narragansett Bay which 
Plaintiffs [were] entitled to access.’”20  The trial judge then turned 
to Plaintiffs’ claim of an implied easement and reasoned that 
“when a common owner severs his or her own land and retains the 
dominant estate, [an] implied easement over the servient estate 
can arise only if the easement is ‘absolutely necessary’ to the use 
and enjoyment of the dominant estate.”21 The trial court 
concluded that “the right of way was not absolutely necessary for 
[P]laintiffs’ use of their properties because they were able to 
access Kirwins Fifth Ward Land and their tennis courts through 
the access point on Harrington Street,” and final judgment was 
entered on September 8, 2010 for Defendants.22 Plaintiffs 
appealed on several grounds.23 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The trial justice sat without a jury, and, therefore, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court must give “great weight” to his factual 
findings unless “the record shows that the findings clearly are 
wrong or the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material 
evidence.”24  If evidence in the record supports the trial judge’s 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 597–98. 
 19.  Id. at 598. 
 20.  Id.  The trial judge found “‘that the intent of the [d]eclarant was to 
provide access to the proposed marina of Phase VI.’”  Id. (internal citation 
omitted). Additionally, the trial judge found “‘[w]hen the Defendants’ 
[p]remises [were] withdrawn, the Third Amendment did not grant to the 
Plaintiffs or its members any right to use the proposed marina’ and, 
‘therefore, no right of way was necessary to access any such amenity[.]’”  Id. 
(internal citation omitted).  
 21.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. (quoting Hernandez v. JS Pallet Co., 41 A.3d 978, 982 (R.I. 
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findings, the Court “shall not substitute [its] own view of the 
evidence for [that of the trial justice] even though a contrary 
conclusion could have been reached.”25 
Additionally, the Court noted that the burden of proof to 
prove an easement is different from that in a normal civil action, 
due to the extensive policy considerations “against placing undue 
burdens upon property.”26 
The Court began its review of the trial justice’s decision by 
examining the text of the declaration that purportedly granted an 
expressed easement.  “Section 14.2 of the declaration state[d] that 
‘the [d]eclarant will provide reasonable rights of way over and 
across the real estate withdrawn necessary to provide adequate 
access to any amenity located in, by, along or adjacent to 
Narragansett Bay.’”27  Plaintiffs argued that this created an 
express easement over Defendant’s land and “applie[d] to 
amenities located on [P]laintiffs’ property that are located along 
Narragansett Bay.”28  Plaintiffs charge error to the trial justice 
and claim he added language to section 14.2 when he concluded 
“‘[w]hen the Defendants’ Premises was withdrawn, the Plaintiffs 
had no right to use any amenity in, by, along or adjacent to 
Narragansett Bay located within the [d]efendants’ Premises.’”29 
Rhode Island law has long held that “‘[w]hen construing an 
instrument that purportedly creates an easement, it is this 
Court’s duty to effectuate the intent of the parties,’” and “‘when 
the written terms of an agreement are clear and unambiguous, 
they can be interpreted and applied to the undisputed facts as a 
matter of law.’”30  Accordingly, oral testimony and extrinsic 
evidence will not be “received to explain the nature or extent of 
2012)). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 599.  “[A]lthough a plaintiff in a civil action normally must 
meet his burden by only a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff must 
overcome a higher clear and convincing standard to prove an easement.”  Id. 
(quoting Ondis v. City of Woonsocket ex rel. Treasurer Touzin, 934 A.2d 799, 
803 (R.I. 2007)).  
 27.  Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
 28.  Id.  The “amenities” included the tennis courts.  Id. 
 29.  Id. Plaintiffs contend the trial justice added the highlighted 
language (internal citation omitted). 
 30.  Id. (quoting Hilley v. Lawrence, 972 A.2d 643, 649 (R.I. 2009)). 
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the right acquired.”31  The Court found the text of the declaration 
to be clear and unambiguous, but held that it did not extend to the 
tennis courts or access to Kirwins Fifth Ward Lane because 
section 14.2 applied only to the marina on Phase VI.32  The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the inclusion of “Narragansett Bay” 
in the purported easement served as a limitation insomuch as it 
narrowed the scope of the easement to “any such amenity [that is] 
directly connected to or linked with Narragansett Bay.”33  There 
was no express easement for the tennis courts as they were not 
located on Narragansett Bay, and they did not bear any 
“relationship to Narragansett Bay”;34 therefore, even if considered 
an “amenity,” the tennis courts do not fit within the narrow 
construction of the easement, and the Supreme Court found no 
error in the trial justice’s finding.35 
The Court then turned to Plaintiffs’ claim of an implied 
easement.36  The Court, relying on Wiesel v. Smira, noted two 
different types of implied easements—an implied reservation of an 
easement and an implied grant of an easement.37  The trial court 
justice’s synthesis of Wiesel yielded that “‘when a common owner 
creates a severance of his own land and retains the dominant 
portion, he is presumed to reserve whatever rights he needs in the 
 31.  Id. at 600. 
 32.  Id.  The Supreme Court agreed with the trial justice’s finding that 
“‘the intent of the [d]eclarant [in] including §14.2 in the First Declaration was 
to provide access to the proposed marina.’”  Id. 
 33.  Id. at 600–01. 
 34.  Id. at 600. 
 35.  Id. at 600–01.  The trial judge “properly focused his analysis on the 
precise language of Section 14.2 and the specific easement rights that were 
reserved—those relating to the marina.” 
 36.  Id. at 601. 
 37.  Id.; see Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 253 (1928).  
[T]he distinction is based upon the theory that the common owner’s 
deed of a portion of his land conveys all essential rights which he 
has, and that whatever is apparent and continuously necessary to 
the beneficial use and enjoyment of the granted property is intended 
to be conveyed so far as the grantor could do so. From this it is clear 
that where the owner creates a severance by sale of the servient 
portion of his premises[,] no implication of intention to reserve any 
rights to himself as owner of the quasi dominant estate ought to be 
made unless such rights are absolutely necessary to the use of the 
property reserved.  
Wiesel, 49 R.I. at 249. 
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servient portion of the real estate.’”38  The trial justice found “an 
implied easement can only arise in such a situation if the rights in 
the servient estate are absolutely necessary to the dominant 
estate,” and concluded that the declarant, Plaintiffs and the 
original condominium association, did not reserve an easement for 
its premises when the parcel was severed.39  After this finding, 
the trial justice analyzed the facts “under the framework of an 
implied easement by reservation, which triggers the more exacting 
standard that the use of the easement be ‘absolutely necessary.’”40 
The Court began its review of the trial justice’s determination 
of an implied easement by determining which party “was the 
common owner of the property vested with the right to reserve an 
easement unto itself.”41  The preamble stated the declarant was 
the “owner in fee simple” of the entire parcel and reserved the 
right to withdraw parcels of real estate in section 14.2.42  Thus, 
Newport Partners, as successor declarant, was assigned the same 
rights as the declarant and “stepped into the shoes of the 
declarant.”43  Accordingly, “it was the declarant that withdrew the 
real estate and not [P]laintiffs.”44  Therefore, the Court found the 
trial justice’s conclusion to be erroneous as the trial justice 
“conflated the estates that were retained by the declarant and the 
portion that comprised [P]laintiffs’ premises.”45  The Court held 
that the trial justice misapplied the proper analysis because it 
“rest[ed] on the erroneous conclusion that Plaintiffs conveyed a 
portion of land without expressly reserving a right of way for their 
use,”46 when, in fact, it was the declarant who “withdrew and 
retained a portion of the premises—the servient estate—for its 
own commercial purposes, thereby in effect transferring the 
 38.  Wellington Condo. Ass’n, 68 A.3d at 601. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. at 601–02 (citing Wiesel, 49 R.I. at 249). 
 41.  Id. at 602.  The court noted that the basic tenants of property law do 
not “coalesce easily with complex modern real estate transactions and the law 
of condominium development and ownership.”  Id.  Additionally, the court 
noted that “[t]he law of implied easements may not be well-suited to the facts 
of this complex case.”  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 601. 
 46.  Id. at 602. 
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dominant estate to [P]laintiffs.”47  Consequently, as Plaintiffs did 
not convey anything and could not “be deemed to be grantors or 
characterized as [] common owner[s] who convey[ed] a portion of 
[their] estate,”48 they could not have created an implied easement 
by reservation. 
The Court found that the property was severed by a common 
owner and a portion was retained for further development; 
therefore, the facts must be analyzed under an implied easement 
by grant.49  A claim for implied easement by grant must be “(1) 
apparent, (2) permanent, and (3) reasonably necessary for the 
enjoyment of the claimant’s parcel prior to severance.”50  The trial 
justice did not make any findings as to an easement by grant, and 
the record did not hold sufficient facts to make this 
determination.51  Therefore, the decision of the trial justice, with 
respect to the implied easement, was vacated and remanded for 
“further evidence and fact-finding to ascertain whether the 
Plaintiffs have an implied easement by grant over the claimed 
right of way.”52 
Plaintiffs’ appeal was “sustained in part and denied in 
part.”53  The trial justice’s finding of an express easement was 
affirmed, and the determination of the claim of an implied 
easement was vacated and remanded.54 
 
COMMENTARY 
While the trial justice and Court applied the correct 
applicable law and arrived at the correct logical conclusion, 
easement law is archaic, outdated, problematic, overbroad, 
complex, and merely a burden to current real estate transactions 
and development.55 Easements are too easy to create and are 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 603. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:  Reweaving 
the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1981-1982).  “The law of 
easements . . . is the most complex and archaic body of American property 
law remaining in the twentieth century.”  Id. 
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sometimes created inadvertently; however, existing easements are 
very difficult to dispose of, especially considering the high costs of 
litigation.  Easements plague properties with nearly irreversible 
burdens that disrupt sales, divisions and developments of 
properties and potentially decrease the property’s market value—
all interests which are fundamental to property ownership. 
As seen in the present case, implied easements are not only a 
fall back to a failed argument of an express easement, but courts 
may grant an implied easement and implicate the property 
despite lack of intent to do so.  Implied easements not only burden 
the current landowner, but inhibit prospective purchasers of the 
land.  Implied easements are often difficult to discover, and their 
use may be unnoticed during an inspection of the property.  Even 
if noticed, the scope, extent, and duration of the easement may be 
impossible to ascertain.  Why put such an important property 
right at stake?  Why allow implied easements at all?  A property 
owner is giving up one of his “sticks” in the property bundle; why 
allow that to be decided by implication?  There is nothing more 
valuable to a property owner than his fundamental property 
rights—including excluding others from his property—and implied 
easements unduly and unnecessarily challenge this right. 
Moreover, implied easements of grant and reservation should 
be abolished.  The policy and purpose of implied easements by 
grant and reservation can be found in other easement categories— 
express easements, easements of necessity and easements for an 
intended use.56  These latter easements should be construed and 
only enforced in a narrow way. 
Easement law needs consideration and reform. The 
simplification and modernization of the law will eliminate the 
outdated complexities that inherently coincide with easements.57  
In fact, England, from which the United States derived its 
fundamental property law and principles, has recognized 
easements’ shortcomings, and recently, called for simplification 
and reform of servitude law.58 
 56.  Law Commission Report No. 327, Making Land Work:  Easements, 
Covenants, and Profits à Prendre (Jun. 7 2011), available at http://law 
commissionjustice.gov.uk/docs/lc327_easements_report.pdf. 
 57.  French, supra n.55 at 1265. 
 58.  See JAMES A. NORMINGTON, Rethinking Easements and Restrictive 
Covenants, 15 IBA REAL EST. 43 (2011); see also Law Commission Report No. 
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The Court’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding is 
supported by case law.  However, this case law is outdated.  This 
case may be the last of its kind if its call for modernizing the 
easement law is recognized and accepted by the legislature.  As 
times change, so do laws, and easement law has been left behind 
and alleged servient estate property owners are suffering for it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s 
decision concerning the claim of an express easement.  However, 
the Court vacated and remanded the trial justice’s determination 
of an implied easement by reservation due to a lack of fact-finding 
to determine whether the requirements of an implied easement by 
reservation had been satisfied. 
 
Christopher J. Fragomeni 
 
327, supra n.56. 
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Tort Law.  Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438 (R.I. 2013).  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment entered against an echocardiologist in a 
medical malpractice action, holding the following:  (1) the defendant did not 
put forth sufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on intervening and 
superseding cause, (2) testimony showing the plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest 
soon after his second surgery was admissible as there was evidence 
establishing a causal nexus between this injury and the defendant’s breach, 
(3) the trial justice was not clearly erroneous in concluding the damages 
award was not excessive, (4) the trial justice’s sua sponte instruction 
prohibiting jurors from considering the parties’ insurance coverage was 
proper, and (5) the statute imposing a mandatory twelve percent 
prejudgment interest rate in medical malpractice actions was constitutional. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On January 26, 2004, forty-nine year old plaintiff Paul Oden 
underwent open-heart mitral valve replacement surgery at Rhode 
Island Hospital.1  Heart surgeon Arun K. Singh, M.D. performed 
this surgery with the assistance of defendant Carl Schwartz, M.D., 
an echocardiologist at Rhode Island Hospital.2  Neither Dr. Singh 
nor Dr. Schwartz documented any surgical complications.3  
Approximately three months later, however, Mr. Oden’s 
cardiologist diagnosed him with severe aortic insufficiency (“A.I.”) 
allegedly caused by Dr. Singh mistakenly suturing his aortic valve 
during the January 2004 mitral valve replacement.4  As a result, 
Mr. Oden required an aortic valve replacement in August 2004, 
immediately after which he suffered cardiac arrest.5 
 Mr. Oden brought medical malpractice actions in Providence 
County Superior Court against Rhode Island Hospital, Dr. Singh, 
and Dr. Schwartz, but settled his claims against Rhode Island 
Hospital and Dr. Singh.6  Thus, only the action against Dr. 
 1.  Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438, 441 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. at 443–44. 
 4.  Id. at 441. 
 5.  Id.  
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Schwartz went to a jury trial and is the subject of this case.7 
 
A.    Summary of the Testimony 
At trial, Mr. Oden called two expert witnesses and Dr. Singh 
to testify on his behalf.8  Mr. Oden and his wife Linda also 
testified.9  Dr. Singh testified that he mistakenly stitched Mr. 
Oden’s aortic valve causing the A.I., but said he was not aware of 
the problem at the time of the surgery.10  He explained that he 
was unable to see behind the mitral valve while working on it and 
relied on his surgical team, his echocardiologist in particular, to 
identify such a problem.11  Dr. Singh’s testimony was somewhat 
inconsistent as to whether Dr. Schwartz informed him of the A.I. 
after the surgery.12  Mr. Oden’s expert witnesses testified that 
regardless of whether Dr. Schwartz reported the A.I. to Dr. Singh, 
Dr. Schwartz deviated from the standard of care by “fail[ing] to 
conduct a detailed study of the aortic valve” following the first 
surgery, as well as by failing to document the A.I. in Mr. Oden’s 
medical record.13  In addition, one of the experts testified that Mr. 
Oden would not have required a second surgery if the injured 
aortic valve was properly addressed at the first surgery.14  The 
second surgery, Mr. Oden testified, made it difficult for him to “get 
on with his life,” and knowing he would need a third “ma[de] [him] 
sad and affect[ed] his mood.”15  In regards to the the cardiac 
arrest he suffered following his second surgery, Mr. Oden 
described being cardioverted as “the wors[t] pain [he] ever felt.”16 
Likewise, Dr. Schwartz testified on his own behalf and also 
called an expert witness.17  Dr. Schwartz testified “that it was his 
 7.  Id. at 442. 
 8.  Id.  Mr Oden’s expert witnesses were Stuart Pett, M.D., a heart 
surgeon, and Justin D. Pearlman, M.D., an expert in the field of 
echocardiography.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 443. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 446. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17.  Id.  Dr. Schwartz’s expert witness was Adam B. Lerner, M.D., the 
director of the cardiac anesthesia division at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
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‘best recollection’ that he advised Dr. Singh of the A.I. at the 
conclusion of the mitral valve replacement.  He admitted that he 
failed to document the A.I.,” and “acknowledged that, in this case, 
he ‘did not do a totally detailed exam’ of the aortic valve.”18  He 
believed, however, that the standard of care did not require him to 
obtain further information without Dr. Singh’s instruction, as the 
surgical team “must defer to the surgeon’s decisions in this 
regard.”19  Dr. Schwartz also testified that Dr. Singh was not 
concerned about Mr. Oden’s A.I. upon learning of it, thus decided 
to take him off bypass.20  Dr. Schwartz’s expert testified that, in 
his opinion, Dr. Schwartz’s failure to document the A.I. in the 
medical record did not meet the standard of care.21  On the other 
hand, he testified that Dr. Schwartz did meet the standard of care 
by identifying the A.I. and alerting Dr. Singh to it.22  He 
acknowledged, however, that his opinion was based on accepting 
Dr. Schwartz’s testimony as true.23 
 
B.    Jury Charge and Jury Verdict 
Despite Dr. Schwartz’s requests to the contrary, the trial 
justice’s closing instructions to the jury did not include an 
instruction on intervening and superseding cause and did include 
an instruction prohibiting the jurors from speculating about the 
parties’ insurance coverage.24  Dr. Schwartz objected to both 
aspects of these instructions and argued that it was improper for 
the trial justice to inject the issue of insurance into the case.25  In 
response, the trial justice explained that she “deemed it important 
to tell jurors that they mustn’t consider insurance as a factor in 
deciding the merits of the case” because “there was so much media 
coverage on this subject.”26  In addition, she pointed out that since 
“everyone has insurance,” she had not “raised anything that the 
Center in Boston.   Id. 
 18.  Id. at 444. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 446. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 447. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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jurors [did not] know about.”27 
“Before the jury retired to deliberate, Dr. Schwartz moved for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a)(1) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial justice deferred her 
ruling on that motion until the jury reached its verdict.”28  “[T]he 
jury returned a $1.5 million-dollar verdict in [Mr.] Oden’s favor,” 
finding “that Dr. Schwartz was 25 percent responsible for [Mr.] 
Oden’s injuries and that Dr. Singh was 75 percent responsible for 
those injuries. Thus, Dr. Schwartz was deemed responsible for 
$375,000 of those damages, plus costs and statutory interest.”29 
 
C.    Post-Trial Motions 
After the verdict was announced, the trial justice denied Dr. 
Schwartz’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.30  After final 
judgment and statutory interest were entered for Mr. Oden in the 
amounts of $375,000 and $170,260.27, respectively, the trial 
justice also awarded costs in favor of Mr. Oden in the amount of 
$4,416.50.31  Dr. Schwartz then moved for a new trial under Rule 
59(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.32  He also 
moved to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), 
and asked for a remittitur, contending the evidence did not 
support the damages awarded.33 
In ruling on these motions, “the trial justice independently 
reviewed and summarized the trial testimony.”34  She explicitly 
found Mr. Oden and his expert witnesses to be credible, but found 
that Dr. Singh and Dr. Schwartz were not credible.35  While she 
did not make a specific finding as to the credibility of Dr. 
Schwartz’s expert, she noted that his testimony “assumed Dr. 
Schwartz was telling the truth.”36  Concluding “reasonable minds 
could have reached differing results with this evidence,” the trial 
 27.  Id.  (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28.  Id.  (internal footnote omitted). 
 29.  Id. at 447–48. 
 30.  Id. at 448. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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justice denied Dr. Schwartz’s Rule 59 motions.37 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Dr. Schwartz raised five arguments on appeal.38  First, he 
argued the trial justice should have instructed the jury on 
intervening and superseding cause.39  Second, he argued the trial 
justice should not have admitted evidence concerning the cardiac 
arrest Mr. Oden suffered following his second surgery.40  Third, he 
argued the trial justice erred in concluding the damages award 
was not excessive.41  Fourth, he argued the trial justice should not 
have sua sponte instructed the jury on the issue of liability 
insurance.42  Finally, he argued that a Rhode Island statute 
imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment interest rate 
in medical malpractice actions was unconstitutional as it would 
deprive litigants of substantive and procedural due process.43  The 
Court addressed each of these issues in turn.44 
 
A.    Instruction on Intervening and Superseding Cause 
Dr. Schwartz argued that the trial justice erred in failing to 
instruct the jury on intervening and superseding causes, 
contending that Dr. Singh’s failure to evaluate the aortic valve 
when notified of the A.I. constituted an independent intervening 
force sufficient to break the causal connection between his own 
alleged failure to obtain sufficiently detailed echocardiographical 
views of the aortic valve and Mr. Oden’s harm.45  Reviewing the 
issue de novo,46 the Court held that such an instruction would 
have been improper.47  In so holding, the Court emphasized that 
 37.  Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id.  
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
 45.  Id.  
 46.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews “issues pertaining to jury 
instructions” de novo. Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 47.  Id.  
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Dr. Schwartz had the burden of proof on this affirmative defense, 
and that he failed to introduce sufficient evidence to meet that 
burden.48  Further, the Court defined an intervening cause as one 
that “exists when an independent and unforeseeable intervening 
or secondary act of negligence occurs, after the alleged tortfeasor’s 
negligence, and that secondary act becomes the sole proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.”49  The Court largely adopted the 
trial justice’s reasoning in determining that Dr. Singh’s negligence 
did not fall within this definition because it was not independent 
of Dr. Schwartz’s negligence.50  Rather, the Court concluded that 
the two doctors, operating as part of a surgical team, had “roles 
and responsibilities [that] were inextricably intertwined” and that 
“if anything, this [was] a situation in which one physician’s duty 
include[d] guarding against the mistakes of another, even if those 
mistakes may [have been] the result of negligence.”51 
 
B.    Admission of Testimony Pertaining to Oden’s Post-Operative 
Cardiac Arrest 
Next, Dr. Schwartz argued “there was no testimony from any 
witness competent to opine that Mr. Oden’s post-operative cardiac 
arrest in August of 2004 [was related to] * * * any act or omission 
on [his part] in connection with the surgery in January of 2004,” 
that instead the cardiac arrest was likely caused by Mr. Oden’s 
nicotine and alcohol use, and that the trial justice thus erred in 
allowing testimony concerning the cardiac arrest.52  The Court 
disagreed and concluded that Mr. Oden’s expert’s testimony was 
sufficient “to suggest that a causal relationship existed between 
the cardiac arrest and Dr. Schwartz’s negligence at the first 
surgery, such that the admission of testimony concerning the 
cardiac arrest was proper.”53  In addition, though the Court found 
Dr. Schwartz’s argument concerning Mr. Oden’s alcohol and 
nicotine use to be unconvincing, it noted the jury had been allowed 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 450–51 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 50.  Id. at 451. 
 51.  Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 52.  Id.at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53.  Id.  
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to hear and weigh that argument.54 
 
C.    Denial of Defendant’s Request as to the Damage Award 
Dr. Schwartz further contended that the jury verdict was 
excessive as it was “against the fair weight of the evidence” and 
was improperly based on sympathy evoked by Mr. Oden’s “frail 
and weak” condition on the witness stand due to his unrelated 
stroke.55  Accordingly, he argued that the trial justice erred in 
denying his request for remittitur as well as his motion to vacate, 
alter, or amend the damage award.56  Applying a clearly erroneous 
standard of review, the Court noted that the trial judge “aptly 
performed her role in assessing the credibility of witnesses, 
weighing the evidence, and evaluating the propriety of the damage 
award,” and held that she did not err in “conclud[ing] that the 
damages award was satisfactory and that the verdict [did] not 
shock the conscience.”57 
 
D. Insurance Instruction 
Dr. Schwartz next argued that the trial justice’s sua sponte 
jury instruction on insurance violated Rule 411 of the Rhode 
Island Rules of Evidence.58  Reviewing the instruction de novo, 
the Court considered whether the instruction, though not 
technically evidence, violated the spirit of the rule; the Court 
concluded it did not.59  First, the Court recognized that “the 
overall concept of liability insurance may have pervaded the 
minds of the jurors in this case,” as it is “a wholly familiar 
concept—from mandatory motor vehicle insurance coverage to the 
vigorous nationwide debate concerning medical insurance and 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 452–53. 
 56.  Id. at 452. 
 57.  Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58.  Id. at 454.  “In pertinent part, Rule 411 states:  ‘[e]vidence that a 
person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the 
issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.’  However, such 
evidence may be allowed ‘when offered for another purpose, such as proof of 
agency, ownership, or control, bias or prejudice of witness, or when the court 
determines that in the interests of justice evidence of insurance or lack of 
insurance should be permitted.’”  Id. (citation omitted).   
 59.  Id.  
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medical liability.”60  Thus, the trial justice’s instruction likely did 
not awaken jurors to anything of which they were previously 
unaware.61  Further, the Court cited the Advisory Committee’s 
Note to Rule 411, which “declares that ‘[t]he Rhode Island 
approach tempers the rule excluding evidence of liability 
insurance with a realistic view of contemporary society that 
recognizes the ubiquitous presence of insurance.’”62  In this 
regard, the Court concluded that the trial justices’ instruction 
“directly square[d] with the spirit of Rule 411” by “prohibit[ing] 
the jury from speculating about insurance coverage in its 
deliberations.”63  Finally, the Court noted that the instruction on 
insurance coverage likely did not prejudice the jurors as it 
occupied only thirty seconds of the two-hour-long jury 
instructions.64  For these reasons, the Court determined that this 
instruction was proper.65 
 
E.   The Constitutionality of §9-21-10(b) 
Lastly, Dr. Schwartz challenged the constitutionality of Rhode 
Island General Laws § 9-21-10(b) under the due process clause of 
the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.66  He argued 
that by imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment 
interest rate in, the statute infringed on a defendant’s 
fundamental right to a jury trial, thereby depriving that 
defendant of substantive due process.67  Dr. Schwartz rested this 
 60.  Id. at 455. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id.  The court advised:  “the trial justice might more appropriately 
have refrained from using the phrase ‘a physician’s insurance premiums’ in 
her instruction,” but determined that this phrase did not render the jurors 
“incapable of arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.”  Id. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Id.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 456.  “Section 9–21–10(b) states in pertinent part:  ‘In * * * 
medical malpractice actions in which a verdict is rendered or a decision made 
for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of the court to the 
amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum 
thereon from the date of written notice of the claim by the claimant or his or 
her representative to the malpractice liability insurer, or to the medical or 
dental health care provider or the filing of the civil action, whichever first 
occurs.’”  Id.  
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argument on the contention that “a defendant, facing the looming 
threat of obtaining an unfavorable judgment with the inclusion of 
prejudgment interest, [would] opt to settle rather than assert his 
or her right to a trial by jury,” and that the statute operated to 
punish those who did opt to assert that right.68  Contending that a 
jury trial constituted a fundamental right, Dr. Schwartz argued 
the statute needed to survive a strict scrutiny.69  Dr. Schwartz 
further argued that the “process in which the clerk of the court 
uniformly adds such interest deprives a defendant of his or her 
property without an opportunity to be heard,” thereby depriving 
the defendant of procedural due process.70 
In addressing these arguments, the Court stated that it would 
not hold a statute unconstitutional unless the party challenging 
its constitutionality “prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
act violate[d] a specific provision of the Rhode Island Constitution 
or the United States Constitution.”71  In addition, the Court 
determined that the prejudgment interest statute constituted 
economic legislation that did not implicate a fundamental right.72  
As such, the Court examined the statute using a rational basis 
standard of review, under which “the statute [would] be upheld ‘if 
there [was] any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could 
provide a rational basis’ for the [twelve] percent prejudgment 
interest rate in medical malpractice actions.”73 The Court 
concluded that the statute served two purposes, compensating 
plaintiffs for delay and encouraging early settlement of claims, 
and thus held that it passed a rational basis review.74  Likewise, 
the Court determined that “[t]he fact that the prejudgment 
interest award [was] uniform, not discretionary,” did not deprive a 
defendant of procedural due process because it “[was] both an 
expedient and efficient use of judicial resources.”75  For these 
reasons, the Court held that §9-21-10(b) was constitutional.76 
 
 68.  Id.   
 69.  Id. at 457. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Id. at 456 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 457. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  Id.  
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COMMENTARY 
Though this case presented the Court with several issues, this 
Commentary will focus on just one:  whether Rhode Island’s 
twelve percent prejudgment interest rate violates defendants’ 
constitutional rights.  As the Court resolved this issue quite 
straightforwardly, despite it being an issue of first impression, 
this Commentary will offer a more in-depth discussion of the 
arguments on either side of the debate. 
Prejudgment interest is generally understood to serve two 
purposes.  First, by compensating plaintiffs for the inability to use 
money they were entitled to use, prejudgment interest puts 
plaintiffs in the position they would have been in had a judgment 
been paid immediately.77  Second, prejudgment interest provides 
defendants with an incentive to resolve disputes efficiently, for 
example by settling.78  In the case at hand, the Court deferred to 
these two purposes in holding that Rhode Island’s legislature had 
a rational basis for imposing a mandatory twelve percent 
prejudgment interest rate.79 
In theory, however, these purposes are served when the 
interest is at or near the market rate.80  As the market rate is 
currently quite low, and as Rhode Island’s twelve percent 
prejudgment interest rate is among the highest in the United 
States, the question becomes whether it really serves these 
purposes.81  For example, it could be argued that Rhode Island is 
overcompensating plaintiffs to whatever degree a twelve percent 
prejudgment interest rate exceeds that which is truly necessary to 
 77.  For example, plaintiffs could invest and collect interest on their 
judgments once paid; likewise, plaintiffs might need to borrow money at 
interest until a judgment is paid.  Michael S. Knoll, A Primer on Prejudgment 
Interest, 75 TEX. L. REV. 293, 294–02 (1996). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Oden, 71 A.3d at 457. 
 80.  Knoll uses the term “market rate” to make this point.  Knoll, supra 
note 77, at 297.  It should be noted, however, that prejudgment interest rates 
are frequently compared to the “prime rate,” or base institutional lending 
rate.  For the purposes of this discussion, I use the term “market rate” to 
include a broader range of interest rates at which the plaintiff and defendant 
might, respectively, borrow or lend the money at stake in the action.      
 81.  See Brandon Gee, Defense Bar: Interest Rate on Verdicts 
Unreasonable, MASS. LAWYERS WEEKLY, (July 1, 2013), http://masslawyers 
weekly.com/2013/07/03/defense-bar-interest-rate-on-verdicts-unreasonable/.   
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compensate them.  The marginal difference between a truly 
compensatory prejudgment interest rate and an overly 
compensatory prejudgment interest rate might not, then, be 
rationally related to the purpose the interest rate is intended to 
serve, in which case the rate might indeed violate due process.  
The Court seemingly dodged this possibility, however, by applying 
a low level of scrutiny and using double-negatives, concluding that 
it “[could not] say that, even in today’s economy, [twelve] percent 
[was] not a reasonable measure of the loss sustained through 
delay in payment.”82 
Yet, even if the court approached its analysis with a higher 
level of scrutiny, the result would likely be the same.  First, Rhode 
Island’s prejudgment interest rate can certainly be defended as 
rationally related to the goal of compensating plaintiffs for delay.  
The Rhode Island Association for Justice’s amicus brief, quoting 
the trial justice, set forth such a defense: 
Although institutional lending rates are quite low right 
now, that fact alone does not render the rate of 12 percent 
irrational or unrelated to an important legislative 
purpose.  One or two percentage points over the prime 
rate is generally reserved for a bank’s best corporate 
customers.  For the average person or small business, 
rates are higher.  Home loans are between four and six 
percent, second home and automobile loans are around 
seven to eight, or even nine.  Vendors and suppliers add 
18 to 21 percent to their invoices.  Retailers and revolving 
credit companies charge 21 to 29 percent.  Currently, 12 
percent is pretty much in the middle and, as such, it 
provides compensation and serves as an incentive . . . 
assessing interest at the prime rate would do little, if 
anything, to promote early and fair settlements.  In fact, 
it would serve as a disincentive.  Banking and other 
institutions such as insurance carriers can achieve a 
higher rate of return if they keep their money instead of 
settling . . . The statute, at its statutory rate of 12 
percent, is rationally related to all of its purposes.83 
 82.  See Oden, 71 A.3d at 456 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 83.  Brief for Paul Oden and Linda Oden as Amicus Curiae Rhode Island 
Association for Justices Supporting Appellees and the Constitutionality of 
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Second, it seems Rhode Island’s true goal is to encourage 
settlement, and by erring on the higher end of the interest-rate 
spectrum, Rhode Island seems to be targeting large, institutional 
defendants that would lack incentive to settle if the prejudgment 
interest rate were closer to market value.  In that regard, any 
difference between a truly compensatory prejudgment interest 
rate and an overly compensatory prejudgment interest rate would 
be rationally justified by Rhode Island’s interest in protecting its 
consumers and small businesses from large institutions with 
ample resources to litigate.  Thus, although the Court did not 
articulate this line of reasoning in such depth, it was correct in 
holding that Rhode Island’s legislature had a rational basis for 
imposing a mandatory twelve percent prejudgment interest rate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed five 
distinct issues in this case. First, it held that there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on intervening and 
superseding cause. Second, the Court held that testimony showing 
the plaintiff suffered cardiac arrest soon after his second surgery 
was admissible where there was evidence establishing a causal 
nexus between this injury and the defendant’s breach.  Third, the 
Court held that the trial justice was not clearly erroneous in 
concluding the damages award was not excessive.  Fourth, 
acknowledging that the concept of insurance coverage is a matter 
of common knowledge, the Court held that the trial justice’s sua 
sponte instruction prohibiting jurors from considering the parties’ 
insurance coverage was proper and did not violate the spirit of 
Rule 411 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.  Finally, the court 
held that §9-21-10(b) was constitutional as it was rationally 
related to Rhode Island’s goals of compensating plaintiffs and 




R.I. GEN. LAWS §9-21-10 at 7, Oden v. Schwartz, 71 A.3d 438 (R.I. 2013) (No. 
SU-11-0167) (citation omitted). 
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Tort Law.  Vasquez v. Sportsman’s Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313 (R.I. 2012).  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated a preliminary injunction preventing a 
bar and a related corporation from selling property upon a finding that a 
customer had not established a prima facie case that the bar owed him a duty 
of care when he was shot and seriously injured outside the bar. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
Gilberto Vasquez (“Vasquez”) sued the Sportsman’s Inn and 
DLM, Inc. (“DLM”) for failure to provide sufficient security on the 
premises after an unknown individual shot him outside the bar in 
the early morning hours of November 12, 2006.1  The Sportsman’s 
Inn was the subsidiary of DLM, and DLM’s only source of income 
was the rent the Sportsman’s Inn paid to it.2  When Vasquez 
learned that DLM listed the Sportsman’s Inn property for sale, he 
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction with the trial court as 
the property value was the largest asset among the defendant 
businesses.3  The trial judge granted the preliminary injunction 
after finding that Vasquez would likely prevail on arguing that 
the Sportsman’s Inn breached the duty of care it owed him and 
that piercing the corporate veil was appropriate.4  The defendants 
subsequently appealed the trial judge’s decision. 
During the preliminary injunction hearing, the president of 
the Sportsman’s Inn testified that security personnel worked 
inside, not outside, of the bar and used a metal detecting wand to 
prevent individuals from bringing weapons into the bar.5  He 
further testified that on the night Vasquez was shot, only one 
security personnel out of the usual three was working.6  Vasquez 
also testified at the hearing and stated that after leaving the bar, 
he “remembers . . . hearing a gunshot, falling to the ground, and 
waking up in a hospital.”7  Additionally, Vasquez testified he 
 1.  Vasquez v. Sportsman’s Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313, 315, 317 (R.I. 2012). 
 2.  Id. at 316. 
 3.  Id. at 315. 
 4.  Id. at 317. 
 5.  Id. at 316. 
 6.  Id. 
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consumed about five alcoholic drinks while at the bar and took 
ecstasy earlier in the day.8  The Court noted that Vasquez did not 
testify about his interactions, specifically “arguments or 
altercations” while at the bar that evening.9  A Providence Fire 
Department first responder testified that Vasquez was “found on 
the ground . . . outside of the doors in close proximity to the club” 
but he could not recall specifically where Vasquez was.10 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that proximity to the 
bar door was not enough to establish that the defendants owed 
Vasquez a duty of reasonable care.11  The standard of review for 
preliminary injunctions is whether the trial judge made an abuse 
of discretion, which is very deferential to a trial judge’s decision.  
The Court only needs to find four factors to determine that the 
trial judge made a valid decision in issuing a preliminary 
injunction:  (1) that the moving party needs to show “a reasonable 
likelihood of success on the merits”; (2) that the moving party “will 
suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief”; 
(3) that the moving party must be the party favored by a “balance 
of the equities”; and (4) that the “injunction will preserve the 
status quo.”12  Here, the Court found that the first factor of the 
test was wrongly decided and had no reason to analyze the other 
factors. 
Regarding the first factor, the Court held Vasquez could not 
establish “a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of his 
underlying negligence claim.”13 The general presumption is 
landowners do not owe a duty of care to others from harm caused 
by a third party unless the landowner has a special relationship 
with the other person.14  Bars do have a special relationship with 
their patrons, and thus owe a duty of care to their patrons due to 
the nature of the alcoholic beverages they serve.15  This duty, 
 8.  Id. at 314–15. 
 9.  Id. at 317. 
 10.  Id. at 317. 
 11.  Id. at 320. 
 12.  Id. at 318. 
 13.  Id. at 321. 
 14.  Id. at 319. 
 15.  Id. 
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however, is qualified to “incidents occur[ing] in the proximity of a 
particular establishment ‘and had their origins within.’”16  Here, 
the lack of testimony establishing an explanation for why Vasquez 
was shot and that some preceding incident was within the 
Sportsman’s Inn control failed to show that this incident had its 
origin within the Sportsman’s Inn and was detrimental to 
establishing a prima facie case of breach of duty.  The Court noted 
one mention that Vasquez had argued with another customer at 
the bar in the record, but the evidence was scant and not 
mentioned at all during the injunction hearings.17  Accordingly, 
the Court was cautious not to impose liability on a business where 
the injury might be unforeseen and not preventable.18  Dissenting 
Justices Goldberg and Indeglia argued that because neither party 
significantly raised the negligence finding on appeal, the Court 




The majority was right to address the negligence issue even if 
the parties were primarily focused on appealing the decision to 
pierce the corporate veil because not addressing the negligence 
issue would have created a much easier standard for establishing 
negligence for purposes of a preliminary injunction.  The specific 
facts regarding the plaintiff’s illicit drug use earlier in the day, the 
lack of specific facts about his exact proximity to the bar entrance, 
and the lack of testimony about his conduct and interactions at 
the bar likely led the Court to believe this would be too easy of a 
standard for a “reasonably high likelihood of success on the 
merits” and would impose an unfair burden on a business if it was 
enjoined from certain financial activities but then ultimately won 
its case.  If not for these facts (or, lack thereof), it certainly would 
have been possible for the Court to affirm the trial judge’s decision 
that the defendants had likely breached a duty of care.  The Court 
noted the Sportsman’s Inn was not an infrequent site of police 
 16.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 17.  Id. at 320 n.12. 
 18.  Id. at 320. 
 19.  Id. at 321–22 (Golderberg, J. & Indeglia J., dissenting). 
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reports.20  Common sense would suggest that the origins of a 
shooting for anyone leaving a bar are likely to be within that bar.  
The parties’ lack of focus on the negligence issue, which the 
dissent points out, also suggests that the parties themselves may 
have found the finding of negligence reasonable.21  In hearing 
appeals, the Court should not focus on the issue the parties have 
primarily raised to the neglect of other issues that could have 
major impacts on other areas of the law in future cases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated Vasquez’s 
preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of the Sportsman’s Inn 
because the Court held Vasquez could not establish “a reasonable 





 20.  Id. at 315.  In a span of less than eleven years, the police were called 
to the Sportsman’s Inn 667 times. Id. at n.3. 
 21.  Id. at 321–22. 
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Wills and Trusts Law.  Swain v. Estate of Tyre Ex Rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283 
(R.I. 2012).  The Rhode Island Slayer’s Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1, 
prohibits the stepchildren of a decedent from recovering as contingent 
beneficiaries from the decedent’s estate when the stepchildren’s father is the 
slayer of the decedent under the Act. Such recovery would benefit the slayer, 
which is prohibited by the Act. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On October 5, 1993, Shelley Arden Tyre (“Shelley”) executed a 
will, naming her soon to be husband, David Swain (“David”), “as 
the sole beneficiary of her estate” and his two children, Jennifer 
and Jeremy Swain, the plaintiffs, “as the only contingent 
beneficiaries,” named in the event David died within thirty days 
after Shelley’s death.1  Shortly thereafter, Shelley and David were 
married.2  On March 12, 1999, “Shelley died while scuba diving 
with David,” and, thereafter, “David was named as the executor” 
of her will.3  Shelley’s parents, however, brought a wrongful death 
claim against David alleging that he was a slayer who caused 
Shelley’s wrongful death and that he “should be subject to civil 
liability for a criminal act.”4  On July 3, 2002, Shelley’s parents 
successfully petitioned the Jamestown Probate Court to remove 
David as executor and replace him with James H. Reilly (Reilly).5  
In February of 2006, a trial was held to establish David’s liability 
on all three counts alleged by Shelley’s parents, and it was 
determined that David was a slayer pursuant to the Act.6 
On June 27, 2008, in response to a petition filed by Reilly, the 
Jamestown Probate Court issued a written order precluding 
Jennifer and Jeremy from “inheriting under Shelley’s will.”7  
 1.  Swain v. Estate of Tyre ex rel. Reilly, 57 A.3d 283, 285-86 & n.4 (R.I. 
2012). 
 2.  Id. at 285–86. 
 3.  Id. at 286 n.5. 
 4.  Id. at 286; “Section 33-1.1-1(3) states that a slayer is ‘any person who 
willfully and unlawfully takes or procures to be taken the life of another.’”  
Id. at n.8 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-1(3) (1956)). 
 5.  Id. at 286. 
 6.  Id.; Shelley’s parents were awarded $2,815,085.46 in compensatory 
damages and $2 million in punitive damages. In response, David motioned 
for a new trial, which was denied and also appealed to the Supreme Court, 
but the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.  Id.  
 7.  Id. at 286–87; “The probate judge issued a written order declaring 
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Jennifer and Jeremy appealed this order to the Newport County 
Superior Court on the basis that, as they were named as 
beneficiaries in Shelley’s will, they “were not inheriting ‘through’ 
their father” and, so, were not barred from their inheritance by 
The Rhode Island Slayer’s Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-1.1 (“the 
Act”).8  Shelley’s Estate, however, argued that the language of the 
Act, stating “[n]either the slayer nor any person claiming through 
him . . . shall . . . receive any benefit as the result of the death of 
the decedent,” should be interpreted broadly with “‘discretion to 
determine when a slayer will benefit by either taking directly or 
indirectly,’” which would bar Jennifer and Jeremy from the 
inheritance as their inheritance would benefit David.9  “On cross-
motions for summary judgment, the hearing justice found in favor 
of the Estate,” holding that, because “Jeremy had personally 
contributed and raised money to finance [David’s] defense” and 
“Jennifer and Jeremy had both stated that they would use . . . 
[their inheritance] for their father’s criminal defense, if 
necessary,” Jennifer and Jeremy were barred from the inheritance 
by the Act as the Act prohibits a slayer, here David, from profiting 
“from his wrongdoing.”10  Thereafter, Jennifer and Jeremy 
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.11 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
Upon review of the trial justice’s grant of summary judgment, 
the Supreme Court considered the statutory language of the act de 
novo, finding that “the clear intent of [the Act] is to ensure that a 
slayer does not benefit [in any way] from his or her wrongdoing” 
and that the Act “‘shall be construed broadly in order to effect’” 
that intent.12  Focusing on this language in the Act, the Court was 
that ‘neither [David], nor his heirs at law, shall receive directly or indirectly 
from the Estate of [Shelley].’”  Id. at 286. 
 8.  Id. at 287. 
 9.  Id. at 287 n.10 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).  
 10.  Id. at 287. The justice relied on “§ 33-1.1-15, which prescribes that 
[the Act] be interpreted ‘broadly to effectuate the policy of this State that no 
person shall be allowed to profit from his or her wrongs.’”  Id. (citing R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 33-1.1-15). 
 11.  Id. at 287. The plaintiffs appealed with the additional argument that 
“Shelley’s publicity rights . . . are inheritable,” however, as this issue was not 
raised in the lower court, it was precluded.  Id. at 288 n.13. 
 12.  Id. at 292–93 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2; § 33-1.1-15). 
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not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ contention that, as they are not 
“claiming through” David, they are not barred.13  The Court held 
that, even though the Act does not specifically bar a slayer’s issue 
from inheriting, because it is undisputed that the slayer will 
benefit if his issue is allowed to inherit, the Act bars their 
inheritance.14  Jennifer and Jeremy stated that they would use 
their inheritance to support their father’s criminal defense, “if 
necessary,” and the majority considered this admission to be a 
clear statement that if they inherit they intend to confer a benefit 
upon David.15 
Finally, the majority rebutted the dissent’s argument that the 
majority’s holding added an ‘issue’ “category of prohibited 
beneficiaries” and construed the Act “‘limitlessly’” by explaining 
that their holding is limited to “the facts of this case, in which 
there is no dispute that the plaintiffs’ taking under Shelley’s will 
unquestionably would confer a benefit upon David” but that this 
will not always be the case when dealing with contingent 
beneficiaries.16  Also, the dissent’s argument that the benefit was 
not deriving from the “‘death of the decedent’” as required by the 
statute but is “‘one step removed’” was rebutted by the majority’s 
decision that the “explicit language of the Act [] forbids a slayer 
from benefitting or acquiring property ‘in any way as a result of 
the death of the decedent.’”17 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave great weight to the 
intent of the Act,18 coming to a conclusion that seemingly 
embraces such intent.  The intent of the Act, to “ensure that a 
slayer does not benefit from his or her wrongdoing”19 certainly 
appears to be met by preventing David, the slayer, from 
benefitting through his children, who stated on record that they 
 13.  See id. at 292–93. 
 14.  Id. at 293.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id. at 293–94 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2) (Robinson, J., & 
Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 17.  See id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2); (Robinson, J., & Flaherty, 
J., dissenting). 
 18.  See id. at 292, 294. 
 19.  Id. at 292–93 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2). 
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would use their inheritance to pay for his defense. However, in 
this question of first impression, the Court may not have given the 
proper consideration to the plain language of the Act.20  The 
contention of the dissent, that Jennifer and Jeremy do not fall into 
either of the two categories of people prohibited from receiving a 
benefit from the death of the testatrix and that the benefit to 
David is not deriving from the “‘death of the decedent’” as required 
by the statute but is “one step removed,” are important arguments 
and, although the majority attempted to rebut these arguments in 
its analysis, there are still factors, addressed below, that are 
worth consideration.21 
The Act states that “[n]either the slayer nor any person 
claiming through him or her shall in any way acquire any 
property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the 
decedent.”22  Under the plain language of this statute, the 
restrictions contained therein are that the slayer himself, or 
“those claiming through him”23 are barred from inheritance if the 
benefit is “the result of the death of the decedent.”24 The 
reasoning behind the majority’s holding is that the slayer cannot 
benefit “‘in any way’” even if the benefit to the slayer is “one step 
removed from the ‘death of the decedent’” and even if the 
inheritance is being taken from a party not indicated in the 
statute and who is specifically named by the decedent.25 The 
majority, does not appear to be basing its conclusion on the 
language of the Act and the plaintiffs’ claim to the inheritance as 
beneficiaries, as much as it is basing its conclusion on the way the 
plaintiffs intend on using their inheritance, as such use may 
benefit the slayer.26 
The majority may be interpreting the statute too broadly by 
restricting the inheritance of named beneficiaries on the basis of 
the manner in which they may want to use their inheritance in 
 20.  See id. at 285, 292–94.  
 21.  See id. at 293–95 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2).   
 22.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2.  
 23.  See id.; The majority stated, “it is clear that plaintiffs are not 
claiming through the slayer. Rather, they seek their share explicitly under 
the terms of Shelley’s will.”  Swain, 57 A.3d at 291.  
 24.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2; Swain, 57 A.3d at 294–95. 
 25.  See Swain, 57 A.3d at 293–94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2). 
 26.  See id. at 292–94. 
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the future.27  The majority’s decision, therefore, appears to be 
opening the door to prohibiting from inheritance anyone who may, 
at some point in the future, “confer a benefit on the slayer,” 
because a benefit derived by the slayer “‘in any way’” would be 
prohibited.28  This holding is not only a disincentive to similarly 
situated beneficiaries from testifying as to their intended use of 
their inheritance but it is a punishment to named beneficiaries 
who have done nothing wrong because they volunteered 
information on their possible intended use.29  Furthermore, the 
majority notes that David’s murder conviction was overturned 
and, therefore, there may not even be a benefit conferred to him 
by the plaintiffs, but instead, the inheritance would serve to 
benefit the plaintiffs, themselves, as “reimbursement for money 
already spent for David’s benefit.”30  This holding, therefore, is not 
only a punishment to named beneficiaries for their possible 
intended use of their inheritance but is a punishment to named 
beneficiaries for the completely legal way in which they chose to 
spent their money in the past.31  Thus, though the majority has 
based its decision on the intent of the Act by considering the 
possibility that the slayer may benefit from the plaintiffs’ 
inheritance, it appears to go beyond the true intent of the Act, as 
expressed in its plain language, by focusing in on one part of the 
text and interpreting it so broadly as to ignore the restrictive 
language in the Act.32 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that even though the 
Act does not specifically bar inheritance by a slayer’s issue, the 
Act does bar a slayer from benefitting “‘in any way . . . as the 
 27.  See id. at 292–95. 
 28.  See id. (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2). 
 29.  See id. at 294.  
 30.  See id. at 293 n.21.  
 31.  See id. at 293–94 n.21. 
 32.  The intent of the Act is “ensur[ing] that a slayer does not benefit 
from his or her wrongdoing.”  The intent can also be found in the plain 
language of the Act, restricting those prohibited beneficiaries to “the slayer 
[and] any person claiming through him or her.”  The majority, however, only 
appears to focus on the language that the slayer shall not, “in any way . . . 
receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent.”  See id. at 292–
94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2) (emphasis added).  
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result of the death of the decedent.’”33  The Act, therefore, 
according to the majority, barred the step children of the decedent 
from inheriting under the decedent’s will because the slayer would 
benefit from decedent’s death if her stepchildren, also the slayer’s 
issues, inherited under her will and used their inheritance to 
financially support his defense.34  There is, however, a compelling 
argument that the Court has gone too far by using the Act to 
prohibit an inheritance based on the way in which the beneficiary 
might use that inheritance in the future. 
 
Charlene Pratt 
 33.  See id. at 293–94 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-1.1-2). 
 34.  See id. at 293. 
 
ELLIS.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:43 PM 
998 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:998 
Workers’ Compensation.  Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 A.3d 510 
(R.I. 2013).  In order for an employee’s injury to be compensable under 
Rhode Island’s workers’ compensation laws, the injury must occur during 
the period of employment, at a location where the employee is reasonably 
expected to be, and while the employee is reasonably fulfilling duties of the 
employment.  Rhode Island adopts an “actual-risk” test to determine if an 
employee’s injury arose out of the course of employment.  In essence, the 
employer must subject the employee to the actual risk that resulted in the 
employee’s injuries.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that dangers 
associated with the use of the streets are an actual risk of employment, if the 
employer requires the employee to use the streets.  Additionally, an 
unprovoked assault can be considered a danger of the streets, dependent 
upon the area that the assault occurs in. 
 
FACTS AND TRAVEL 
On September 17, 2007, Paul Ellis (“Ellis”) was sent by his 
employer, Verizon New England, Inc. (“Verizon”), to repair 
outdoor cable lines.1 The lines were located on Union Avenue in 
the West End of Providence, Rhode Island.2  When Ellis arrived at 
the job site, he witnessed a man shouting statements such as, 
“The country is going down.  The President is dead.”3  Ellis 
initially ignored the man and continued to repair the cable lines; 
however, he eventually approached the stranger.4  The stranger 
did not verbally respond, but instead struck Ellis several times in 
the head with a piece of wood.5 The stranger fled the scene, but 
was later apprehended by authorities and criminally indicted.6 
Ellis filed suit against Verizon in Workers’ Compensation 
Court.7 The trial court stated that in order for an employee’s 
injury to be compensable under Rhode Island’s workers’ 
 1.  Ellis v. Verizon New England, Inc., 63 A.3d 510, 512 (R.I. 2013). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id.  The injury resulted in two different wounds to Ellis’ head and 
required fourteen staples to close his lacerations.  Id. Ellis did not return to 
work for approximately two months after the assault.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
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compensation laws, a nexus is required between the injury and 
the conditions of the employment.8  Specifically, the employer 
must subject the employee to the actual risk that caused the 
injuries sustained.9  Ellis offered testimony from James Lucht, the 
Information Group Director of Providence Plan, an organization 
that “compiles and aggregates statistics on violent crimes in 
various Providence neighborhoods.”10  Lucht testified that the 
West End was a hot spot for violent crime based on data from 
2002 to 2007.11 The majority of the data was publicly available; 
however, the statistical breakdown of specific crimes was not 
publicly available.12 Therefore, the trial court held that the 
publicly unavailable statistics were inadmissible because Verizon 
could not be held accountable for information that it could not be 
aware of.13  Further, Ellis’ supervisor testified at trial that he was 
unaware of any assaults that occurred in the West End area on 
Verizon employees.14  Ellis’ workers’ compensation benefits were 
denied because he failed to differentiate between the types of 
crimes associated with the West End and was unable to establish 
Verizon’s knowledge of the statistical data for the area.15  
Therefore, the trial judge held that Verizon did not subject Ellis to 
the actual risk that caused his injuries.16 
Ellis appealed and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling, holding that “the trial judge did not err in 
determining that the evidence adduced at trial failed to establish 
 8.  Id. at 513.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-1 (2003) (“ . . . receives a 
personal injury arising out of employment, connected and referable to the 
employment . . . ”). 
 9.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 513. 
 10.  Id. at 512.  
 11.  Id. Lucht testified that “‘[v]iolent crimes’ included murder, sexual 
assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.” Id.  
 12.  Id. at 512–13. 
 13.  Id. at 513. 
 14.  Id. at 512.  Ellis’ supervisor was tenured with the company and had 
worked with Verizon for thirty-nine years. Id.  Despite the lack of knowledge 
of prior assaults in the area, Verizon sent employees to the neighborhood in 
pairs while the assailant was at large and continued to reassign employees 
that were unwilling to work in the area for weeks afterwards.  Id. 
 15.  Id. at 513.  Under Rhode Island workers’ compensation law, the 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing the connection between the injury and 
the conditions of the employment. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-1 (2003). See also 
Toolin v. Aquidneck Island Med. Res., 668 A.2d 639, 640 (R.I. 1995). 
 16.  Ellis, 510 A.3d at 513. 
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that this random assault was an actual risk of Ellis’s 
employment.”17  A writ of certiorari was granted by the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court.18  The Court reviewed only one of the four 
issues considered on appeal:  if street perils,19 in particular an 
unprovoked assault,20 of the West End were an actual risk of Ellis’ 
employment.21 
 
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING 
The issue of whether there is a nexus between a plaintiff’s 
injury and the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment in a 
workers’ compensation claim is “a mixed question of law and 
fact.”22  The Court shall accept the findings of fact from the trial 
court; however, if the facts are undisputed, the issue is purely a 
question of law and the Court may substitute the judgment.23 
The Court adopted a three-prong test to determine if a nexus 
existed between the injuries sustained and the employee’s 
conditions of employment: 
We first inquire whether the injury occurred within the 
period of the employee’s employment.  Next, we examine 
the situs of the injury to determine whether it occurred at 
a place where the employee might reasonably have been 
expected to be.  Third, we inquire whether the employee 
was reasonably fulfilling the duties of his or her job at the 
time of the injury or was performing some task incidental 
to those conditions under which those duties were to be 
performed.24 
The Court only found the third prong to be at issue25 and adopted 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. 
 19.  A street peril is a danger that is associated with the use of the 
streets.  See generally id. at 516. 
 20.  An unprovoked assault is different from an assault specifically 
directed at an individual for personal reasons. Id. at 515 n.2. See, e.g., 
Gaudette v. Glass-Kraft, Inc. 163 A.2d 23 (R.I. 1960).  
 21.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 514.  
 22.  Id. at 513–14. 
 23.  Id. at 514.  
 24.  Id. at 514–15. 
 25.  Prongs one and two were not at issue because it was undisputed that 
the assault occurred during Ellis’ work hours and at a location where Verizon 
required him to be.  Id. at 515. 
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the actual-risk test to determine if the injury arose out of the 
course of employment.26  Under the actual-risk test, an injury 
that arises from an actual risk of the particular employment is 
compensable, even if the risk is one that is general to the 
community.27  Specifically, the Court considered if street perils 
were compensable under the actual-risk test, and if so, if an 
unprovoked assault is considered a street peril.28 
Reluctant to broaden the scope of the actual-risk test too far 
and risk a flood of workers’ compensation claims, the Court turned 
to the overarching policy of the governing laws.29  On one side of 
the scale, the Court recognized that workers’ compensation 
redress is available to ensure that employees have a means to 
provide for medical and financial ends if they are injured during 
employment.30  The Court reasoned that an employer is better 
situated to carry the burden that may result from the risks of his 
employment than the employee.31 However, despite the 
humanitarian underpinning of workers’ compensation litigation, 
the Court additionally acknowledged that the Legislature did not 
intend to open the floodgates and compensate every employee 
injured during the course of their employment.32 
Policy considerations aside, the Court reviewed applicable 
precedent and persuasive authority in order to determine if 
streets perils can be an actual risk of employment and if an 
unprovoked assault can be considered a street peril.33  In 
 26.  Id. The Court mentions two other known approaches for determining 
if prong-three is met: “increased-risk” test (“[I]njury is compensable if the 
employment increased the amount of exposure to a general risk that is not 
unique to that employment but, rather, is one to which the general public is 
exposed”) and “positional-risk” test (“ . . . essentially applies a ‘but-for’ 
analysis . . . ”).   Id.  See generally 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, 
LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW § 3.03 at 3–5; § 3.04 at 3–5, § 3.05 at 
3–6 (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2012). 
 27.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 515. 
 28.  Id. at 515–16. 
 29.  Id. at 517. 
 30.  Id.  
 31.  Id.  See also infra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 32.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 517. See, e.g., Zuchowski v. U.S. Rubber Co., 229 
A.2d 61, 65–66 (R.I. 1967) (stating that allowing compensation for all injuries 
that occur during the course of employment would be to treat employers as 
insurance companies). 
 33.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 516, 518. 
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preceding case law,34 Rhode Island recognized that the risks of 
using the public streets, such as car accidents, can be actual risks 
of employment if the employer requires the employee to use the 
streets.35  Therefore, the Court recognized that Ellis’ injuries 
would have been compensable had he been struck by an 
automobile while crossing the street because Verizon required 
Ellis to use the streets.36  However instead of Ellis’ injuries 
resulting from an automobile accident, the injuries were caused 
from a stranger that was “at least slightly off his rocker.”37  
Nevertheless, the Court found “no meaningful difference” between 
the two risks and reasoned that “in either instance, the possibility 
of injury is an actual risk to which employees are necessarily 
exposed if they are required by their employees to travel on public 
roads.”38  Additionally, the Court looked to the New York Court of 
Appeals39 to reinforce its expansion of street perils.40 With 
reliance on Katz v. Kadans & Company, the Court recognized that 
urban streets are filled with “street brawlers, highwaymen, 
escaping criminals, [and] violent madmen” and with using the 
streets comes the risk of engagement with such “dangerous 
characters.”41  Even so, the Court cautioned that street perils 
 34.  See, e.g., Toolin, 668 A.2d at 641 (holding that an automobile 
accident that occurred while the plaintiff was traveling from appointment to 
appointment for her employer was an actual risk of the employment); Branco 
v. Leviton Mnfg. Co., 518 A.2d 621, 623 (R.I. 1986) (holding that being struck 
by an automobile while crossing an intersection from an employee parking lot 
was an actual risk of employment); Sullivan v. State, 151 A.2d 360, 361–62 
(R.I. 1959) (holding that being struck by an automobile while using the 
highway to retrieve refreshments for an employer was an actual risk of 
employment). But see Nowicki v. Bryne, 54 A.2d 7, 8–9 (R.I. 1947) (failing to 
hold that a stray bullet crossing the street, encountered while departing from 
work, was an actual risk of employment). 
 35.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 516. 
 36.  Id. at 517.  In order for Ellis to repair the outdoor cable lines he had 
to park his work vehicle on the street and walk to and from that location. Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 134 N.E. 330, 331 (N.Y. 1922) (holding 
that stabbing injuries sustained by a chauffeur during employment hours 
were compensable because the risk of being stabbed by an insane man was 
incidental to the conditions of his employment). 
 40.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.  
 41.  Id. (quoting Katz, 134 N.E. at 331).  With reliance on Katz, the Court 
accepted that the streets encompass a variety of actual risks outside of 
automobile accidents. Id. 
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should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis and should only satisfy 
the actual-risk test if the employer requires the employee to use 
the streets which encompass such perils.42 
The Court concisely summarized its holding and stated:  “the 
risks of the street are the risks of employment, if the employment 
requires the employee’s use of the street.”43 Therefore, street 
perils were an actual risk of Ellis’ employment because Verizon 
required Ellis to work on the streets on a regular basis.44  
Moreover, the Court expanded the definition of street peril and 
held that a “random assault by a stranger” in an urban area was a 
street peril under the circumstances.45  Thus, Ellis’ injuries were 
compensable under Rhode Island workers’ compensation laws 
because they resulted from an actual risk that Verizon subjected 
him to, namely the street peril of an unprovoked assault.46 
 
COMMENTARY 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court correctly and appropriately 
expanded the scope of the actual-risk test.  The Court considered 
public policy, legislative intent, Rhode Island precedent and 
precedent of neighboring states to ensure that the floodgates to 
workers’ compensation would not explode.47 The Court 
emphasized a case-by-case approach when considering various 
street perils as actual risks and emphasized that the employer 
must subject the employee to such risks in order for the injury to 
be compensable.48 
Unfortunately there are a wide range of street perils 
associated with urban city streets that extend beyond automobile 
accidents.49  Many of these risks can pose greater danger than the 
danger associated with other employment tasks.50  If an employer 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. (quoting Hudson v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 597, 
602 (Tenn. 1979)). 
 44.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See supra notes 30–32, 34–35, 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 48.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.  
 49.  See, e.g., Katz, 134 N.E. at 331 (stating examples of different types of 
street perils associated with urban areas to include:  fragmented pavements, 
hostile crowds, ferocious animals, fleeing criminals, police chase and gunfire). 
 50.  For example, the injuries associated with a slip and fall that 
 
ELLIS.SURVEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:43 PM 
1004ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:998 
chooses to subject an employee to these (often escalated) risks of 
the streets, the employer should bear the burden of compensation 
if the risk manifests itself into actual harm.51  The employer is 
often in a better position to bear the burden of compensation 
because the State of Rhode Island requires all employers52 to 
obtain workers’ compensation insurance.53  Although employers 
should not be used as insurance agencies in workers’ 
compensation litigation, Rhode Island workers’ compensation laws 
require employers to act as an intermediary to insurance 
companies.54  Between two “innocent” parties, the insured 
employer is better equipped to bear any loss than a potentially 
insolvent plaintiff.55  Nonetheless, regardless of the insurance 
requirement imposed on Rhode Island employers, it is still 
essential to maintain control over the compensability of injuries 
that occur in the employment context to avoid overcompensation 
and the possibility of illegitimate claims.56 
Safeguards are in place to ensure that workers’ compensation 
benefits are not abused.57  A plaintiff has the burden to prove that 
occurred while a janitor is mopping a high school hallway will most likely be 
less severe than the injuries associated with a mugging that takes place as 
the janitor disposes of the trash in a dumpster across the street in an urban 
neighborhood.  
 51.  See Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.  It should also be noted that injuries from 
some forms of street perils may have little chance for recovery in the 
traditional tort system. For instance, in Ellis, it was unlikely that the 
plaintiff could have filed an intentional tort against his assailant and 
recovered from a crazed stranger on the streets.  Generally see id.   Therefore, 
it is more appropriate for a risk-subjecting employer to bear the burden than 
an innocent plaintiff.  Id. at 517. 
 52.  Employer is defined as “[e]very person, firm, and private corporation, 
including any public service corporation, including the state, that regularly 
employs employees in the same business or in or about the same 
establishment under any contract of hire, express or implied, and a city or 
town in this state that votes to accept the provision of those chapters in the 
manner provided . . . ” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-6 (2003). 
 53.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-36-1 (2003). 
 54.  See id.  See also supra note 32.  
 55.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-36-1 (2003). 
 56.  Rhode Island also regulates the forms of workers’ compensation 
benefits.  See, e.g., Bissonnette v. Fed. Dairy Co., Inc., 472 A.2d 1223, 1226 
(R.I. 1984) (holding that “pain is not compensable under [Rhode Island’s] 
compensation statute”); Provencher v. Glass-Kraft, Inc., 264 A.2d 916, 919 
(R.I. 1970). 
 57.  For example, using a case-by-case approach instead of adopting a 
broader scope of risk approach.  See Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518. 
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his injuries are compensable under the three-prong test58 and 
specifically, that his employer subjected him to an actual risk that 
resulted in harm.59  The Rhode Island Supreme Court adhered to 
the general rules governing workers’ compensation benefits and 
acknowledged that the employment context often encompasses 
risks that may not be generally thought of but, that employees are 
still forced to face.60 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the actual-risk test 
to determine if an employee’s injury arose out of the context of the 
employment.61  The Court held that street perils, in particular a 
random assault by a stranger, are an actual risk of employment if 
the employer requires the employee to use the streets.62  
Additionally, the sufficiency of a particular street peril under the 
actual-risk test and whether the employer actually subjected the 
employee to such risk should be considered on a case-by-case basis 
to retain structure and to balance policy considerations.63  
Therefore, if an employer requires an employee to use the streets 
and a street peril associated with that area results in an actual 
injury, the injury is compensable under Rhode Island’s workers’ 
compensation laws.64 
 
Nicole M. Manzo 
 
 58.  See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 59.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 515. 
 60.  See id. at 517–18.  
 61.  Id. at 515. 
 62.  Id. at 518.  
 63.  Id. at 517–18. 
 64.  Ellis, 63 A.3d at 518.  The injury would be compensable so long as 
the first two prongs of the adopted test were satisfied. See supra note 26. 
 
 2013 RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC LAWS 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 004, 005.  An Act Relating to 
Domestic Relations – Persons Eligible to Marry.  As amended, this 
law redefines persons eligible to marry in Rhode Island.  The 
“Equal access to marriage” section, § 15-1-1, provides that “any 
person who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of 
chapters 15-1 and 15-2 may marry any other eligible person 
regardless of gender;” thus, allowing same-sex marriage.  
Meanwhile, § 15-1-2 was renamed to forbid kindred marriages, 
and §15-1-3 remains to void any incestuous marriages.  Under 
§15-1-5, bigamous marriages are void, as are marriages where 
either of the parties were mentally incompetent at the time of the 
marriage. 
The Act added §§15-1-7 to 15-1-9 to address marriage 
codification, the recognition of relationships entered into in 
another state or jurisdiction, and the applicability of state laws to 
marriages not recognized by federal law, respectively.  Section 15-
1-7 reiterates that “marriage is the legally recognized union of two 
(2) people,” and that interpretation of the martial or familial 
relationship must be construed consistently with this definition 
throughout all areas of the law.  Next, section 15-1-8 provides that 
if two persons are within Rhode Island’s jurisdiction and “have a 
legal union other than a marriage that provides substantially the 
same rights, benefits, and responsibilities as a marriage,” and is 
not expressly prohibited by Rhode Island law, then that marriage 
is recognized under Rhode Island law. Also, section 15-1-9 extends 
any provisions and benefits of Rhode Island law to anyone 
recognized as a spouse under Rhode Island law, regardless of 
federal recognition of that individual as a spouse. 
Section 15-3-6.1 was added to protect freedom of religion in 
marriage and provides that religious institutions have “exclusive 
control over its own religious doctrine, policy and teachings 
regarding who may marry within its faith, and on what terms,” 
consistent with §15-1-2 (forbidding kindred marriages), §15-1-3 
(incestuous marriages void), §15-1-4 (marriages of kindred allowed 
by the Jewish religion), and §15-1-5 (bigamous marriages void).  
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required to officiate or solemnize any marriage and is immune 
from any civil suit for refusing to do so.  The state and local 
government may not “base a decision to penalize, withhold 
benefits from, or refuse to contract with” any such church or 
religious denominations for refusing to solemnize a marriage. 
Section 15-3.1-12 was added to merge civil unions into 
marriages by action of the parties of a civil union, provided that 
these parties are otherwise eligible to marry under the amended 
Rhode Island law, and the parties to the marriage will be the 
same as the parties to the civil union.  Upon solemnization of the 
marriage and filing for a marriage license pursuant to §15-2-1, the 
civil union is merged into a marriage effective as of the date of the 
recording of the marriage certificate.  Alternatively, parties to a 
civil union may apply to the clerk of the town or city in which 
their civil union was recorded and, at no additional expense or 
requirements, have the union legally designated and recorded as a 
marriage.  Section 15-3.1-13 provides that the date the marriage 
certificate is recorded is the recognized date of marriage between 
the parties. 
The sections entitled “Civil Unions” were repealed entirely. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 029, 044.  An Act Relating to 
Courts and Civil Procedure – General Powers of Supreme and 
Superior Courts.  This Act requires the approval of the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court regarding any rules that regulate the 
practice, procedure, and business of the state’s Workers’ 
Compensation Court. This change is consistent with the 
procedures that are currently in effect for the Superior, Family, 
and District Courts, as well as the Traffic Tribunal in Rhode 
Island.  Further, the Workers’ Compensation Court is now 
included within the judicial bodies that are empowered to “make 
the rules for regulating practice, procedure and business therein.” 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 148, 197.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Children.  The Rhode Island General 
Assembly amended the law to allow the tattooing of minors under 
the age of eighteen (18) for medical purposes.  In order for this 
exception to apply, the minor must be accompanied by a parent or 
legal guardian.  Both parties must provide the tattoo artist with 
valid government-issued, photo identification and must submit 
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written proof that he/she is the minor’s parent or guardian, and a 
physician’s written notarization of consent for the tattoo.  The 
tattoo artist must be properly licensed in the state of Rhode Island 
and is charged with proper maintenance of their clients’ records.  
If the tattoo artist makes a good faith effort to validate the 
identities of the minor and parent or guardian but is deceived, the 
artist shall not be charged with violation of this law.  Upon first 
conviction of violation of this law, the maximum penalty shall be a 
fine not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300); but upon 
subsequent violations resulting in conviction, the violation will be 
classified as a misdemeanor and accompanied by a fine of up to 
five hundred dollars ($500).  It is within the power of the 
Department of Health to create regulations relating to compliance 
with this law as well as create applications and certificates 
necessary to implementing this law. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 158, 233. An Act Relating to 
Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals.  
Should a parent not be able to care for a person with 
developmental disabilities, this act allows an interested and 
approved relative (such as an adult sibling) to serve as a shared 
living provider subject to already-existing rules and receive the 
financial aid or subsidies.  The Director of Mental Health, 
Retardation, and Hospitals continues to be authorized to set 
regulations relating to care by approved parents and now also by 
approved relatives of persons with developmental disabilities.  
This act also directs the Department of Behavioral Healthcare, 
Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals to “develop options, 
fiscal impact analysis, and recommendations for the expansion of 
shared living services to siblings of individuals with 
developmental disabilities who are no longer able to be cared for 
at home by aging parents.” 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 165, 222.  An Act Relating To 
Health and Safety – Licensing of Massage Therapy 
Establishments. This act creates various substantive and 
procedural changes in licensing and regulating the massage 
therapy profession, including the establishment of a seven-
member board appointed by the director of health and approved 
by the governor.  In part, this act serves to protect the profession 
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through prohibiting unlicensed persons from holding themselves 
out as massage therapists under any of nine terms or their 
derivatives, codifying licensing standards, and suggesting further 
possible regulations for the board’s consideration. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 185, 235.  An Act Relating To 
Towns And Cities – Subdivision Of Land.  This act modernizes 
public hearing and notice requirements with an additional 
requirement that municipalities establish and maintain an 
electronic public notice registry, allowing any person or entity to 
register for electronic notice of any changes to local regulations.  
Municipalities are also encouraged to provide notice to interested 
parties and to the general public of the new registry. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 190, 200.  An Act Relating to 
Domestic Relations – Divorce and Separation.  As amended, this 
act denies an individual custody of, or visitation with, a child if 
that individual has been convicted of, or pled nolo contender, to a 
violation of §11-37-2 (first degree sexual assault), §11-37-4 (second 
degree sexual assault), or §11-37-8.1 (first degree child 
molestation sexual assault), or a comparable law of another 
jurisdiction, and the child in question was conceived as a result of 
that violation.  However, the court may order supervised visitation 
and counseling if, after a hearing by the family court, it finds that 
the natural mother or legal guardian consents to visitation with 
the child, and the court determines visitation is in the best 
interest of the child. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 192, 240.  An Act Relating to 
Bryant University.  Amended to state that the town of Smithfield 
shall, from March 1, 2014 onward, charge any private, non-profit 
college or university located and operating within its town for the 
costs of its usage of police, fire, and rescue services, unless 
specifically reimbursed otherwise. However, colleges and 
universities in Smithfield are free to enter into a memorandum of 
agreement with the town to stipulate alternative billing 
agreements. 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 193, 371.  An Act Relating to 
Alcoholic Beverages – Regulation of Sales.  As amended, this law 
allows retail Class A liquor license holders to open beginning at 
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10:00 a.m. on Sundays instead of noon, as was previously 
authorized.  The law still requires license holders to close no later 
than 6:00 p.m. on Sundays, unless the following Monday is a 
holiday, in which event it is permissible to stay open no later than 
9:00 p.m.   
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 255, 432.  An Act Relating to 
Courts and Civil Procedure – Particular Actions – Small Claims 
and Consumer Claims.  As amended, this law increases the 
jurisdictional limit on counterclaims properly filed in small claims 
court from one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500) to two 
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 271, 361.  An Act Relating To 
Public Utilities And Carriers – Property Assessed Clean Energy - 
Residential Program.  This law establishes a new financing 
program, “Property-Assessed Clean Energy” (PACE), which lowers 
the financial barriers to homeowners associated with energy 
upgrades.  PACE financing allows loans of up to twenty years in 
duration at low fixed rates.  Liens established through PACE are 
subordinate to previously existing liens but superior to liens 
created after the PACE filing; however, participating financial 
institutions are also protected through a Loan Loss Reserve Fund 
(LLRF).  The Office of Energy Resources contracts with approved 
financial institutions to manage a LLRF with a minimum deposit 
of one million dollars, backed by American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, Department of Energy State Energy Program 
funds.  Municipalities need not raise bonds and are not liable for 
the performance of the program.  Municipalities may also receive 
assistance from Rhode Island’s Office of Energy Resources in 
implementing and publicizing the PACE program.  The law 
requires the Office of Energy Resources to, beginning on or before 
July 1, 2014, publish on its website a list of the types of eligible 
energy efficiency and renewable projects that are available, 
respond to municipal requests for information, offer 
administrative and technical assistance to participating 
municipalities, and develop and offer informational resources to 
help residents make best use of the PACE program. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 291, 393.  An Act Relating to Motor 
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and Other Vehicles – Miscellaneous Rules.  This Act increases the 
penalties for sending text messages while operating a motor 
vehicle.  A conviction for a first violation of this law can now result 
in an eighty-five dollar ($85) fine, up to a thirty (30) day license 
suspension, or a combination of both.  For a subsequent violation, 
conviction can result in a one hundred dollar ($100) fine, up to a 
three (3) month license suspension, or both.  A third violation and 
any thereafter, can now result in a one hundred twenty-five dollar 
($125) fine, up to a six (6) month license suspension, or both. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 293, 402.  An Act Relating to 
Courts and Civil Procedure – General Powers of Supreme and 
Superior Courts.  This section was amended to increase the 
“reasonable” arbitration cost that the court could charge to 
litigants from three hundred dollars ($300) to five hundred dollars 
($500).  Also, if a party wishes to reject an arbitration award and 
proceed to trial, the court may now order a three hundred dollar 
($300) filing fee in conjunction with the demand, as opposed to the 
previous two hundred dollar ($200) fee. The amendment mandates 
that if both parties reject the arbiter’s award, then the first filing 
fee received will designate the party rejecting the award, whereas 
it was previously apportioned amongst the parties. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 327, 392.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Flags and Emblems.  This section was 
amended to add the attorney general, deputy attorney general, 
assistant or special assistant attorney general to the list of public 
officers, impersonation of which results in a violation of this law 
and up to one (1) year imprisonment or a one thousand dollar 
($1,000) fine upon conviction. This act stipulates that an 
unauthorized person, firm, or corporation cannot use the 
department of the attorney general’s emblem in order to 
perpetrate fraud, deceit, or harm.  Conviction of using the emblem 
in such a manner is a misdemeanor and subjects the individual to 
a one (1) year term of imprisonment, a fine of up to five hundred 
dollars ($500), or both. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 338, 424.  An Act Relating To Labor 
And Labor Relations – Minimum Wage.  This amendment raises 
the minimum wage to $8 per hour beginning on January 1, 2014 
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for approximately 23,000 Rhode Island workers and requires 
annual adjustments by the Department of Labor and Training 
commencing January 1, 2015.  The amendment also requires the 
Rhode Island minimum wage rate to automatically increase to 
fifteen cents ($.15) above the rate set in the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, “if the federal minimum wage equals or becomes higher than 
the state minimum.” 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 334, 415.  An Act Relating to 
Delinquent and Dependent Children – Proceedings in Family 
Court.  As amended, this law requires a probation counselor to file 
a petition in family court alleging a violation of probation if, at 
any time during a child’s probationary period, he is charged with 
an additional and subsequent offense, that if committed by an 
adult would constitute a felony.  A probation counselor has 
discretion to file a petition in the family court alleging the same if, 
during the child’s probationary term, he is charged with an 
additional and subsequent “wayward/disobedient or status 
offense.”  Prior to the amendment, a probation counselor only had 
an obligation, at the end of the child’s probationary period, to 
report to the court regarding the child’s conduct during the 
probationary period.   
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 336, 429.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Children.  As amended, this law includes a 
new section requiring, among other things, signs provided by the 
department of behavioral healthcare, developmental disabilities, 
and hospitals to include the following language, in both English 
and Spanish: 
“WARNING: SMOKING CIGARETTES CONTRIBUTES TO 
LUNG DISEASE, CANCER, HEART DISEASE, STROKE AND 
RESPIRATORY ILLNESS AND DURING PREGNANCY MAY 
RESULT IN LOW BIRTH WEIGHT AND PREMATURE BIRTH.” 
The signs must be white with red lettering, at least one-
quarter of an inch high, and must also include information 
pertaining to resources available in Rhode Island for those who 
wish to quit using tobacco products.  These signs, along with any 
and all signs concerning the sale of tobacco products to individuals 
under the age of 18, must be displayed prominently wherever 
tobacco products are sold and must also be available electronically 
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in both English and Spanish on the department of behavioral 
healthcare, developmental disabilities, and hospitals’ websites. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 454, 481.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses.  This law was amended to include regulations 
for firearms where there is no maker’s name, model, 
manufacturer’s number or other identifying marks on the firearm.  
Should a firearm be missing such identification, without obtaining 
recertification paperwork, a person shall not knowingly possess, 
transport, or receive any such firearm.  Possession of a firearm, 
without recertification paperwork, without its identifying marks 
or with such marks that have been altered, removed, or 
obliterated constitutes prima facie evidence that the individual in 
possession of the firearm altered, removed, or obliterated the 
identifying mark(s).  Recertification paperwork may be obtained 
by the person in possession of such a firearm, with proof of 
ownership and/or transfer from a Federal Firearms License (FFL) 
dealer, from a Rhode Island based licensed firearms business 
owner who is also an FFL dealer or from a local police chief or 
department official, if there has only been partial damage to the 
firearm’s identifying mark(s).  Within sixty (60) days, the firearms 
business owner, local police chief, or police department official 
shall recertify the firearm to the person who presented it and 
certify the identification information in a notarized document, or if 
there are no identification markers on the firearm, then any other 
mark that has been only partially damages and thus is still 
identifiable and traceable to the record owner so long as the 
certifying party is reasonably able to verify the ownership of the 
firearm and its identifying marks.  If a recertified firearm is sold 
or transferred or a report by the record owner is submitted that 
the firearm was stolen, the recertification documentation is 
immediately voided.  Violation of this law may result in a term of 
imprisonment for up to five (5) years, and does not apply to the 
lawful exchange of component parts of firearms nor to antique and 
collectible weapons lawfully in firearm collectors’ and dealers’ 
possession. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 455, 464.  An Act Relating to 
Criminal Offenses – Firearm Violations.  This law created Section 
11-47-5.2, “Possession of a stolen firearm,” thereafter making it a 
PUBLIC.LAWS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  3:45 PM 
1014 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:1006 
felony to possess a firearm that one knows to be stolen and 
providing the appropriate sentencing guidelines.  Under the new 
law, any person found in violation is to be sentenced to no less 
than three (3) and not more than fifteen (15) years of 
imprisonment, which is an increase from the previous maximum 
of ten (10) years. 
 
2013 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 462, 463.  An Act Relating to 
Alcoholic Beverages – Manufacturing and Wholesale Licenses.  
This Act, as amended, provides that an alcohol manufacturer 
licensee may provide “clearly marked” samples to guests as part of 
a “tour and/or tasting” for off-premise consumption.  However, the 
Act requires that the sample beverage be manufactured at the 
licensed plant and also places a limit of three hundred seventy-
five milliliters (375 ml) per visitor for distilled spirits and seventy-
two ounces (72 oz) per visitor for malt beverages. 
 
 
 
